Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses

Graduate School

1995

The Church in Post-Transition Societies: Evidence From Eastern
Europe.
Mary L. Gautier
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Recommended Citation
Gautier, Mary L., "The Church in Post-Transition Societies: Evidence From Eastern Europe." (1995). LSU
Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6100.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6100

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UM I
film s the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
T h e q u a lity o f th is rep ro d u ction is dependent u p o n th e q u ality o f th e
co p y su b m itted .

Broken or indistinct print, colored or po o r quality

illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and im proper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did n o t send UM I a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
th e deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand com er and
continuing from left to right in equal sections w ith small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy.

Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white

photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact U M I directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeh Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

THE CHURCH IN POST-TRANSITION SOCIETIES:
EVIDENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment o f the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
The Department o f Sociology

by
Mary L. Gautier
B.A., Louisiana State University, 1987
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1990
December 1995

UMI Number: 9618290

Copyright 1995 by
Gautier, Mary L.
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 9618290
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

©Copyright 1995
M ary L. Gautier
All rights reserved

dedicated to
Fr. Pat,
because for what you have lost
in sight
you have more than compensated
in vision

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the contributions o f some very
significant people in my life to the success o f this endeavor. Fr. Andrew Greeley, o f the
National Opinion Research Center and the University o f Chicago, gave me his personal
copy o f the 1991 International Social Survey Program data. Dr. Renata Kticher and Mr.
Werner SUBlin, o f the Institut flir Demoskopie Allensbach, provided me with the 1990
World Values Survey. And I would especially like to thank Dr. Elisabeth NoelleNeumann and Dr. Frederick Weil, co-principal investigators, for the 1991 and 1992
Institut filr Demoskopie Allensbach surveys cited in this manuscript.
For their diligent guidance and unerring ability to spot the logical inconsistencies
I tried so hard to overlook I would like to thank the members of my committee: Dr.
Frederick Weil, Dr. Joachim Singelmann, Dr. Cecil Eubanks, Dr. Katharine Donato, and
Dr. Charles Tolbert. Thank you all for believing in me and guiding me through the rough
spots.
For their individual assistance, and especially because they were crucial role
models for me along the way, I would like to thank Dr. K. Jill Kiecolt, Dr. Joan Morris,
and Dr. Pamela Smock. I would like to thank Rebel Reavis for painstakingly
proofreading and providing critiques o f endless drafts o f this manuscript. I am sure that
she is as happy as I to be done with it! And finally I would like to thank my family, both
immediate and extended, for patiently enduring and confidently supporting this entire
process. I accept full responsibility for any mistakes or shortcomings to be noted within
these pages.
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER I .............................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.........................................................................5
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE................
6
Values in Society........................................................................................... 6
Civil Society and Political Culture .............................................................. 7
The Church as It Influences V alues.............................................................. 8
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL:
HOW CIVIL SOCIETY AFFECTS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC
VALUES IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES..................................... 16
CHAPTER I I ........................................................................................................................20
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES DURING
COMMUNISM ...........................................................................................20
East Germany............................................................................................... 20
Poland ............................................................
28
H ungary....................................................................................................... 38
HYPOTHESES ....................................................................................................... 47
Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition —Power from
A bove............................................................................................... 47
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic
Tradition...........................................................................................49
Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition —Power from
B elo w ............................................................................................... 51
CHAPTER III ......................................................................................................................54
DATA FOR THIS ANALYSIS...............................................................................54
VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS .......................................................... 55
Independent V ariables.................................................................................56
Dependent Variables...................................................................................67
METHODS ............................................................................................................. 91
CHAPTERIV ............................................................................................................... . . . 9 3
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE 93
Church Membership.....................................................................................93
Church Attendance..................................................................................... 102
v

Religious B e lie fs ........................................................................................ 105
Authority vs. Autonomy ............................................................................110
Family Values ...............................
112
Attitudes about Religion and Politics .......................................................119
CHAPTER V ...................................................................................................................... 129
POLITICAL VALUES OF CHURCH ATTENDERS ........................................ 129
Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition —Power from
A b o v e...............................................................................................132
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic
Tradition...........................................................................................139
Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition —Power from
B e lo w ...............................................................................................157
CHAPTER VI ...................................................................................................................... 176
DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................... 176
CO NCLUSIONS..................................................................................................... 186
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................191
VITA

197

ABSTRACT
I explore the relationship between religious affiliation and support for democratic
values in postcommunist societies. Using the Tocquevillian idea o f the institutional
learning o f democratic values within civil society, I examine three post-transition
countries o f Eastern Europe for evidence that the churches preserved and promoted
democratic values during the years o f Soviet regime control.
Comparative historical examination o f the relationship between the institutional
churches and the state during the years o f communist regime control demonstrate how the
churches worked to preserve and promote democratic values. In those countries where
the churches were marginalized and excluded from power by the state (such as Poland
and East Germany) church elites worked to promote the reemergence o f civil society.
But where the churches were able to maintain a base o f power through cooperation with
the communist regime (Hungary) church elites were less involved in the democratic
transformation process.
Survey data on democratic attitudes in Poland, Hungary, and eastern Germany in
the immediate post-transition period o f 1990-1992 demonstrate that church attenders in
these societies, similar to church attenders in western Germany, report higher levels o f
support for democratic values than non-attenders. Church attendance is strongly related
to democratic values o f confidence and trust in institutions, as well as support for a
democratic form o f government. Church attenders demonstrate more support for
democratic values in societies where the church had an instrumental role in the recreation
o f civil society (Poland and eastern Germany) than they do in Hungary, where the church
vii

cooperated with the regime and did little to promote democratic values. Some evidence
o f optimism, trust, and efficacy among church attenders in these post-transition societies
is also attributed to the church’s active participation in the transition.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
After 45 years o f totalitarian domination, churches in Eastern Europe are free
again to operate as they did before the communist takeover following World War II.
Although the churches had not been abolished outright, they were strictly constrained by
the Soviet-controlled governments and often severely repressed. Marxist teaching does
not proscribe religion, but rather considers religion to be primitive and superstitious, and
predicts that religion will tend to disappear in an enlightened communist society (Marx
1974). The official policy o f the communist governments was to tolerate the churches for
the social services they provided, while their normal practice was to do as much as
possible to discourage people from active participation.
Nevertheless, the churches managed to jy isist in the harsh environment of Soviet
totalitarianism. They not only provided social and spiritual services for the masses, they
also played an important part in the prodemocracy movement which culminated in the
democratic transformations of 1989. The churches in several of the countries of Eastern
Europe were influential in providing structural support for those groups and organizations
who sought to overthrow the Soviet regime. The churches also provided support for the
expression and preservation o f democratic values which were likewise suppressed by the
regime.
Now that the democratic transformations have taken place in most of these
formerly communist lands, it is possible for the first time to see just how much decline
I
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the churches behind the Iron Curtain have experienced, and evaluate what remains of
them. It is enlightening, surely, to examine the numbers and see what the figures for
church membership and church attendance actually are in post-communist eastern
Europe. However, church membership and attendance rates have been falling steadily
(and in some places, such as the Netherlands, even dramatically) since World War II. We
would expect church membership and attendance rates to have been significantly affected
by the years of repression.
More important to an understanding of the persistence of influence o f the
churches behind the Iron Curtain, then, is an examination of the attitudes of those who
remain affiliated with a church in eastern Europe. How much influence have the
churches been able to retain over the moral and political values o f their members? Are
Eastern European church members' values significantly different than those o f their
western brothers and sisters? In addressing these questions I will be able to explore what
remains o f the churches in Eastern Europe today after two generations of communism.
In this paper I examine the moral and political values expressed by individuals
living today in formerly communist countries. Using survey data collected in several
countries o f eastern and western Europe in 1990 and 1991,1 examine the moral and
political values o f church attenders to see how much influence over those values the
churches have been able to retain. For comparison with church members in western
European democracies who have not had to contend with state repression of churches, I
contrast several eastern European countries to the case of the western part of Germany,
which has been a successful democratic state since 1945.
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There exists a gap in the literature regarding the moral and political values of
contemporary church attenders in Eastern Europe. I propose to address this gap by
investigating the values o f Eastern European church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland
and Hungary. I chose these three specific countries of Eastern Europe because I believe
they are roughly comparable to one another in several important ways, and at the same
time share some interesting differences.
East Germany, Poland and Hungary were the first of the former Soviet bloc
countries to achieve a democratic transformation, followed closely by Czechoslovakia.
Free elections took place March 18, 1990 in East Germany and Hungary, May 27, 1990
in Poland and June 8,1990 in Czechoslovakia. All three countries have historical ties to
the West, consider themselves to be Europeans, and share a primarily Judeo-Christian
religious heritage. Although East Germany was the most advanced in terms of industrial
and economic development of all the nations in the former Soviet Bloc, Poland and
Hungary were also relatively well industrialized and economically developed. For
example, percent o f GNP in industry for 1975 was 49% for East Germany, 48% for
Poland and 39% for Hungary (East European Economies. Joint Economic Committee,
U.S. Congress, 1977).
All three countries share a somewhat western orientation. Even during the years
o f Soviet domination, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary preferred to
refer to themselves as "Central Europe" to distinguish themselves from the more eastern
orientation o f the remainder o f the Soviet Union. Historically, the distinction refers back
to the split o f the Catholic church into eastern (Orthodox) and western (Roman) spheres
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o f influence. The countries o f "Central Europe" were under the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church, as was the rest of Western Europe. The rest o f the Soviet Union was
territory that had been under the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As for
exposure to western culture, East Germany had the advantage of access to West German
TV and radio. But Poland and Hungary had Radio Free Europe and the BBC. They also
had the Roman Catholic Church. The western orientation of Catholicism and its
historical significance in both Poland and Hungary helped shape both countries' national
identification in terms o f western culture. And the global organization of Catholicism
provided links with the Western world, particularly through ties with international
organizations (Johnston 1992).
Despite the similarities o f their ancient religious histories, the particular religious
cultures of these three countries are quite different. Eastern Germany is predominantly
secular, with about 65% claiming no religious affiliation, but its primary religious
affiliation is Protestant (about 30% of the population). Poland remains predominantly
Catholic, with very few non-believers. Hungary is about 70% Catholic, about 20%
Protestant, and about 5% non-believers. Each country also experienced a continuum of
religious participation in the prodemocracy movement. Poland had very active church
participation in the prodemocracy movement, East Germans were active participants in a
few church-organized protests toward the end of the movement and during the transition,
but Hungary had practically no participation by churches in the prodemocracy movement.
These three countries have enough in common, then, to allow me to formulate a
conceptual model about church/state relationships in the totalitarian societies o f Central
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Europe, although the effect o f this relationship was unique within each country and will
be analyzed separately.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of interest in this analysis is what has remained of the churches in
eastern Europe after 45 years of communism. Are church members' attitudes different
from those of non-affiliates? What are the moral and political values of church attenders
in eastern Europe? Are they significantly different from those who do not attend? How
much influence has the church been able to maintain in these post-transition societies?
Very little research has been done on the political attitudes o f church members in
post-communist societies. There has been some historical documentation of the
persistence of churches behind the iron curtain, but in all areas under Soviet domination
the social sciences were severely repressed and compelled to reflect Marxist teaching.
Empirical social research was carefully controlled by the Soviet regime, and the few
opinion surveys that were fielded since 1945 have not been made available to the general
public. Even if such data were made available, the representativeness o f the results
would be suspect.
In contrast, the richness o f data available since the fall of communism in Eastern
Europe allows me to conduct empirical research on the political and religious values of
individuals immediately following the democratic transformations. These data are from
1990-91 and they provide a baseline measure of the extent of democratic values in
postcommunist societies at the point of their democratic transitions. Likewise, baseline
measures o f church attendance and religious beliefs allow me to examine the extent and
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depth o f secularization in Eastern Europe. In these analyses, I measure how much
influence the churches have been able to maintain in Eastern Europe and how much
influence political repression o f the churches has had on the political values of church
attenders.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Values in Society
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between institutions and
values. Research from the 1950s and 1960s generally asserted that it was the preexisting
political values which influenced the development of the subsequent political institutions
(see, for example, Stouffer 1955, Lipset 1960, Almond and Verba 1963, and Easton
1965). A reaction to this admittedly functionalist view was provided by the literature of
the 1970s and 1980s, which tended to assert the opposite - that it is the political
institutions which influence the political values of citizens (see Barnes and Kaase 1979,
Almond and Verba 1980, and Alford and Friedland 1985). These structuralist
interpretations are now being challenged by theories which suggest a synthesis between
the two poles -- an interaction between political institutions and political values (see Weil
and Gautier, eds., 1994, especially the articles by Weil, Kaase, and Steinmetz; see also
Casanova 1994).
I agree that the relationship is a complex one, with values and institutions
interacting together to produce the political culture. Another important aspect of this
relationship, though, is the realization that the various institutions of society also interact
to influence the political culture. In particular, I point out the influence of the church, as

an institution o f civil society, on the political culture. And 1 assert that the church affects
political culture in two ways —as an institution itself and through the actions of
individual church members.
Civil Society and Political Culture
Civil society is understood here as that sphere of social interaction existing
independently from the State.1 In a totalitarian state, such as the Soviet Union, civil
society is officially nonexistent, as the state ostensibly controls all aspects of public life.
However, even in a totalitarian state, structures exist which are self-organized outside the
institution of the state. In particular, churches are an example o f an institution which is
organized outside the realm of the state, which retain an autonomous, if circumscribed,
existence even while under the domination of the state.
Civil society is important to the state, for it is the arena in which political
socialization takes place. Political socialization is a very important factor in regime
support. Every state tries to socialize its citizens to assimilate its dominant political
values. Every institution of society has a role in that political socialization. And of all
the institutions o f society, such as families, schools, and other government bodies, the
churches have probably the greatest possibility of autonomous existence in civil society,
outside the realm o f direct influence by the state. Whether in a democratic or a
totalitarian society, the separation of church and state implies the autonomous existence

1 For a more thorough development of the concept of civil society see Seligman,
1992; Casanova, 1994; Cohen and Arato 1992; and Frentzel-Zagorska, 1990.
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of the church as a power in society apart from the power of the state. Therefore, the
churches can exert a powerful influence on political values.
The Church as It Influences Values
The church has long been recognized as an important institution of civil society,
significant to the regime for its support and promotion of the values important for the
political culture (see for example, Lipset 1960; Tocqueville 1969). Together with
schools, families, and a variety of political and other voluntary interest organizations,
church involvement influences political attitudes. Max Weber's (1962) comparative
study of the relationship between religion and the economy also demonstrated that
religious values and ideas can be important agents for change in society.
Tocqueville, in his classic work Democracy in America, was particularly
interested in the interplay between religion and politics. He observed that in his native
France the oppositional relationship between the Catholic church and the newly
established French liberal democracy seemed to be detrimental to both parties. But in
America there appeared to be relative harmony between Christianity and democracy. He
tried to understand and explain first the need for religion in a democratic community and
second the effect o f religion on a democratic society.
Churches influence political values in two ways. First, as an institution of civil
society the church has a direct influence through the generalized support of the regime by
the religious elite - the clergy. The church has a direct interest in maintaining the
stability of the political order, so that the power it possesses will not be diminished or
threatened. Therefore the church, through its elites, will promote and support the
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political values which will assure the maintenance of the political order as it is. This
perception o f the common good can serve to defend a traditional social order from radical
social change.
Second, the church influences the political order indirectly through the religious
values shared and promoted by individual religious believers acting in society.
Tocqueville understood this to be the most significant way that the church influences the
state. He used the word “mores” to mean the “whole moral and intellectual state of a
people” and described in detail how the church, as an institution in civil society,
“contributes to the maintenance of a democratic republic among the Americans”
(Tocqueville 1969, p. 287). He noted a shared moral consensus among believers in
America, whatever the denomination, which he attributed to a widespread Christian
culture. This common culture creates a moral climate which promotes domestic
tranquility, tolerance and civility. He described how religion, as it regulates domestic life,
also helps to promote order in the state by creating a moral community (Tocqueville
1969, p. 291). Finally, he argued that the influence of religion extends even to the
intellect, by setting ground rules which confine intellectual debate within parameters of
moderation and reason. This indirect influence of religion on the state is, for Tocqueville,
indispensable for liberal democracy: “Religion, which never intervenes directly in the
government of American society, should therefore be considered as the first of their
political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly
facilitates their use thereof’ (Tocqueville 1969, p. 292).
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The Priestly and Prophetic Influences of the Church
The Church has not always been seen as supportive of democracy. In fact,
Tocqueville lamented the unhealthy oppositional relationship between the formerly
established Catholic church and the newly formed liberal democracy in his native France.
However, churches appear to have learned over time an appreciation for democracy.
Share (1987) reports in his study o f the democratic transition in Spain how the loss of the
Church as a major ally o f the authoritarian government helped bring about Spain's
transition to democracy. Stephens (1989) also argued that the Catholic church was
instrumental in helping organize the working class as a political force in Western Europe.
More recently, Casanova (1993) discussed how the Catholic church in both Spain and
Poland played a positive role in the processes of democratization
With the exception of Tocqueville, though, prior studies focused primarily on the
role of elites in bringing about social change. I argue, with Tocqueville, that the effect of
the church on political values is more subtle than the actions of its elites. In other words,
the church operates at two levels simultaneously to affect society - at an institutional
level, where the influence o f church leaders is most clearly observed, and at the level of
the individual. And at each level there are two countervailing traditions in the church,
both influencing support for the regime. These two traditions -- the priestly and the
prophetic as they are known in political theology —have their origin in the earliest JudeoChristian tradition.
The priestly tradition was most clearly enunciated by Saint Augustine in his work
The Citv o f God (Paolucci 1962). The primary function of the state, according to
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Augustine, is the maintenance and enforcement of peace and order. Augustine says that
earthly authority descends from God, as a condition of original sin. If man were not a
sinful creature there would be no disorder, and no need for earthly authority. But the
nature o f humanity has been tainted by original sin and this sin has brought disorder into
the world. Therefore, obedience to authority is necessary to the preservation of order, no
matter what form that earthly authority takes. The priestly tradition stipulates that it is
better to be a servant to an earthly authority than to disobey that authority which comes
from God. The legitimacy of the ruler derives from his position as one chosen by God,
and his power is imposed on the people from above (see also Turner 1991, p. 179 on the
descending and ascending principles of kingship).
The prophetic tradition, in contrast, also has a long history, originating in the
writings o f the Hebrew Scriptures. This tradition calls upon the individual to speak out
against any earthly authority whenever that authority is being misused and is causing
injustice. Obedience to authority is not the highest mandate here; rather, it is the call of
the individual to speak out for righteousness and against injustice. According to the
prophetic tradition, the individual prophetic voice is called from within the community to
speak out against the existing power structure and to call for a return to justice. This call
derives from God and has a higher level of authority than any earthly authority. Because
the prophet comes usually from within the community, rather than from the hierarchy, the
prophet receives his (or her) legitimacy from within the community, and the power of the
prophet moves upward from within the community toward the existing power structure.

At both the institutional level and the individual level churches in Eastern Europe
experienced repression from the totalitarian state. And at both levels the competing
influences of the priestly tradition and the prophetic tradition operated to define the
church's relationship to the state. Church support for democratic values emerged where
the separation between church and state was sufficiently defined to allow for the gradual
recreation o f civil society by the church - at both the institutional as well as the
individual level.
At the institutional level the churches were officially repressed. Marxist teaching
considers religion primitive and nonprogressive. Churches were handicapped by formal
sanctions and church affiliation and participation were both subtly and directly
discouraged. But at the institutional level the priestly tradition o f obedience to authority
was expressed most strongly. As an institutional body the churches had perhaps their
greatest power, but at the same time they lacked a prophetic voice to speak out against
injustice. On the institutional level the churches of Eastern Europe for the most part
observed the priestly tradition of obedience to the state and managed in that way to
coexist with the state as the only semi-autonomous institution of civil society. As long as
they were left in relative peace by the state so that they could pursue their primary
purpose of promoting traditional moral values, preserving ritual and providing for the
salvation of souls, the churches were resigned to accommodate to the status quo.
Institutional opposition to the communist regime varied by country, but may be
characterized overall as sporadic and essentially conciliatory. The only exceptions to

13
this situation were the prophetic voices of a few outspoken church leaders, whose
leadership had only a moderate influence against the communist regime.
At the individual level, church attenders were also repressed and sanctioned.
Church affiliation was ridiculed as primitive and naive, and official substitutes for
traditional church functions (such as state marriage ceremonies and confirmation
ceremonies for youth) marginalized the role o f religion in individual's lives. It was at this
level that the prophetic tradition was most clearly expressed. Individual church attenders
continued to believe and to practice their faith, despite official and unofficial pressures
not to do so, and in so doing proclaimed their opposition to the regime. In some
countries, in gradually increasing numbers, individual church attenders joined ranks to
speak out and march in protest against the regime (Oberschall 1993). The influence of
the priestly tradition continued at this level in the desire for, and support of, order and
peace and a regime which would accomplish these desired goals. But the prophetic
tradition was also expressed in the protest demonstrations, in the candlelight marches in
Leipzig, and in the individuals who deliberately refused to acquiesce to the regime and its
demands.
The Church and Democratic Values
As I stated before, the church has not always been known as a staunch supporter
o f democracy. In fact, the Roman Catholic church is still very hierarchic in its
organization and has been reluctant to adopt many democratic reforms as an institution.
The Protestant churches, in contrast, have been much more democratic in their
organization and leadership. Churches in general, though, have been supportive overall
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of democratic reforms and democratic movements, particularly since the end of World
War II.
Some democratic values, such as individual and collective human rights,
individual liberty, safeguarding o f the collective common good and the dignity and worth
o f the individual are intrinsic to church teaching, whatever the denomination. These are
cherished values to those who would affiliate with a church, regardless of the official
regime form of their government. Therefore, even in communist countries, those who
chose to affiliate with a church, despite official and unofficial sanctions against it, have
continued to support those democratic values. In the face of increasing corruption,
oppression and disregard for the common good in favor of individual privilege,
committed church attenders interpreted the movement toward democracy as the
appropriate regime change necessary to support and promote the humanitarian values in
which they believed.
In a modem democratic society, the church will support and promote many
democratic values. These values promote regime stability as well as the maintenance of
the right of autonomous existence of the church. In a communist society, though, the
church is faced with a dilemma. In order to promote the stability of society it must come
to some sort of a compromise with a hostile state. Each of the churches o f East
Germany, Poland and Hungary addressed the problem of existence in an officially
atheistic state in a different manner, which I will address in detail in the next chapter.
Democratic values promoted by the church include support for the democratic
regime itself and confidence in the institutions of the regime. Other values promoted by
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the church which are not directly related to the promotion of democracy yet at the same
time are not contrary to democratic ideals include orientations toward authority, certain
family values and values relating to the relationship between the church and the state.
Church members will tend to value and respect authority; they will value traditional
family arrangements; and they will support cooperation between church and state.
Certain other democratic values which may be conducive to the promotion of the
democratic regime are not promoted by the church, usually because they are seen as
promoting individual rights, and therefore contrary to the common good. These values
include political tolerance, civil liberties, freedom of speech, and support for protests and
demonstrations. Such democratic values are seen by the church as promoting the rights
of the individual to the detriment of the common good. When it must choose between
the two, the church always promotes the good of the community over the right of the
individual.
Finally there are certain democratic values having to do with the orientation of the
individual as an actor in a democratic society, particularly values o f personal and political
efficacy, which are sometimes promoted by the church because they relate to issues of the
value and dignity of the individual within society. These values are not usually an issue
for the church; as I stated above, the church teaches that the value of the community has
precedence over the individual. But when the individual is being severely repressed by
an oppressive society, such as was the case of religious believers in communist regimes,
the church promotes individual rights in a prophetic call to overthrow injustice.
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THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL:
HOW CIVIL SOCIETY AFFECTS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES
The Church, in opposing the communist regime which actively sought its demise,
worked to (re)establish autonomous civil society. This happened first in Poland, where
the Church had a long and strong history of opposition to externally imposed State
controls. The Polish resistance movement, which became known as Solidarity, originated
from an organization of liberal intellectuals and church leaders called KOR (Ost 1990;
Laba 1991; Michnik 1993). Poland is probably the best example of active involvement
by the church in the revival of civil society.
In contrast, the church in Hungary had very little involvement in the revival o f
civil society, for three main reasons. First, the church was much weaker there. National
identity was not tied to church affiliation in Hungary the way it was in Poland. And since
participation was split between two major denominations -- Catholics and Protestants -none o f the churches could speak with authority as the unified voice of the people.
Second, Hungarian political reformers began in 1968 to implement a series of political
and economic reforms from above, so there was less pressure for alternative forms of
opposition. Finally, the Church had never been as completely in opposition to the regime
as it was in Poland —church leaders served as party members and government officials
all along in Hungary. They could seek reform politically.
In East Germany the church only very late and somewhat reluctantly joined the
movement to reestablish civil society, pushed mainly by the activist peace groups which
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co-existed within the protective spaces allotted to the churches. At the end, though, the
church was quite influential in the democratic reform movement.
Therefore, I propose the following conceptual model of the relationship between
civil society and democratic values. In communist societies in which the churches were
excluded from participation in the state (Poland and East Germany), the church became
drawn into the formation o f civil society in opposition to the regime and actively
promoted and supported democratic values. In communist societies which allowed for a
measure o f church participation in the state (Hungary) the church saw little value in
opposing the regime and did little to promote or support democratic values.
Consequently, church members in Poland and East Germany will be more supportive of
democratic values than will church members in Hungary (who are less likely to recognize
a connection between religious affiliation and democratic values).
CHURCH EXCLUDED
FROM THE STATE

------> CHURCH OPPOSITION
TO THE REGIME

------> SUPPORT FOR
DEM. VALUES

OR
CHURCH INCLUDED
IN THE STATE

-> NO CHURCH OPPOSITION ------> LESS SUPPORT
TO THE REGIME
FOR DEM. VALUES

The model is intended to reflect the relationship between civil society and support
for democratic values, as it is filtered through the church. Civil society is a contextual
variable here; it is the context within which the church operates to support democratic
values. As I stated above, the church operates at two levels to support democratic values.
At one level, the church as an institution, primarily through the words and actions of its
elites, influences society in its support for democratic values. On another level, though,
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individual church members also express support for democratic values, stemming from
their attempts to live out their faith in society. The data that I have for this analysis are
individual level data. Therefore, I can explicitly model and test church influence on
democratic values at the individual level. Church influence on democratic values at the
society level could also be formally modeled and tested, but the model would be overly
complex. Adding this contextual variable would require a model which tests for
interaction between a variable indicating the nature of civil society and individual
attitudes o f democratic support.
Instead of adding another level of complexity I have chosen to test this model at
the individual level separately for each country. I then explain these individual results
separately, within the context of the particular civil society/state context of each country.
Since I do not have a direct measure of this contextual variable it is possible that between
country differences in effect could also be due to other variables not captured in these
models. Therefore, this relationship remains implicit and suggestive in this analysis, and
I do not explicitly test alternative country-specific explanations o f difference. But my
results do point in the direction o f context-specific differences in the effect of church
attendance on support for democratic values.
From this context, then, I have proposed a conceptual model of the effect of civil
society on church support for democratic values in these countries of central and eastern
Europe. In countries where civil society has been severely repressed, where the church
was excluded from any possibility of meaningful participation in the state, such as eastern
Germany and Poland, the church has responded on both levels with strong support for

democratic values. In countries where the state/church relationship was less defined,
such as Hungary, where the church had a legitimate voice in society and consequently felt
that it had a role in the state, the church has not felt so strongly the need to preserve and
express support for democratic values.
In the next chapter I provide a brief comparative-historical account of the
relationship between church and state in each o f these three countries, up to the point of
their democratic transformations in 1989. I state formal hypotheses o f the relationships
between church attendance and particular democratic values for each of these countries.
In chapter three I discuss the data and methods I use for my analysis of church support of
democratic values.
In chapter four I provide a descriptive analysis of the present demographic
characteristics and religious beliefs of church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland and
Hungary, as o f 1990 and 1991. I compare these characteristics and beliefs with the case
of western Germany, as a comparable western democracy. In chapter five I examine the
effect o f church attendance on a variety of democratic values, separately for each of the
countries. I focus in particular on the priestly vs. the prophetic influences, to see which
influence predominates in support of democratic values in each of the countries. Finally,
chapter six will summarize my findings and discuss directions for further research.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES DURING COMMUNISM
Each of the countries under Soviet control had their own state-level government
organizations, and each State had some level of autonomy in determining policy toward
their churches. Therefore, church-state relations in each of the countries under Soviet
control varied, depending on the nature of state-level government policy toward the
churches and the level o f active participation or resistance of the churches in each
country. In this chapter I will evaluate that relationship separately for each of the Eastern
European countries in this study, to see how the churches reacted to communist
domination in each country.
East Germany
In Germany, the Protestant church is more closely identified with the social
structure and power of the State (Gauly 1991), whereas the Catholic church remains more
closely identified with the power of the Vatican in Rome. For this reason, plus the fact
that the former East Germany has traditionally been nearly entirely Protestant, it is more
important for our purposes to focus on how the Protestant church developed as opposition
leader o f the democratization movement in eastern Germany.
The role o f the Protestant church in Germany has been that of "State Church" —
the officially recognized and designated religious institution of the state (Herms 1989).
Since the Peace o f Augsburg (1SS5) and the rise of the modem state, Protestant church
boundaries in Germany have been equated with state boundaries (Goeckel 1990). Each
20
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state had its own Landeskirche - State Church. The various Landeskirchen were united
on a national level into the Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund (1922) which evolved
into the Evangelical Churches in Germany, or EKD in 1948. There was little competition
from other denominations or sects, and in return for its loyalty the church received semiautonomous status within the state. It was supported financially by a Kirchensteuer, a
federally collected tax on individuals, and granted freedom of assembly and a limited free
press (Gellner 1991). Although church leaders could provide advice to state leaders,
there was little opposition to the regime in this arrangement. The church promoted civic
values, educated good citizens and provided social services such as hospitals, homes for
the infirm and counseling services.
Upon inheriting the eight Landeskirchen of East Germany at the end of World
War II, the Stalinist regime saw a benefit in allowing the institution to continue to exist.
The East German government managed quite successfully to use the Protestant church to
promote cooperation of citizens within the socialist society, while at the same time
marginalizing the place of the church among the population.2 While in 1950 the
proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical in eastern and western Germany,

2 The East German regime was less successful in its attempts to control the
Catholic church (Ockenfels 1989; Zander 1992). However, because the Catholic church
represents such a small constituency in eastern Germany, the Protestant church was by far
the most significant political actor in the struggle. See Krisch 1985, Grass 1990, and
Spohn 1991 for brief, but illuminating, explanations of the predominance of the
Protestant church in eastern Germany.
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approximately 90% o f the population, by 1989 the proportion of adherents in the East had
dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of the population (Lemke 1989).3
Compromises of the East German Protestant Church
The East German regime managed this dramatic reduction in religious affiliation
through a series o f deliberate maneuvers designed to marginalize the effectiveness of the
church. At the same time, it permitted the church enough autonomy to continue, as an
institution o f civil society, to legitimize the regime. For example, the church was totally
excluded from the education o f the young when the state took over the operation of the
schools in 1946 (Hutten 1967). Although religious instruction in the schools was a right
guaranteed to churches in the 1949 constitution, this practice was nevertheless forbidden
by the state and the churches were compelled to set up alternative means of religious
instruction for children. At the same time the Kirchensteuer, the federal tax collected to
support the churches, was eliminated in East Germany, and the East German churches
were forced to rely on private donations for support (McCauley 1983).

3 Lemke cited these membership figures as published by Gunnar Winkler, ed., in
Sozialreport '90. Daten undJak ten zuLsozialen Lage in der DDR (Social Report '90.
Data and Facts on Social Conditions in the G.D.R.. page 308). For comparison, Roski
cites 1991 der Spiegel survey church membership statistics of 93% for western Germany
and 32% for eastern Germany. Similarly, results from a survey conducted by the Institut
fiir Demoskopie Allensbach in September 1991 show 86% of western Germans and 31%
of eastern Germans claim membership in a church. The declining rates of church
membership in eastern Germany are not a function of data manipulation on the part of
East German demographers but rather a function of the powerful social pressure against
church involvement exerted upon the East German population during 45 years o f Soviet
domination.
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Young Christians faced severe discrimination in their educational opportunities,
the churches faced great difficulties in building repair and maintenance, restrictions were
placed on the activities o f the church —in these and many other ways church members
were made to feel like second-class citizens (Childs 1983). These concessions provide
evidence of the marginal position of the church relative to the state, but other
compromises made by the church had even farther reaching consequences.
The church was compelled to accept the Jugendweihe, the secular confirmation
ceremony in which young people profess their loyalty to the state. For a time, the church
opposed this ceremony and refused the religious equivalent to those youth who had
participated in the secular ceremony, but by 1960 the number of young people opting for
religious confirmation had dropped so drastically that the church lifted its ban. It was
clear that the social pressure to participate in the Jugendweihe was far stronger than the
power of the church to oppose it (Dennis 1988).
Another way the church compromised its position relative to the state was in
response to the militarization policies of the state. The church was a leader in the
movement to allow alternatives to full military service in the 1960s, but was unsuccessful
in its struggle against compulsory military science studies in the schools (Cordell 1990).
Once again, the church took a strong oppositional stand each time a new policy was
introduced by the state, but compromised or moderated its position in response to state
pressure.
A final significant concession made by the church concerned the formation of a
separate organizational body for Protestant churches in Hast Germany -- the League of
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Evangelical Churches (BEK). The eight Landeskirchen of East Germany had been
formally united with the other Protestant churches of West Germany through their panGerman national organization, the Evangelical Churches in Germany (EKD) since 1948.
Although they managed to hold out until 1969, difficulties in traveling between East and
West, as well as increasingly disparate problems of the two societies, finally led church
leaders to acknowledge the need for separate coordinating bodies (Krisch 1985; Cordell
1990; Neubert 1991).
Each o f these concessions and compromises marginalized the position of the
church in East German society. Yet there were other instances where the church gained
concessions from the state and thereby retained its place as an institution of civil society.
The success o f this persistence against the regime elevated the legitimacy of the church,
which gradually assumed responsibility for the protection and promotion of the
opposition prodemocracy movement.
Persistence of the East German Protestant Church
The Protestant church in East Germany maintained enough legitimacy in society
to achieve certain concessions from the state which helped it to persist in society.
Although the East German communist government was ideologically opposed to religion
in society, the church provided certain social benefits which the regime recognized as
useful and necessary. For example, it was a major force in health and social services
during the years of state socialism, administering over 50 hospitals, 89 institutions for the
physically handicapped and numerous other similar institutions (Krisch 1985). It was a
major private employer, providing jobs for people who otherwise would have been
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dependent on the state. It provided counseling and support for thousands, in a state
threatened by alarmingly high rates of divorce, suicide and alcoholism (Smith 1985). The
church was also the source of significant sums of hard western currency, generously
provided by western churches to support the activities of the church in the East (Smith
1985).
To preserve this uneasy truce between church and state in 1971 Bishop Albrecht
Schbnherr, head o f the BEK, announced that the church was willing to legitimize the
regime, provided it was taken seriously as a partner. The new church attitude of loyal
opposition was summed up in Bishop Schbnherr's statement: "We do not want to be a
church against, or alongside, but in socialism" (Krisch 1985). This compromise led to
increased concessions by the state to the churches, including permission to establish new
churches, increased access to radio and TV broadcast time, importation o f some church
literature from the West and increased state financial support for the churches (Smith
1985).
Opponents o f Bishop Schbnherr wanted the church to assume a more oppositional
role at the time, but the church was not able to directly oppose the state for several
reasons. First, although it was by far the largest religious denomination in East Germany,
the church was not a majority organization. At best, no more than a third o f the
population were even nominal adherents by the mid 1970s. Second, because it was
organized as a state church, most of its support lay within the boundaries of the state.
Unlike the Polish Catholic church, which could mobilize support worldwide to sway
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world opinion on the plight o f workers fighting for democracy, the East German
Protestant church had lost its last link with the West upon the establishment of the BEK.
Consequences of the "C hurch in Socialism" Policy
The advantage of the "church in socialism" policy for the church was a relaxing of
the Party's control and an increase of the relative power of the church in East German
society (Scharf 1984; Krisch 1985). The disadvantage was that by aligning itself with the
state the church could be seen as just another arm of the state, and as the state lost
legitimacy, so did the church. It was seen by some as having sold out to the regime; they
felt the church had abdicated its legitimate opposition to the regime to preserve a few
limited concessions. Therefore, although the church was allowed greater freedom of
assembly, access to television and radio, as well as its own independent news agency, its
message reflected at least superficial support of the regime (Childs 1983).
As the church became involved in the peace movement of the 1980's, this attitude
began to change gradually and it gained recognition as an opposition force. The church
became an organizational umbrella for various peace initiatives which evolved as a
reaction to the increased militarization of East German society at all levels. These groups
organized around public opposition to cold war policies such as mandatory defense
studies in the schools and compulsory military service for young men. Despite its official
policy of cooperation with the regime, the church helped create and later support a host of
oppositional groups in East Germany in the 1980s (Ramet 1984). To a large extent, this
change was caused by a radical church faction which called on the church to "set an
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example and challenge the state where it feels morally obliged so to do" (Cordell 1990,
p.56).
From this position, the church needed to make only a small step to support the
various political reform groups of the late 1980s (Cordell 1990). These included citizens
committees, or action groups, which evolved from the Peace Movement and became
increasingly political throughout the decade. They organized mass protest rallies
attended by thousands, and addressed issues which had long been forbidden in East
Germany. Although continually harassed by the secret police, these action groups created
a second public sphere which received strong support from the western media. They
grew quickly, to nearly 500 separate groups by 1988, and most of them found shelter
within Protestant churches (Neugebauer 1993). The consequence of the political reform
movement was German reunification. For church members in particular, some of whom
could claim an active role in the delegitimation of the communist regime, the end result
was a mixture o f feelings o f increased self-worth: pride in being German, enthusiasm
about reunification and optimism about their future.4
In sum, the loyal opposition of the Protestant churches in East Germany allowed
them political latitude which was unavailable to any other institution in the regime. As a
result, the church served as protective "free spaces" for organized protest against the

4The correlation (among eastern Germans) between church membership and
pride in being German is .14, between church membership and joy about reunification is
.22, between church membership and optimism (when comparing the present to the past)
is .17, and between church membership and optimism (when comparing the future to the
past) is .15. All correlations are significant at p<.001. These data are from the Institut fiir
Demoskopie Allensbach, survey 5055.
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regime.5 This protest activity gradually broadened from specific actions against
particularly oppressive policies o f the state to broader human rights issues, peace
initiatives and calls for democratic reforms. As the church took an increasingly public
stand on these issues, church members felt empowered to support political action, to
speak out against abuses by the state and to take a stand on democratic reform.
The church, therefore, affected the democratic reform of East Germany in two
important ways. First, as an institution of civil society, it operated to some extent as a
loyal opposition to the regime, raising issues of reform and providing organizational
support for reform movements. Second, church members were increasingly empowered
by their own political actions within the action groups and by the support of the church
around these action groups to take the steps necessary to bring about democratic reform.
Poland
Poland has been a Catholic country since 966, when Prince Miezko of Poland
married the daughter of Catholic Prince Boleslaw of Bohemia (Tobias 1956). Although
invading armies and changing national borders have influenced the ethnic and religious
composition of Poland, its predominant religious affiliation has remained Roman
Catholic up to this day.
The relationship between the Roman Catholic church and the nation of Poland has
been, since the Middle Ages, one of close identification. What friction there has been
between church and state has most often been between nationalistic Catholicism and

5See Evans and Boyte (1986) for a more thorough discussion of the importance of
free spaces, created within civil society, to enable democratic participation.
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liberal Protestantism or between the Catholic state church and the non-Catholic churches.
The power of the Polish state has traditionally been closely linked with the power of the
Polish episcopate (Tobias 1956).
One particularly strong characteristic of Polish culture, though, is the fact of
Polish nationalism. Lacking natural geographic boundaries, such as great rivers or
mountains, and with an unfortunately weak political structure, Poland has been overrun
many times in its history, and partitioned out of existence twice in the past 200 years. In
1795 Poland ceased to exist as a state, having been divided between Tsarist Russia,
Prussia and Austria. This "century of partition" lasted till the end of World War I and
severely affected Poland's political culture and national identity. It also strongly affected
Poland's Roman Catholic identity. Of the three occupying powers, only Austria pursued
a tolerant policy toward the Poles; both Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia posed
more fundamental threats to Polish identity. Therefore, the link between Poland and
Roman Catholicism was strengthened (Ramet 1987). Especially important was the
church's role in maintaining the Polish language. The church was the only institution
allowed to express itself in Polish during the years of the partition, and therefore it
became permanently identified with the protection of Polish language and culture
(Kennedy and Simon 1983). From the time that Poland was reestablished as a country at
the end o f World War I its national identity as Catholic was firmly established.
Increasingly, from this time forward, to be Polish meant to be Catholic, and to be Polish
Catholic meant to be fiercely nationalistic.

30
Once again, however, in September 1939, Poland was partitioned - this time
between Germany and Russia:
In German-occupied Poland, on orders from the Foreign Office of the
German Evangelical Church, the churches were reorganized: Lutherans
were to be assimilated into the German Church. Polish literature and
Bibles were destroyed and the theological faculty closed... In Russianoccupied Poland much church property was immediately confiscated and
some monasteries were stripped. After the incorporation o f Eastern
Poland into the USSR as a republic, the Orthodox Church was temporarily
protected from the oppression of the former Roman Catholic Church-State
(Tobias 1956, p.384).
Following this partition the Poland which was reestablished was even more
uniformly Catholic than before. In fact, the political borders established for Poland after
World War II increased the proportion o f Catholics to greater than 90% of the total
population:
The post-war border changes along with the German extermination
o f nearly three million Polish Jews made Poland, for the first time in
centuries, an almost homogeneous Catholic country in which nonCatholics made up less than 3 per cent of the population. At the Teheran
meeting in 1943, the Big Three agreed that the 1920 Curzon line would
form the basis for Poland's eastern frontier. This meant that the Polish
lands annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939, where the majority of Poland's
non-Catholics lived, would remain in Soviet hands. Two years later, at
Yalta, Poland's right to the lands annexed from eastern Germany was
recognized, but without being defined. At Potsdam in 1945, the new
Polish-German frontier, 220 miles west o f the former one, was fixed, and
Germans were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
The Catholic Church, with a structure equal to the Communist
Party's and a wide social base that the Communists lacked —the Party had
only 40,000 members when the Red Army arrived - was a worthy
adversary. The church represented great power, with over 90 per cent of
the people united in faith (Broun 1988).
It was this social base of the Catholic church in Poland which helped it to evolve
into an institution o f civil society, and an opposition force to the Communist regime in
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Poland. The relationship between Poland and Russia has always been tenuous, and Poles
were deeply resentful o f the Soviet control o f their society following World War II.
Opposition Between the Church and the State
The separation o f church and state was formalized in the constitution o f 1952.
Questions about religious affiliation were removed from all application forms, the
teaching o f religion in public schools was forbidden, all church property and nearly all
church-run schools were nationalized, and only civil marriages were recognized as valid
(Strassberg 1988). In 1953 the state even took over responsibility for appointing bishops
and pastors and determining parish and diocesan territorial boundaries. Tension between
the church and the state was so high that the Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski,
was imprisoned from 1953 to 1956 for refusing to cooperate with the government
(Strassberg 1988).
One o f the most effective ways for ordinary citizens to flaunt their opposition to
the Soviet regime and its communist ideology was by continuing to support the churches.
Attendance at Sunday Mass become not only a religious obligation, but also a
reaffirmation o f Polish identity and a subtle form of public protest against the regime
(Nielsen 1991). Poles who continued to affirm their religious identity in the face of
totalitarian power were at the same time asserting their autonomy. They delegitimated
the power o f the state and legitimated the power of the church by their actions.
While this action was not discouraged by the church, it was not the official policy
o f the Polish church to encourage disloyalty to the regime. Cardinal Wyszynski became
convinced that it was necessary to reach a compromise with the state in order to maintain
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an effective Catholic presence in Poland. So although the Vatican did not recognize the
legitimacy of the Polish communist regime, Cardinal Wyszynski agreed in 1956 to a
nineteen-point accord with the state that included concessions on both sides (Nielsen
1991).

Religion could once again be taught in public schools; church authorities

regained a voice in the selection o f bishops, pastors, and chaplains; and while civil
marriages remained the only form recognized as valid by the state, an additional religious
ceremony was once again allowed (Strassberg 1988). Additional concessions by the
church included a loyalty oath for all bishops, state regulation of church-sponsored
organizations, and state permission before any church-sponsored construction could
begin.
The church and the state continued their struggles for the allegiance of the people
throughout Wyszyriski's lifetime. When the regime ordered religious instruction banned
in the public schools, the church opened its own catechetical centers, which functioned
even more effectively. And for the millennial celebration o f Christianity in Poland in
1966 the church planned a brilliant appeal to both Polish history and piety. The Cardinal
called for a year-long round o f Marian devotions, a "Great Novena." All Catholics
personally were to take the vows o f loyalty to God and the Virgin Mary made by Polish
noblemen after they had successfully defended the monastery of Czestochowa against the
Swedes in 1656. The icon o f our Lady o f Czestochowa, the "Black Madonna," was sent
out to visit every church throughout the country. Communist officials made every effort
to hinder the visitation, and the icon was occasionally "arrested." Many churches were
visited only by its empty frame (Broun 1988, p. 182). In retaliation, the state revoked
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Wyszynski's passport, thus preventing him from attending the first bishop's synod after
the Second Vatican Council (Strassberg 1988).
The Prophetic Voice of the Church
Church/state relations evolved in scale from a strictly Polish matter into a more
international dialog during the 1970s, primarily due to two significant events. The first
was the Vatican's recognition of state ownership of the western territories. Since World
War II, the western territories o f Poland had been under the direct jurisdiction o f the Holy
See. In 1972 Pope Paul VI acknowledged the Polish state as the rightful owners of this
territory, and the state in turn transferred jurisdiction over them to the Polish bishops
(Strassberg 1988). This led to more direct links between Polish state authorities and the
Vatican.
The second significant event of the seventies was the election o f Cardinal Karol
Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II on October 16, 1978. From this moment on, Polish
church/state relations assumed international proportions. The entire world watched as
Pope John Paul II returned to his homeland for a nine-day visit in June, 1979. Speaking
to a crowd o f half a million people in the center of Warsaw, the pope issued a strongly
prophetic appeal to the people for spiritual renewal. He said nothing which could be
construed as an attack on the regime, nor did he exhort the people to rise in revolt.
Instead, he spoke straight past the government and appealed to the strong link between
nation and church of the Polish people. "He evoked an ancient Christian nation, as if
Communist rule was a transient phenomenon of little importance " (Ascherson 1988).
The effect o f this visit was immediate, powerful, and long-lasting. The Polish people
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realized finally that the message that KOR and the rest of the Polish opposition had been
trying to put across was true: the Polish nation was ready for democracy.
The Church and the Solidarity Movement
The independent trade union Solidarity was formed in the late summer of 1980 as
a result o f the workers' strike at the Lenin shipyard at Gdansk. The workers' opposition
movement which encompassed it, though, had its roots in the mid-1970s in a coalition
between intellectuals of the dissident Left and the Catholic church, called the Workers'
Defense Committee (KOR). This unlikely alliance worked in Poland because both
groups felt excluded by the state, and they found common ground in the discussion of
liberal democratic values espoused by the left and essential human rights espoused by the
church.
KOR did not directly organize the Solidarity Trade Union; Michnik and the other
members o f KOR initially opposed the demand for free trade unions as unattainable
(Michnik 1993). Neither did the church have any direct role in the organization of
Solidarity —in fact, Solidarity always felt much closer to the church than the church felt
to Solidarity (Ost 1990). Nevertheless, both organizations had an important influence on
the origin and direction o f Solidarity. KOR provided the intellectual framework for
Solidarity; the church provided spiritual direction and institutional legitimacy.
Solidarity was inextricably linked to the church. Pictures o f the Black Madonna
o f Czestochowa or the Pope accompanied all workers' protests. At the Lenin shipyard in
Gdansk during the strike the gates would open once a day to allow a priest to enter and
pray with the striking workers (Ascherson 1988). The workers, for whom patriotism and
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Catholicism were inseparable, simply assumed that because they were acting for Poland,
they had the support o f the church behind them.
The church was more interested in compromise than in conflict, though, fearing
that an escalation might lead to Soviet intervention and suppression of existing rights.
Thus there was no official statement either o f support or protest by the Catholic hierarchy
during this time, although several groups o f Catholic laypersons became increasingly
involved in the movement. Church officials soon became increasingly involved, whether
they wanted to or not:
Cardinal Wyszynski appeared on television to appeal for peace and work,
and on August 26 the main council of the Polish bishops met at Jasna Gora
in Czestochowa to discuss the reasons for social discontent, the issue of
civil rights, and the question o f social and moral revival in Poland. On
August 31 representatives of Solidarity and the state signed the so-called
Gdansk Agreement, which allowed more religious freedom, including the
broadcasting o f Sunday masses. In early September Cardinal Wyszynski
met for the first time with Solidarity's leader Lech Walesa, and from
September 24 to the end o f the year, a joint commission o f the bishops and
the government met eighty-one times. During the spring of 1981, after the
riots in Bydgoszcz, the social tensions in Poland dramatically increased.
Upon receiving a letter from the pope requesting that every possible effort
be undertaken to solve the existing problems in a peaceful way, Cardinal
Wyszynski met first with General Wojciech Jaruzelski and, two days later,
with Lech Walesa. As a result of these meetings, the so-called Warsaw
Agreement was signed on April 1,1981, as the foundation for a peaceful
compromise (Strassberg 1988, p. 194).
The succession of Cardinal Jozef Glemp as Primate of Poland upon the death of
Cardinal Wyszynski in the Spring o f 1981 signaled a turn away from active involvement
o f the church in the Solidarity movement. But social and political pressure continued to
mount, and martial law was declared on December 13,1981. The Solidarity trade union
was outlawed and over 10,000 people were confined in internment camps or prisons,
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including even Lech Walesa. The church opposed martial law and served as refuge and
support for Solidarity activists, but it openly declared its willingness to work with the
government in finding a solution to the civil unrest (Ost 1990). And the government
increasingly expressed willingness to work with the church as a legitimate representative
of civil society.
The conflict continued as it had before, but increasingly the church was drawn in
as church activists became politicized. In 1983 there was a political battle in defense of
the right of public schools to display crosses in the classroom. Special masses were held
for Solidarity and many priests were guest speakers. The end of martial law in July,
1983, after a second papal visit, resulted in a consolidation of power in Poland between
the Catholic church on one side and the military government o f Jaruzelski on the other
side. Since Solidarity was gone, except as an illegal opposition, the influence o f the
church increased substantially. Repeatedly, the church called for the restoration of
Solidarity and civil rights, provided support for the internees and their families,
distributed food, clothing, and medical supplies brought in by Western voluntary
organizations, and in other ways provided assistance to the underground opposition.
Finally, in 1984, things came to a head in the conflict between church and state
with the murder of a priest by a group o f secret policemen from the religious affairs
department o f the ministry o f the interior. Father Jerzy Popieluszko was a very popular
supporter o f Solidarity, and had been the target o f previous press attacks and police
harassment. He was kidnaped and assassinated by three policemen in retribution for his
anti-govemment sermons. The affair caused a tremendous outcry, and the three were
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eventually convicted and given prison sentences. But instead o f quelling the movement
for Solidarity in Warsaw, the death of Father Popieluszko created a martyr for the cause
and galvanized public sentiment against the regime. Candlelight protest processions were
organized in the churches and attended by thousands of frustrated citizens. Crosses were
erected at street intersections to remind protestors of the cost o f their sacrifice and to
protect demonstrators from military intervention. And when the government at last sat
down to discuss reforms at the Polish Round Table negotiations of February-April 1989,
the church had an official negotiating seat at those talks.
In sum, the church in Poland influenced the regime change on a more institutional
level than did the church in East Germany. In Poland, the church was primarily an
institutional actor; it was legitimated by the people as an official voice o f opposition to
the regime. It received additional legitimacy from its supranational ties to the Vatican in
Rome. While the church in East Germany had to rely on the combined voices o f the
bishops o f the nine states o f East Germany for their authority, Polish bishops could
appeal to the Church o f Rome for their authority. Thus, the church in Poland was a force
to be reckoned with in the struggle to reestablish civil society. The prophetic voices of
John Paul II, Father Popieluszko, and other church leaders who spoke eloquently for a
return to a democratic Poland certainly furthered the cause of democracy by galvanizing
public opinion around the issue. But once the power o f the institutional church in Poland
had been mobilized behind the movement for democracy it is likely that success would
have been only a matter o f time, even without these voices.
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Hungary
The relationship between church and state in Hungary was quite different from
that o f either Poland or East Germany. Though the churches in Hungary were also
repressed by the communist regime, they chose cooperation early on as their preferred
method o f interacting with the regime. The church in Hungary operated alongside the
state, and there was never the severity o f antagonism between church and state which
prevailed in Poland and East Germany.
Hungarians have always been religiously plural, about two-thirds Roman Catholic
and one-third Protestant (Calvinist, the larger denomination, and Lutheran). But
Catholicism has never been linked with nationalism the way it is in Poland; in fact, some
Calvinists still regard themselves as the "true Hungarians" (Nielsen 1991). Nevertheless,
since the naming o f Emperor Franz Josef o f Austria as King of Hungary in the middle of
the 19th century, the country has been linked with Western Europe and identified as
predominantly Roman Catholic. At this time, religious freedom was granted to almost all
churches in Hungary. The law identified Roman and Greek Catholics, the Eastern
Orthodox groups, the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, the Unitarians, and the Jewish
congregations (since 1895) as "Accepted Religions." Three other denominations —
Baptists, Methodists, and Mohammedans —were identified as "Recognized Religions"
and enjoyed the same privileges o f organization and freedom to conduct services and
teach religion to their children, but they did not receive state support or have the privilege
o f collecting church dues as state taxes. Other religious groups were tolerated, but treated
as persons "without religion" (Tobias 1956).
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Roman Catholics were always the most numerous of the faiths and were also the
most closely aligned with the government. In fact, the Catholic bishop of Esztergom
held, by tradition, the rank of Prince and was second only to the King in political power.
The Catholic church was the greatest landholder in Hungary; it controlled more than half
o f all schools and had the power to mandate obligatory religious instruction for all
children. By the end o f 1940 the churches were represented in Parliament by forty-eight
religious leaders, o f whom fourteen archbishops held their offices by "right o f birth"
(Tobias 1956, p. 430). Financing o f the church's operations came from a long tradition of
royal patronage, as well as income generated from its extensive landed estates. This cozy
relationship between church and state in Hungary helped to protect the church from some
of the more serious consequences experienced by churches in Poland and East Germany
as a result of the significant transformations in the ensuing years of World War II and its
aftermath.
The Hungarian religious hierarchy originally supported the nation's alliance with
Nazi Germany, as the church gained lands and people in the alliance. Religious
leadership was not threatened by the fascists, and the bishops were so adamantly opposed
to any movement that was even remotely social democratic or communist that they
interpreted the anti-Nazi activities of these groups as a threat to the established order.
Church resistance to the Nazi presence in Hungary came primarily from a federation of
Catholic organizations called the Catholic Social People's Movement. Formed in 1943
with the support o f Prince Primate Seredi and Baron Archbishop Vilmos Apor o f Gyiir, it
eventually became the Christian Democratic People's Party and played a small part in the
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postwar coalition government (Osa 1989). In contrast to the severe repression
experienced by church in Poland, which was essentially forced underground for its
operations, the church in Hungary continued to operate in the same manner as before,
with the addition o f some new restrictions imposed by the state.
With the Soviet takeover o f Hungary after World War II, the Hungarian
communist regime essentially sought to create a perfect new society. The entire
institutional structure of society was rebuilt. In an attempt to create an ideal social
system all the former elites lost their rights and power was delegated administratively.
The primary effect o f this restructuring for the churches was twofold. First, a complete
restructuring of the religious hierarchy loosened the churches' grip on legitimate social
power. All Catholic religious orders were banned and several bishops were placed under
house arrest. Over half of all seminaries were ordered closed, and the church was
compelled to submit all hierarchical appointments to the newly created State Office for
the Church for approval (Ramet 1987). This move severely compromised the autonomy
o f the church.
Second, the state instituted a far-reaching series o f land reforms, designed to
redistribute income more equally. This had disastrous consequences for the church,
which had been a major landowner. Most church income came from the revenue of its
estates and the patronage o f landed gentry. This money was used to support church
programs such as schools, hospitals, and seminaries, as well as providing a major source
o f operating revenue for the dioceses. But there was tremendous support for land reform,
especially among the peasantry, as Hungary transformed itself from a largely agrarian
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society to an industrial society. The church tried to influence land reform so that its own
economic base would not be seriously undermined, yet at the same time support
redistribution in general. For example, in September 1945 Bishop Mindszenty urged
Catholic farmers not to accept lands confiscated from the church (Tobias 1956). The
church did manage to retain some 90,000 acres o f property, and was subsidized by the
government after 1951.
In general, the attitude of the church toward the Soviet occupied state was one of
intransigence, primarily led by the Primate of the Catholic church, Cardinal Mindszenty.
He refused to negotiate with the government and instead sent dramatic appeals to the
United Nations, President Truman, and King George VI, publicizing the plight of
Hungarians living in border areas o f Czechoslovakia and Romania as a result o f World
War II border changes (Osa 1989). Mindszenty fought state takeover of the private
schools, even though the state offered to leave teaching clergy in their jobs and to allow
the continuation o f religious instruction in the schools. The Primate refused to back
down; he was arrested in the fall o f 1948 and the compromises were revoked. His
successor, Archbishop Joseph Grflsz, signed the first agreement between church and state
in 1950.
The signing of this agreement set the tenor for church/state relations from that
point on. Those who were without political power -- most of the rural and elderly
population — retained ties with the church. Those who possessed or sought to acquire
power distanced themselves from the church. As the state progressed from an
agricultural economy to an industrial economy the church, in turn, moved from a position
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o f nearly equal power with the state to a position very much subordinate in power with
the state. The process is popularly known in the sociology of religion literature as
secularization, and is poignantly described by Tomka as follows:
Rapid industrialization, urbanization, revolutionary growth in education,
and, in consequence, an extreme mobility, destroyed both the strongly
traditional religious culture and its interconnecting relationships based
mostly on kinship and neighborhood, which had formerly sustained the
religious culture. A crippled church could not substitute for this loss with
a single hour o f religious instruction and another hour's religious service
per week; nor could it fully guarantee adequate religious socialization
(Tomka 1988, p. 172).
In March, 1956, revolutionaries in Hungary attempted a revolt against the Soviet
regime, which was violently quelled by Russian troops and tanks. All in Hungary
suffered from this abortive revolution, and church leaders were among its innocent
victims. Cardinal Mindszenty fled to the American Embassy. The Lutheran bishop,
Lajor Ordass, was imprisoned. Clergy were forced to submit and conform to state policy,
and those who refused to were forced out o f their positions (Nielsen 1991). But the
churches had not taken a leadership role in the revolution and thus were not singled out
for reprisal by Stalin's troops. Instead, the church learned a valuable lesson about the
devastating consequences o f opposition to the Soviet regime from this failed revolution
and decided that cooperation was the better course o f action to follow.
Officially, the institutional church removed itself from the process of
sociopolitical change and abdicated responsibility for influencing the evolution of the
state. The churches operated under the control and supervision of the State Office for the
Church, to whom they had to appeal for funds, appointments, buildings, and all
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institutional functions. The church accepted as a self-limitation that it had nothing to do
with the concerns o f secular life, the public affairs o f non-affiliates, or with social
problems in society. In turn, the state removed all public expression o f religious values
from society and acknowledged the right o f individuals to private expression of
religiosity. So long as religion was a purely private and individual affair, religious
practice was accepted as a human right. But all public expressions o f religiosity were
effectively marginalized. This meant that groups without social influence —the poor, the
elderly, the uneducated, and rural peasants —were free to express their religiosity. But
middle and upper class urban dwellers —those who had a place in society and those who
sought to improve their place in society -- had to subjugate and strictly privatize their
religious beliefs or risk losing their place in society . This "social schizophrenia" helped
bring about a sharp decline in religious practice in the 1960s and 1970s (Tomka 1988).
Publicly, religion all but disappeared from Hungarian urban culture and society.
Unofficially, though, another religious movement was taking place within
Hungarian society but outside the authority of the institution itself. Within the Reformed
church a movement which called itself the Confessing Church came into existence in the
1950s. Composed o f both clergy and laity, it was severely critical o f what it called "the
dictatorial attitudes o f church leaders who allegedly intimidated pastors, forced changes
upon local congregations, accused their opponents of heresy, and generally acted in
violation o f the Reformation heritage" (Beeson 1982, p. 281). Similarly, from within the
Catholic church many priests, monks and nuns, whose orders had been legally dissolved
by the regime, continued to gather in informal community groups to continue religious
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education and a semi-underground Christian fellowship (Bailey 1991). These groups, as
well as other groups o f primarily lay Catholic intellectuals and young people, known as
"basic" or "base" communities, took it upon themselves to substitute for the church's
neglect o f such areas as religious education, cultivating religious communities, and
promoting spirituality, despite lack o f official support or authorization from the
institution itself. By the early 1970s these groups were so strong that Cardinal Lekai was
called on by the state to control them. These groups, in contrast to the official institution
which had maneuvered to a position o f public isolation with regard to the state, were
politically conscious and were often critical of both the state and the ecclesiastic
hierarchy.
The base communities were particularly critical o f Cardinal Lekai, accusing him
o f failing to take a firm line with the state, as Mindszenty had. Cardinal Lekai insisted on
a cautious policy of full cooperation with the regime in exchange for small improvements
for the institution. He believed that this limited partnership between church and state
provided the best chance for gradual improvement o f conditions in Hungary.
In contrast to Cardinal Lekai, the most threatening of the base communities,
known as "the Bush," was led by Father Gyorgy Buldnyi. This movement, comprised of
some 200 groups o f eight to fifteen members each, was strongly pacifist in character and
sought to live out "the quintessential Catholic resistance to atheism. The bush members'
insistence that the spiritual values o f Christianity transcend political and temporal
expediencies marks them as true heirs of Mindszenty" (Broun 1988, p. 150). This
movement, and Father Bulanyi in particular, were seen as a threat by both the government
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and the Hungarian religious hierarchy, although the Vatican refused to excommunicate
him.
The contrast between the two religious leaders, L£kai and Buldnyi, illustrates the
impossible situation o f the church in Hungarian civil society under the Soviet regime.
The official institution, characterized by Lekai, was paralyzed into inactivity by its
history o f cooperation between throne and altar. Every step that was made, every gain or
concession accomplished from the state, was criticized by the people as too little and too
late. Committed Christians, such as those who were attracted to Bul&nyi, were repelled
from involvement with the institution because they felt that Lekai had sold out to the
regime. Therefore, they did little to push the church to reform. Instead, they gave up on
the institution and sought religiosity in the base communities. The base communities
were also the source o f their political consciousness, as social justice was an important
component of the Christian commitment shared in the base communities.
By the late 1980s, though the churches were in no way united in their
commitment to or relationship with the regime, they did unite on one particular political
issue with far-reaching ramifications. Large groups of ethnic Hungarians living in
Romania had increasingly sought refuge in Hungary as their plight worsened under the
Ceausescu regime. At the same time, increasingly greater numbers of East German
tourists arrived in Hungary and sought safe passage there to the West. Because o f their
express commitment to human rights, the churches united to form an ecumenical ministry
to Romanian and East German refugees.
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And then, in a remarkable appeal, Bishop T6th, the Roman Catholic
Primate L£szl6 Cardinal Paskai and Dr. L&szlo Lehel, general secretary of
the Ecumenical Council, urged the government to open the border to
Austria and guarantee the East Germans safe passage. The government,
still led by members o f the former Communist Party, agreed. Soldiers
with wire cutters opened the fences. Land mines were carefully removed.
The frontier was opened so that East Germans and later Czechs and
Romanian refugees walked safely and easily into Austria. There they were
welcomed and provided with transportation to West Germany. The first
chink in the Berlin Wall had been chipped away (Bailey 1991, p. 71).
In sum, the church in Hungary had relatively little to do with the democratic
transition there. Hungary is a confessional ly mixed country with a long tradition of close
cooperation between church and state. Although this relationship had been reinterpreted
with the imposition o f communism, it had not disappeared. The churches continued to
operate at the service of the state, supporting government policies almost without
exception. The churches' self-imposed withdrawal from the public sphere accelerated
secularization there, as religion became a strictly private matter. The revolutionary
changes o f 1989 were most o f all the work o f reform communists, and religion benefitted
from them. Religious freedom and tolerance came with the democratic transition, but
collaboration with the communist regime had invaded the church in a way that it had not
in Poland and East Germany.
The differences between the Hungarian experience and that o f the churches of
Poland and East Germany are clear. In Hungary there was a communist ordered
hierarchy o f control, with the state at the top. Bishops were state appointed. Persons
designated by the state as leaders o f religious congregations were held accountable for
what went on in their respective communities. In exchange, they received a certain
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amount o f political power, which came from the state, not from their communities. They
were expected to control those communities, and if they proved to be unable to provide
control, they were removed by the state. Consequently, church members came to
understand that their religious leaders were compromised by the state and corrupted. In
response, church attendance dropped dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, as church
members experienced negative sanctions for affiliation and saw that church leaders would
not interfere with state policies. The net result was alienation from the churches,
especially among the younger, better educated, and more urban Hungarians, who stood to
gain the most from turning away from the church. Therefore, I expect that Hungarian
church attenders will show less support for democratic values than church attenders in
either Poland or East Germany, where the churches took more of an opposition stance to
the regime and were more involved in the democratic transitions.
HYPOTHESES
From the review o f the literature in Chapter I, as well as the comparative
historical framework o f the evolution o f church-state relations in East Germany, Poland
and Hungary reported above, I now formulate the following hypotheses concerning
church support for democratic values in post-transition societies. The hypotheses are
arranged according to how well the democratic values express either the priestly tradition
or the prophetic tradition.
Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition - Power from Above
The priestly tradition is a strong force in the political culture of church members.
The institutional church will always recognize the authority o f the regime that is in
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power, regardless of its attitude toward the church. This is because the priestly tradition
emphasizes the need for order over the need for justice. This tradition recognizes that
earthly power comes from God, and is externally imposed from above in a hierarchically
arranged system. That is, those who are in power in society, according to the priestly
tradition, have authority which comes from God and which must be obeyed, regardless of
the political orientation or morality of the rulers, in order to ensure an orderly society. As
long at the church is allowed room to operate in society relatively free from constraint by
the state so that it can promote traditional moral values, preserve ritual and provide for
the salvation o f souls, the church will be inclined to accommodate to the status quo.
That, in turn, has implications for individuals within the church. For individuals, the
priestly tradition will influence them to express obedient political values. I expect the
priestly tradition to affect political values among individuals in the following ways:
Hypothesis 1: Church attenders in these post-transition societies will be more
supportive o f the present regime, its political leaders and its institutions than persons who
do not attend church. The priestly tradition of obedience to authority is a strong tenet of
faith, especially in these relatively pre-modem churches who have been insulated from
change by their isolation o f the past 50 years. I expect that more frequent church
attenders, who show their support (by their attendance) for the institutional church and
the priestly tradition for which it stands, will more strongly express trust and confidence
in the institutions o f the state and support for the current administration than those who
do not attend church.
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Hypothesis 2: Church attenders in recently democratized eastern Germany will
express similar levels o f support for a democratic state as their coreligionists in western
Germany. Although they do not yet have as much experience with a democratic form of
state, they do have the example o f western Germany as a successful democratic model,
and the religious tolerance promised by a democratic state is a right cherished by
religious people. Church attenders will express greater support for a democratic state and
non-attenders, in both parts o f Germany.
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition
There are a number of democratic political values which are not clearly influenced
by either the priestly or the prophetic tradition. Such democratic ideals as political
tolerance, civil liberties, conflict and protest are difficult to classify into either tradition,
as they lie generally outside o f the scope of religion. Similarly, questions that deal with
preference for a particular economic form have less in common with religious attitudes
than do the other political and moral values examined here. Religious belief does
influence these values, but the effect of religion is sometimes ambiguous. I have placed
these relationships between the effects of the priestly and the prophetic traditions,
because I believe that these values are influenced sometimes by both traditions, and
sometimes by neither.
Hypothesis 3: Church attenders in post-transition societies will express similar
attitudes toward individual freedoms and civil liberties as do church attenders in western
European societies. These liberal democratic values do not correspond well with the
strong priestly tradition o f obedience to authority found in these mostly premodem
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churches. Therefore, these are not democratic values which are actively promoted in the
church and church members are less likely to have strong feelings about these more
liberal democratic values. I expect church attenders to express only weak to moderate
support for individual freedoms and civil liberties.
Hypothesis 4: Church attenders in post-transition societies are also likely to be
ambiguous about support for protest. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by
church attenders, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly
tradition o f obedience. However, protest behavior is supported by the prophetic tradition
and public protests were successfully used by several of the churches to promote the
transition to democracy, particularly in East Germany and Poland. Therefore, I expect
that church attenders in these societies should be somewhat less likely to oppose protest
than church attenders in western Germany.
Hypothesis 5: Churches generally uphold communitarian values and tend to
favor some government redistribution o f wealth. The Catholic church, in particular, has
a long tradition of opposing capitalism for its pro-individual/anti-community values.
However, church attenders in western democracies have tended to ignore church teaching
on the role o f government in the economy, interpreting this as the church going beyond
its mandate. I expect that church attenders in post-transition societies will be similar to
church attenders in western democracies in their attitudes about government
responsibility in the economy. That is, church attenders will not support government
intervention in the economy any more than non-attenders, either in providing jobs or in
equalizing incomes.
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Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition - Power from Below
The effect o f the prophetic tradition on the institutional church is more difficult to
assess. The prophetic tradition recognizes that power is called out from within a
community, and moves upward and outward into society from below. The prophetic
tradition from within the institutional church is most often manifested in a call for justice
on a global or transnational scale. But this call for justice from within can be seen by the
existing power structure as a direct or implicit threat to the existing social order. That is
why a transnational church, such as the Catholic church, can call for justice and
democratic reform among its churches locked behind the Iron Curtain. But a state
church, such as the organization o f the Protestant churches in Germany, threatens its own
order if it speaks loudly for reform from within the totalitarian order. Therefore, the
prophetic call for justice among the Protestant churches was heard first as a call for
demilitarization, world peace and social justice. It was not until near the end that the
churches joined in support of the prodemocracy movement. The effect o f the prophetic
tradition within each o f the churches can best be assessed here by evaluating the
emergence o f leaders from within the oppressed churches and how they spoke out to help
bring about needed social change, as described above.
The effect o f the prophetic tradition on individual church members may also be
hypothesized. Because individual church members placed themselves in a position of
opposition to the ruling communist regime by their decision to affiliate (or remain
affiliated) with a church, whether or not they actually took an active part in the
prodemocracy movement they did make a public statement o f opposition by their
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affiliation. Church members who responded to the prophetic tradition were expressing a
call for justice. They were demanding social change from below the existing power
structure. Immediately post-transition these individuals are expressing democratic values
on a very personal level. They feel that in some way they had a part in winning a
deciding victory. They now feel and express trust, optimism and efficacy. They are
ready and willing to invest themselves in the democratic society that they supported and
in some measure helped bring about. I expect the prophetic tradition to affect political
values among individuals in the following ways:
Hypothesis 6: Church attenders will express greater levels o f interpersonal trust
than those who do not attend church, similar to their western coreligionists. Trust is a
religious value reflecting the communitarian aspect o f the prophetic tradition, as well as a
democratic value. Even though interpersonal trust was very low in communist societies,
church attenders have faithfully preserved that value and will express higher levels of
trust in general, as well as trust in family members.
Hypothesis 7: Church attenders in post-transition societies will be more
optimistic than those who do not attend church, and will likely be more optimistic than
even their coreligionists in western Germany. They have much to be optimistic about.
The situation for religious believers in post-transition societies is vastly improved over
their previous situation. Church attenders will likely identify with those church leaders
who spoke the prophetic call to justice which encouraged others to get involved and to
help bring about this social change.
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Hypothesis 8: Church attenders in eastern and western Germany will share
similar feelings o f political efficacy. Though they do not yet have the practical
experience in democracy o f western Germans, eastern German church attenders are
firmly committed to the democratic system, and believe themselves to be competent
democrats. The influence of the prophetic tradition and their recent experience in
participatory democracy should help eastern Germans to feel confident that the
democratic steps they are taking are the right ones for them. As for personal efficacy, this
is not a trait that is normally associated with church attenders. In fact, church attendance
is most often negatively associated with personal efficacy (Hougland and Christenson
1983) and church attenders tend to be skeptical or resistant to social change. I expect
church attenders in post-transition societies to be similar to church attenders in western
Germany in their level o f personal efficacy.

CHAPTER III

DATA FOR THIS ANALYSIS
Data from five separate surveys conducted in the years immediately following the
transitions are used in this analysis. Most of the data were collected during 1990-91; all
were collected before early 1993. I will describe each o f the data sets here in detail, then
describe how each o f the variables used in this analysis were constructed.
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) coordinates an annual survey
in at least fifieen European countries (as well as the United States). These data were
produced by the Zentralarchiv fu r Empirische Sozialforschung, Koln and distributed
through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University o f Michigan. The 1990 survey
concentrated on the role of government, and included Hungary (977 cases) and eastern
Germany (1028 cases) as the first o f the formerly communist countries to be surveyed, as
well as western Germany (2812 cases) and eight other western democracies. The 1991
survey concentrated on the role o f religion; this survey was fielded in both eastern and
western Germany (1486 cases, 1346 cases), as well as the former Soviet satellite
countries o f Poland (1063 cases), Hungary (1000 cases), and Russia. This survey was
made available to me by Dr. Andrew Greeley, a member o f the ISSP Study Team.
Similarly, the European Values Systems Study Group carried out a cross-national
survey o f individuals in 42 nations throughout the world in 1990-93. These data were
documented and distributed through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University of
Michigan. The World Values Survey (WVS) includes modules on political values,
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religious values, family values, environmental values, and so on. It was also conducted
in eastern and western Germany (1336 cases, 2101 cases), Poland (938 cases), Hungary
(999 cases), and several other former Soviet satellite countries. This survey was made
available to me by Dr. Renata Kficher and Mr. Werner SiiBlin, o f the Institut fu r
Demoskopie, Allensbach, Germany.
Finally, two surveys were conducted in eastern and western Germany in
September 1991 and December 1992 by the Institut ftir Demoskopie, Allensbach,
Germany. Commissioned by Dr. Frederick Weil and Dr. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the
surveys ask a barrage o f questions about political values. The 1991 survey (IfD 5055)
includes 1039 western Germans and 1080 eastern Germans. The 1992 survey (IfD 5074)
includes 1081 western Germans and 1131 eastern Germans. These five surveys allow me
to empirically examine the political and religious values of church members in posttotalitarian societies and compare them to non-affiliates there and to church members in
western Germany.
VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS
The relationship that I wish to examine in this analysis is that between religious
behavior and moral and political values. I want to show that church attendance has an
effect on moral and political values. To do this, I must first control for other factors
which also affect religious behavior and attitudes. Previous research has consistently
shown that church attendance is not the same for all groups o f people. Older people,
women, less educated people, married people, and people from small communities are
more likely to attend church (Sigelman 1977; Roof and McKinney 1989). To control for
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these contributing factors, I include age, sex, education, marital status, and community
size as controls in the models examining the relationship between religious behavior and
moral and political attitudes.
Similarly, people from lower socioeconomic statuses are more likely to attend
church, as are people who identify themselves as political conservatives. To address this
relationship, I include dummy variables for employment status, occupation, and political
party identification. I also include a scale of left/right political self-placement in the
models to further specify political orientation.
Finally, there are several attitudinal variables that have been shown to affect
political values. Those persons who express attitudes o f national pride are more likely to
express positive political attitudes. Those persons who are satisfied with their own
economic condition are more likely to express positive political attitudes. And those
persons who are politically engaged —who express an interest in politics - are more
likely to express positive political attitudes. These variables must also be included in the
models, to assess the contribution of religious behavior net of these factors on political
attitudes. Table 3.1 illustrates the availability of each variable by country, across all data
sets. One may wish to refer to this table while reading the following details of variable
construction.
Independent Variables
These data were gathered by several different groups who employed a variety of
coding schemes on the variables. In order to make the surveys comparable, I recoded the
variables to the same scale wherever possible. Where that was not possible, I made sure

Table 3.1 Distribution o f Variables Across Datasets and Countries
World Values
ISSP
1990
1990
p
WG EG H
WG EG
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
X X
X X X X
Age Category
X
X X X
X
X
Attend Church
X X X
X
X
X
Secondary Education
X X X
X
X
X
Higher Income
X X X X
X X
Left-Right Placement
X X
X X X
X
Married or Living as
X X X X
X X
Female
X X
Community Size
X X X
X
X X X
Union Member
X
X X
X
Left Radical Vote
Center-Left Vote
X X X X
X
X
X X X
X X
X
Center-Right Vote
X
X
X
Right Radical Vote
X X X X
X
Unemployed
X
X X
X X X
X
White Collar Occupation
X X
X X X
X
Blue Collar Occupation
X X X X
Self Employed
X X
X X X X
National Pride
X X X X
Economically Satisfied
X X X X
X X
Interest in Politics

H
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

ISSP
1991
WG EG H
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

p

IfD
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WG EG

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

IfD
1992
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X X
(table con'd.)

World Values
1990
WG EG H
P
CHAPTER IV VARIABLES
Religious Beliefs Factor
Follow Conscience/Obey
Right/Wrong by God's Law
Right/Wrong by Society
Traditional Role for Women
Husband Job/Wife Home
Family Life Suffers
Believers Hold Public Office
Unbelievers Unfit for Office
Religion Influence Govt.
Religion Influence the Vote
Churches Too Much Power

ISSP
1990
WG EG H

X

X

ISSP
1991
WG EG H

p

X

X

X
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X
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X
X
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X

X
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X

IfD
1991
WG EG

IfD
1992
WG EG

X X

X X

(table con'd.)

00

World Values
1990
P
WG EG H
CHAPTER V VARIABLES
Confidence in State Inst.
Trust Government
Support Democratic Form
Freedom and Law
Tolerate Free Speech
Citizens Have Free Speech
Free Speech Factor
Support Protest Behaviors
Tolerate Protest Behaviors
Government Repression
Government Provide Jobs
Government Equalize Income
Family Can be Trusted
People Can be Trusted
Life is Happy
Reunification Joy
Now Better Than Past
Future Better Than Past
Political Efficacy Factor
People Can't Change Lives
Favor Change

X

X

X

X

X
X

ISSP
1990
WG EG H

X X

ISSP
1991
WG EG H
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X X X
X X X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

IfD
1992
WG EG
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

P

IfD
1991
WG EG

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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that the variables that I used measured the same thing across data sets and that they were
coded in the same direction across data sets. For example, "income" means "total
household income" whether it is measured in zlotys or Deutsche marks, and greater
income is given a greater value. All opinion questions are recoded so that missing values
are included in a middle category.
Age. Most o f the surveys restricted their samples to adults aged 18 and over in
the population. However, in the ISSP 1991 Poland restricted its sample to adults
between the ages of 16 and 65 in the population. Some of the surveys reported
respondents' actual ages. Other surveys reported age by categories. I recoded age into six
categories, so that the scale would be the same for each data set. Age ranges from a value
o f one for those who are 24 years old or less to a value of six for those who are 65 years
old or greater.
C hurch Attendance. The primary independent variable, used to measure
strength of affiliation with a religious denomination, is a five-point scale o f frequency of
church attendance. Each o f the data sets used a variety of coding schemes to code
church attendance. In order to standardize across the data I recoded the variable where
necessary into five comparable categories. The categories range from zero for those who
say they never attend church to five for those who say they attend at least weekly.
Education. Education was measured using country-specific coding for level of
education attained by the respondent. Sometimes this was reported as years o f education,
sometimes it was reported as school level completed by respondent. For comparability, I
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have recoded education into a dummy variable. Education has a value of one for
respondents who completed at least secondary education and zero for those who did not.6
Income. This variable measures respondents' total household income for all data
sets, but proved to be unwieldy to recode into the same metric. Each survey uses
country-specific income categories to report income, and furthermore, the number of
income categories range from a low of five categories to a high o f 22 categories. Rather
than try to convert country-specific amounts to some standard (such as exchange value in
$US at the time of the survey) and then restrict the converted values to comparable
categories across data sets, I elected to retain the integrity o f the original reported
incomes. Therefore, across all countries in all surveys greater values for income
represent greater levels of household income, with no further comparability implied.
Left/Right Self-Placement. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a
scale o f political ideology. In most cases this was a ten-point scale; one represents the
political left and 10 represents the political right. The IfD surveys employed a 100-point
scale; zero represents the political left and 100 represents the political right. Rather than
trying to impose some sort of reducing metric on this scale to force it to conform to the
ten-point scale, I left the scales as they are reported. Therefore, increased values in

6I also tested education as it was originally coded, with several categories of
education —higher values indicating more education completed. There was very little
difference in effect between either coding scheme, and the value for church attendance
did not change significantly in any model. Therefore, I chose to display the results for
education coded as a dummy variable, since completion o f secondary education is a more
meaningful threshold concept.
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left/right self-placement indicate increased identification with the political right; no
further comparability is implied.
M arital Status. Again, a variety of coding schemes measured current marital
status o f respondent. The ISSP surveys reported married or living together as one
category. In all the other surveys I recoded those who reported they are married as well
as those who reported they are single but living with a partner into one category. I then
created a dummy variable for marital status. This variable has a value of one for those
who are married or living with a partner and zero for those who are not.
Sex. This variable was coded identically across all surveys. I recoded the
variable into a dummy variable, with a value o f one for females and zero for males.
Community Size. Respondents were asked to report the size o f their community
o f residence. Although these data sets used a variety of coding schemes to report size of
community, it was possible to recode each of them into a comparable scale. Community
size is reported here in a five-point scale, with a value o f one for communities with less
than 5,000 residents and a value of five for communities with more than 100,000
residents.
Union M embership. This variable was not available in all surveys, but was
included in the analysis wherever it could be incorporated. Union membership is a
dummy variable with a value of one for those who report they belong to a union and zero
for all others.
Political P arty Identification. All surveys asked respondents some form of
question about identification with a particular political party. Since Europeans do not
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usually formally affiliate with a political party, the most common way to ask about party
identification is to ask respondents to identify which political party they would vote for if
a federal election were held on the following day . Using this question, and the objective
political orientations o f the various country-specific parties, I created four dummy
variables for political party identification.
Left-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the party
most strongly identified with the former communists in that particular country (PDS or
DKP in eastern Germany, MSZMP in Hungary, PZPR in Poland, doesn't exist for western
Germany), zero otherwise.
Center-left vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major
center-left party (SPD in Germany, the center-left opposition alliance of MSZP, SZDSZ
and FIDESZ in Hungary, and the Social Democrats in Poland), zero otherwise. Centerright vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major center-right
party (CDU/CSU/DSU in Germany, the center-right ruling coalition of MDF, FKgP and
KDNP in Hungary, and the Christian Democrats and Solidarity in Poland), zero
otherwise.
Right-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for an ultra
nationalist party (NPD and Republikaner in Germany, Real Politic Union or National
Party for Poland), zero otherwise (see Racz 1993 for Hungarian parties' ideologies and
Jasiewicz 1993 for Polish parties' ideologies).
In this way I have captured both extremes of political party identification for each
of the countries, as well as the two main center parties (or party coalitions). The omitted
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reference category for political party identification includes all those who would not
express a political preference, as well as those who named a party not identified with
either extreme or with the center. For example, Germans who said they would vote for
the Greens/Bundnis '90 Party would be included in the omitted reference category, as that
party is neither centrist nor extreme.
Unemployment. Experience of unemployment is measured in different ways in
several o f the surveys. The World Values Survey reports whether the respondent (or the
chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) is currently unemployed. The ISSP
surveys report current unemployment status only for the respondent. I constructed a
dummy variable for unemployment for each o f these surveys, with current unemployment
coded one and employment coded zero.
The IfD surveys ask several questions about whether the respondent or anyone
else in the household is unemployed, has been unemployed in the last two years, or fears
becoming unemployed in the next six months. From a count of positive responses to
these questions I constructed a variable that ranges from zero to six. The lowest values
represent those who have not experienced unemployment and do not fear becoming
unemployed, and increasing values represent increased experience or fear of
unemployment.
Occupation. Country-specific occupation codes are subsequently recoded into
more general, derived categories o f occupation in the WVS and the ISSP surveys. From
these categories I created dummy variables for white collar occupation, blue collar
occupation, and self-employed. For the WVS those respondents (or the chief wage
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earner, if that is not the respondent) who reported that they were either
employer/managers, professional workers, or middle or junior level non-manual workers
were coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those who reported
occupation as either foreman/supervisor, or skilled, semiskilled or unskilled manual
workers were coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those respondents
(or the chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) who reported that they were self
employed were coded one for self employment, zero otherwise.
The ISSP is handled similarly, except that there is no question to identify whether
or not the respondent is also the chief wage earner. Therefore, respondents whose
occupation is scientific/technical professional, manager/administrative professional,
clerical or service are coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those
respondents whose occupation is trade professions, professions in agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and commercial animal husbandry, or those who are in industrial production,
manufacture, transportation services, or unskilled laborers are coded one for blue collar
occupation, zero otherwise. Data restrictions prevented me from excluding farm-related
occupations from this category, as is routinely done. Another question asking whether
the respondent is self employed is coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.
The IfD surveys, like the WVS, ask the occupation o f respondent or chief wage
earner. Those who respond that their occupation is managing or non-managing
employee, or high, middle or lower-level services are coded one for white collar
occupation, zero otherwise. Those who report that their occupation is technical/trade
worker or other worker are coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those
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who report that they own a large firm, are self employed business people or self
employed hand workers are coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.
National Pride. This variable asks respondents to report how proud they are to
be their particular nationality. Since pride measures a continuum o f attitude, with a
strong negative attitude having the lowest value, and a strong positive attitude having the
highest value, I recoded missing values to the middle category. Therefore, a value of one
corresponds to those who say they are not at all proud to be their nationality, and a value
o f five corresponds to those who say they are very proud to be their nationality.
Economic satisfaction. This variable measures respondents' subjective level of
economic satisfaction. The World Values Survey asks respondents to rank themselves on
a ten point scale, according to their level of financial satisfaction. Values range from one
for dissatisfied to ten for satisfied. The IfD surveys ask respondents two questions about
economic satisfaction. The first asks them to rank general economic conditions in
Germany today. The second asks them to rank their own economic situation. Each
question is measured on a five-point scale, from very bad to very good. The questions
were summed to form a Likert-type scale of economic satisfaction, ranging from two for
very dissatisfied to ten for very satisfied.
In terest in Politics. This variable asks respondents to report how interested they
are in politics. Responses range from one for not at all interested to five for very
interested (WVS 1990 and ISSP 1990 surveys). Response categories for the IfD surveys
range from one for not at all interested to three for very interested.
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variables here are grouped according to the chapter in which they
are examined, as described in the hypothesis section in Chapter Two. That is, dependent
variables that address particular moral values to be discussed in chapter four are grouped
here under the heading "Chapter Four Variables" and the dependent variables that address
particular political values to be discussed in chapter five are grouped under the heading
"Chapter Five Variables" for purposes of discussion. Each of these dependent variables
is not always available in each of the different surveys; refer to Table 3.1 for clarification.
C hapter F our Variables
Religious Beliefs
Religious Beliefs Factor. Respondents were asked about their level of belief in
God, as well as five other articles o f belief. Belief in God is measured on a six-point
scale, ranging from one for no belief in God to six for no doubt in the existence of God.
The other five articles o f belief - belief in an afterlife, the devil, heaven, hell, and
miracles —were each measured on a five-point scale, ranging from one for definitely do
not believe to five for definitely do believe. Factor analysis revealed a one-factor
solution, for each country separately as well as for all four countries pooled, so the factor
score is used as the dependent variable of religious beliefs (Table 3.2).
Authority vs. Autonomy
Follow Conscience R ather Than Obey. The question text reads, "In general,
would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there
exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means
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Table 3.2 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Religious Beliefs8
W estern
Eastern
Germ any
Germ any

H ungary

Factor and Items_______________ Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

Religious Beliefs
Hell
Devil
Heaven
Afterlife
Miracles
God

.87
.86
.85
.76
.65
.64

.88
.87
.82
.82
.60
.70

3.63
3.71
Eigenvalue
Percent o f Variance
60.5%
61.8%
Explained
Source: ISSP 1991
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .74, .68, .46, .33, .15
Eastern Germany .78, .61, .42, .35, .13
Hungary .75, .50, .42, .31, .22
Poland .82, .58, .52, .37, .26

Poland
Factor Loading

.85
.76
.88
.82
.76
.68

.83
.73
.83
.79
.72
.62

3.8

3.45

63.3%

57.5%
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breaking the law?" Response categories range from one for those who say obey the law
without exception to three for those who say follow conscience on occasion.
Right/W rong Should be Based on God's Law. This variable asks respondents
how much they agree with the statement "Right and wrong should be based on God's
laws." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for
those who strongly agree.
Right/W rong Should be Determined by Society. Similarly to the previous
question, respondents here are asked how much they agree with the statement "Right and
wrong should be determined by society." Response categories range from one for those
who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Family Values
Traditional Role for Women. The variable is a factor scale, composed of a
factor analysis of respondent's responses to the following questions, each recoded so that
the more conservative answer is high:
•
•
•

A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (strongly agree is
high)
A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children (strongly
agree is high)
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (strongly agree is high)

These were the variables which loaded most consistently on the same factor in each of the
three countries (Table 3.3), as well as in the pooled model including all three countries.
Traditional Family Roles. This variable asks respondents how much they agree
with the statement "A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the

Table 3.3 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components
Analysis of Traditional Role for Women0
Western
Eastern
Germany
Germany
Factor and Items

Traditional Role fo r Women
Pre-school Children Suffer
Women Want Home and Childre
Housewife as Fulfilling as Work

Hungary

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

.63
.80
.77

Eigenvalue
1.62
54.1%
Percent o f Variance Explained
Source: WVS 1990
“Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .80, .57
Eastern Germany .78, .51
Hungary .80, .48

.63
.81
.81

.64
.84
.77

1.71
57.1%

1.72
57.2%
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home and the family.” Response categories range from one for those who strongly
disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
W orking Women. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the
statement "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." Response categories
range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Attitudes about religion and politics
It is B etter if Religious Believers Hold Public Office. This variable asks
respondents how much they agree with the statement "It would be better for [respondent's
country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office." Response
categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly
agree.
Those W ho Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office. For this
variable respondents report how much they agree with the statement "Politicians who do
not believe in God are unfit for public office." Response categories range from one for
those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Government. Respondents are
asked how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to
influence government decisions." Response categories range from one for those who
strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote. This variable asks
respondents how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to
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influence how people vote in elections." Response categories range from one for those
who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
C hurches and Religious Organizations Have Too M uch Power. This variable
asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "Do you think that churches
and religious organizations in this country have too much power or too little power."
Response categories range from one for those who say "far too little power" to five for
those who say "far too much power".
C hapter Five Variables
Confidence and Trust in the Institutions of Government
Confidence in State Institutions. Respondents were asked to measure their level
o f confidence in each o f up to thirteen various institutions; response categories range
from one (no confidence) to four (a great deal of confidence) or five (for ISSP 1991).
Factor analysis for each o f the countries, as well as for pooled models including all of the
countries together, most often produced a two-factor solution in each country, with minor
variations among the variables included in each factor. When the variables loading most
strongly on the same factor in each country were included together in a second factor
analysis, a one factor solution was produced for each country, as well as for the pooled
models. The institutions included in this factor include schools, courts, Parliament, and
civil service. These variables were the ones which most often loaded on the same factor
in each o f the countries. See Tables 3.4 - 3.6 for results o f the factor analysis of these
variables.

Table 3.4 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components
Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (World Values Survey)0
W estern
Eastern
Germany
Germany
Hungary
Poland
Factor and Items

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament
.79
Courts
.77
Civil Service
.75
Schools
.66
Eigenvalue
Percent o f Variance
Explained
Source: WVS 1990

.66
.74
.74
.68

.76
.76
.76
.69

.81
.57
.80
.58

2.21

2

2.2

1.97

55.2%

50.0%

55.1%

49.2%

"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .75, .57, .48
Eastern Germany .91, .56, .53
Hungary .86, .54, .40
Poland 1.26, .51,.27

Table 3.5 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components
Analysis o f Confidence in State Institutions (International Social Survey
Program)3
W estern
Eastern
Germany
Germ any
Factor and Items

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament
.70
Courts
.78
Civil Service
.78
Schools
.65
Eigenvalue
Percent of Variance
Explained
Source: ISSP 1991

Hungary

Poland
Factor Loading

.68
.76
.78
.65

.79
.75
.82
.66

.67
.73
.72
.66

2.12

2.07

2.3

1.95

53.0%

51.7%

57.4%

53.0%

"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .80, .54, .54
Eastern Germany .80, .60, .53
Hungary .89, .49, .32
Poland .81,-64, .60

Table 3.6 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components
Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (Institut fuer Demoskopie

Factor and Items

Surveys)8
W estern
Eastern
G erm any
Germ any
(91)
(91)

W estern
Germ any
(92)

Eastern
Germ any
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading

Factor Loading

Factor Loading

.81
.79
.72
.69

.77
.71
.68
.62

2.27

1.95

56.8%

48.8%

Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament
.76
.73
Courts
Civil Service
.73
.61
Schools

.77
.73
.71
.58

Eigenvalue
2.00
1.97
Percent o f Variance
Explained
50.0%
49.2%
Sources; IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .80, .68, ,52
Eastern Germany (91) .84, .70, .50
Western Germany (92) .73, .60, .40
Eastern Germany (92) .79, .72, .54
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T ru st in Government. This variable is comprised of a factor scale o f three
questions:
•

•

•

How much.of the time do you think you can trust the government in Bonn to do
what is right -- just about always, most o f the time, only some of the time, or none
o f the time? (never, sometimes, don't know, usually, always)
Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking
out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people? (special interests,
don't know, all people)
Do you believe that the representatives in Bonn first and foremost represent the
interests o f the populace or do they have other interests which are more important
to them? (other interests, don't know, all people)

The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater trust in government.
Factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of confidence in government, so the
factor score is used as the dependent variable here (Table 3.7).
Support for Democracy as a Form of State
Support for Democracy. This variable is comprised o f a factor scale o f opinions
on the following three questions:
•

•
•

Do you believe that the democracy that we have in Germany is the best form of
state or is there another form o f state which is better? (another better, don't know,
best form o f state)
If someone says, "We can solve the problems we have in the Federal Republic
with democracy," would you agree or not? (disagree, don't know, agree)
Two men are discussing how a country should be governed. The one says: "I
like it best when the people place the best politician at the top and give him
complete governing power. He can then clearly and quickly decide with a few
chosen experts. Not much talking is done and something really happens!" The
other says: "I prefer that a number o f people have to determine something in the
country. They do sometimes go round and round until something is done, but it is
not so easy for abuse o f power to occur." Which of these two opinions is closest
to your own view —the first or the second? (one person, don’t know, several
politicians)
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Table 3.7 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Trust in Government0
W estern
Eastern
Germany
G erm any
(91)
(91)
Factor and Items

Trust in Government
Government Run for All
Trust Bonn to do Right
MPs Represent the People

Factor Loading

.83
.78
.75

Eigenvalue
1.87
Percent o f Variance
62.3%
Explained
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

W estern
G erm any
(92)

Eastern
Germ any
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

.81
.80
.79

.79
.80
.74

.80
.82
.78

1.93

1.82

1.93

64.4%

60.5%

64.3%

"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .64, .49
Eastern Germany (91) .55, .52
Western Germany (92) .65, .53
Eastern Germany (92) .58, .49
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The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater support for
democracy. Again, factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of support for
democracy, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable (Table 3.8).
Political Freedoms and Political Rights
Freedom vs. Living Standard. This question asks respondents to decide which
is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard o f living. The responses
are coded so that one is higher living standard, two is don't know, three is freedom and
law.
Tolerate Freedom o f Speech. A set o f questions from the IfD surveys asks
respondents whether one should tolerate a speech made by a racist or a revolutionary.
These questions come originally from the General Social Survey, and are adaptations of
Stouffer's (1955) tolerance questions. The questions are worded:
•

•

There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. First
consider people who want to overthrow the government by revolution. Do you
think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings to express their
views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)
Now consider people who believe that whites are racially superior to all other
races. Do you think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings
to express their views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)

The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater tolerance. Both
questions loaded on the same factor in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the
factor scale is used as the dependent variable as it captures an underlying dimension of
political tolerance (Table 3.9).
Believe Citizens Have Free Speech. The question asks "Do you feel that one
can express his political opinions freely in Germany today, or is it better to be careful?"
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Table 3.8 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis o f
Support for Democracy"
W estern
Eastern
G erm any
Germ any
(91)
(91)
Factor and Items

Support fo r Democracy
Solve Problems with Dem
German Democracy Best
Deliberative Body is Best

Factor Loading Factor Loading

.74
.73
.52

.81
.82
-.06

1.34
1.33
Eigenvalue
Percent o f Variance
44.2%
Explained
44.7%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .92, .74
Eastern Germany (91) .99, .67
Western Germany (92) .90, .78
Eastern Germany (92) .99, .72

W estern
Germ any
(92)

Eastern
G erm any
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading

.72
.70
.56

.78
.79
.25

1.32

1.29

44.0%

43.1%
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Table 3.9 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Tolerance for Freedom of Speech3
W estern
Germany
(91)
Factor and Items

Tolerate Freedom o f Speech
Revolutionary Speech OK
Racialist Speech Allowed

Eastern
Germany
(91)

W estern
Germ any
(92)

E astern
Germ any
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

Factor Loading

.81
.81

.85
.85

.82
.82

1.3
65.2%

1.45
72.7%

1.35
67.3%

.85
.85

1.44
Eigenvalue
71.9%
Percent of Variance Explaine
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .56
Eastern Germany (91) .70
Western Germany (92) .55
Eastern Germany (92) .65
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The question is coded so that higher values represent agreement that people can speak
freely.
Right to Free Expression. This question is a factor score from two items
developed in 1968 by Rudolf Wildenmann and Max Kaase (Kaase 1971). Response
categories range from one for full disagreement to six for full agreement. The questions
read: "On these cards, we have put together a series of commonly-heard opinions about
peoples' behavior. We would like to find out what people really think. Please sort out the
cards on this scale according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement:
•
•

Every citizen has the right to go to the streets for his convictions if necessary
Everyone should have the right to stand up for his opinion, even if the majority
disagrees

Factor analysis o f these two items yielded one underlying factor of support for the right
of free expression, which was used as the dependent variable (Table 3.10).
Protests
Support Protest Behaviors. This variable is a Guttman scale, made up of five
variables which measure whether or not the respondents had ever engaged in various
forms o f protest behavior, or were inclined to do so. These variables were replicated
from the Political Action Data Set, conducted in the mid 1970s in eight countries of
western Europe and the United States.7 These five variables are presumed to have
unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them suitable for Guttman

7See Barnes and Kaase, 1979, for additional information about the original data
set, particularly the Technical Appendix for information about variable construction.
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Table 3.10 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Right to Freedom o f Expression0
W estern
Eastern
W estern
Germ any
Germ any
Germany
(91)
(91)
(92)
Factor and Items

Eastern
Germ any
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading

Right to Freedom o f Expression
Take Convictions to Streets

.83

.80

.83

.81

Stand Up for Own Opinion

.83

.80

.83

.81

1.39

1.28

1.37

1.31

69.5%

64.2%

68.7%

65.7%

Eigenvalue
Percent o f Variance
Explained

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .61
Eastern Germany (91) .72
Western Germany (92) .63
Eastern Germany (92) .69
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scaling. Response categories are one for have done, two for might do, and three for
would never do. The original question wording is as follows:
I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people
can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have
actually done any o f these things, whether you might do it or would never,
under any circumstances, do it.
a) Signing a petition
b) Joining in boycotts
c) Attending lawful demonstrations
d) Joining unofficial strikes
e) Occupying buildings or factories
In order to construct a Guttman scale from these five items I followed the same
procedure detailed in the technical appendix by the creators of the Political Action Data
Set. I reproduced a protest activity scale, with responses ranging from zero (never done
any protest activity) to five (have done or might do all five items) for each country.
Tolerate Protest Behavior. This series of questions was also taken from the
Political Action Data Set. As in the variable above, this variable is also a Guttman scale,
made up of six variables which measure whether or not the respondents think these
various forms o f protest behavior should be allowed. Again, these six variables are
presumed to have unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them
suitable for Guttman scaling. Response categories range from one for definitely allowed
to four for definitely not allowed. The original question wording is as follows:
There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government
action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and
which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. (Please tick one box
on each line).
a) Organizing public meetings to protest against the government
b) Publishing pamphlets to protest against the government
c) Organizing protest marches and demonstrations
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d) Occupying a government office and stopping work there for several days
e) Seriously damaging government buildings
The variable was created using the same procedure as above for creating the variable of
support for protest activity.
Oppose Governm ent Repression. A final variable measuring attitude toward
public protest was also reproduced from the Political Action Data Set. This variable is a
factor scale, composed o f four questions which ask respondents whether they approve or
disapprove o f a variety o f forms o f government repression o f protest activity. The
questions are worded as follows:
What do you think about the following behaviors? Please tell me for each one,
whether you approve or disapprove o f this behavior?
a) Police attack demonstrators with clubs
b) Judges impose severe sentences against protesters who attack police defense
lines
c) The government forbids public demonstrations in the interest o f public safety
and order
d) The federal government employs the national guard or the army to end a strike
The questions are coded so that opposition to government repression has the highest
value. All o f the questions loaded on the same factor of opposition to government
repression in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the
dependent variable (Table 3.11).
Economic Issues
Not the Responsibility of Government to Provide Jobs. Not the
Responsibility of G overnm ent to Equalize Incomes. These variables are the only two
replicated in 1991 from a series o f questions about the responsibilities o f government

Table 3.11 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis
o f Opposition to Government Repression3

Factor and Items

Western
Germany
(91)

Eastern
Germany
(91)

Factor Loading

Factor Loading

Oppose Government Repression
Police Attacks on Demonstrator

.74

.74

Severe Sentences for Protestors

.69

.59

Forbid Public Demonstrations

.74

.64

Troops Intervene in Strikes

.67

.82

2.02

1.97

50.5%

49.3%

Eigenvalue
Percent of Variance Explained

Source: IfD 5055 (1991)
“Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .88, .58, .53
Eastern Germany .99, .69, .34
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asked in 1990. The question text reads, "On the whole, do you think it should be or
should not be the government's responsibility to:"
•
•

Provide a job for everyone who wants one
Reduce income differences between the rich and poor

Answer categories range from one for definitely should to five for definitely should not.
Interpersonal Trust
Family M embers Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents to rank how
much they can trust various groups o f people; the first group asked about is "your
family." Response categories range from one for no trust at all to five for complete trust.
People Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents whether, generally
speaking, they would say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful
in dealing with people. Responses were recoded so that a value of one indicates the
response that most people can be trusted and zero indicates that one must be careful in
dealing with people.
Optimism
Describe Life as Happy. This variable asks respondents, "If you were to
consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are,
on the whole?" Response categories range from one for not at all happy to five for very
happy.
Joyful about Reunification. This question was asked on the IfD surveys, for
both parts of Germany. The question reads, "Is the German reunification more an
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occasion for joy or concern for you?" Response categories are one for concern, two for
don't know, and three for joy.
Evaluation of Present and F uture Relative to the P a s t The IfD surveys asked
respondents to rate from zero to ten the general situation in their part of the country at
three points in time. The question is worded:
If you think back to the time when Germany was still divided, what do you
generally think of the situation at that time? Tell me according to this ladder:
Zero would mean that the situation in our part o f Germany was very bad, and 10
would mean that the situation here was very good. Which number best expresses
what the situation here was like back then? What is the situation like at the
present time? Which number best expresses the present situation in our part of
Germany?
The rating for the past situation was subtracted from the rating for the present situation to
obtain the respondent's evaluation of relative improvement since reunification. The
rating for the present situation was subtracted from the rating for the future situation to
obtain the respondent's projection for improvement in the future. Positive values indicate
optimism about the present and future situations in Germany, relative to the past.
Efficacy and Attitude toward Change
Political Efficacy. This set o f four efficacy questions is replicated from the
University o f Michigan National Election Studies. For each item, respondents are asked
whether they agree (1), don't know (2), or disagree (3). The question is worded: "On this
list are opinions that one sometimes hears. Please tell me for each opinion whether you
agree or disagree."
•
•

Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the
government runs things
I don't think that public officials care much about what people like me think
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•
•

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me
can't really understand what's going on
People like me don't have any say about what the government does

Factor analysis resulted in a single factor o f efficacy for each country separately, as well
as for the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable o f political
efficacy (Table 3.12).
People Can Do Little to Change T heir Lives. A measure of personal efficacy
comes from a question asked on the ISSP 1991 survey. This question asks people
whether they agree with the statement, "There is little that people can do to change the
course o f their lives." Response categories range from one for disagreeing strongly to
five for agreeing strongly.
A ttitude tow ard Change, Three questions were asked about personal attitudes
toward change, which provide another measure of respondent's personal efficacy. A
factor scale is created out of these three questions asking people to rank their outlook on
life, according to a ten point scale. Responses indicating personal efficacy and openness
to change were ranked high. The questions included:
•
•
•

You will never achieve much unless you act boldly (vs. One should be cautious
about making major changes in life)
New ideas are generally better than old ones (vs. Ideas that have stood the test of
time are generally best)
When changes occur in my life, I welcome the possibility that something new is
beginning (vs. When changes occur in my life, I worry about the difficulties they
may cause)

Factor analysis indicated that all three questions loaded on one factor in each country, as
well as in the pooled data, so the factor score was used as another measure o f personal
efficacy (Table 3.13).
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Table 3.12 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Political Efficacy®
Western
Germany
(91)
Factor and Items

Factor Loading

Eastern
Germany
(91)

Western
Germany
(92)

Factor Loading Factor Loading

Eastern
Germany
(92)
Factor Loading

Political Efficacy
Vote Not Only Influence

.63

.60

.63

.50

Officials Care What I Thin

.74

.70

.59

.71

Politics Not Complicated

.72

.69

.59

.66

People Have Say in Govern

.72

.81

.72

.74

1.99

1.99

1.61

1.74

49.7%

49.9%

40.3%

43.5%

Eigenvalue
Percent of Variance
Explained

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .78, .66, .57
Eastern Germany (91) .82, .68, .51
Western Germany (92) .91, .79, .69
Eastern Germany (92) .91, .71, .65

Table 3.13 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components
Analysis o f Attitude Toward Change0
W estern
Eastern
Germ any
Germ any
Factor and Items

Factor Loading Factor Loading

Hungary
Factor Loading

Attitude Toward Change
Welcome Change in My Life
Act Boldly to Achieve in Life
New Ideas Better than Old Ones

.81
.81
.79

.79
.76
.74

.75
.74
.60

Eigenvalue

1.93

1.75

1.47

58.5%

48.9%

Percent o f Variance Explained
64.2%
Source: WVS 1990
°Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .56, .51
Eastern Germany .66, .58
Hungary .85, .69
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Altogether, there are twelve dependent variables to be discussed in chapter four,
dealing with church attenders religious beliefs and attitudes toward certain moral and
social issues. These variables are important to explore the breadth and depth o f the
influence o f religion in these postcommunist societies. Then there are twenty-one
dependent variables to be discussed in chapter five, dealing with church attenders1support
for the government and political values. This broad spectrum of variables is necessary to
explore the terrain of church influence on political values in these postcommunist
societies. As was set out in the hypotheses, certain o f these democratic values reflect the
priestly tradition of the church, others reflect the prophetic tradition, and still others
cannot easily be identified with either tradition. By exploring the effect of church
attendance on each o f these variables of democratic support we can better understand just
how the church is operating in civil society in each of these countries.
METHODS
To provide the most parsimonious model for each dependent variable, while at the
same time provide a model that explains variance within each country, I first ran a full
regression model for each dependent variable. In this full model I included church
attendance as the primary independent variable. I also included other demographic
variables known from the literature to be associated with church attendance (age, sex,
marital status, education, income, political ideology, and community size). I included
union membership as a control variable to capture the influence o f this other aspect of
civil society.
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Finally, I included several variables often associated with support for democratic
values, such as political party identification, occupation, national pride, economic
satisfaction, and interest in politics. Any variable that achieved a minimum level o f
significance (p<. 10) for any o f the four countries was retained for inclusion in the final
models for all countries. Therefore, for each dependent variable, the model reported in
the tables is the most parsimonious model that includes variables important for explaining
variation in at least one o f the four countries. Any variable that was included in the full
model but was dropped from the final models because it failed to achieve significance in
any o f the countries is indicated in the tables by a dash. And any variable that was not
included in the final model for a particular country because it was not asked o f that
country in that data set is indicated in the tables by "n/a".
Each table reports standardized regression coefficients, along with their
significance levels. Since these are standardized regression coefficients their size or
significance cannot be compared across models. The conclusions that I draw from these
models are based on the relative strength of each of the independent variables in the
equations, not on their absolute values.

CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE
The churches in central and eastern Europe are once again free to operate, after
nearly 50 years o f government repression. Before we can speak meaningfully of the
political values o f church attenders in post-transition societies we need first to evaluate
the present condition of these churches. In this chapter I examine church membership
characteristics of East Germany, Poland and Hungary to see who still belongs after two
generations of communism. Then I explore the sociodemographic characteristics of
church members, to search for patterns o f disaffiliation. Next I analyze religious beliefs,
to determine whether church attenders differ from non-attenders in their religious beliefs.
Finally, I examine a variety of moral and social values to see whether church attendance
has an effect on these values.
Church Membership
For purposes of this analysis I have recoded church membership into a dummy
variable, coded zero if the respondent claimed no religious affiliation and one if the
respondent claimed a religious affiliation. I have done the same for Catholic and
Protestant affiliation (one if the respondent reported self as Catholic or Protestant, zero if
not). Poland and Hungary report the highest rates of religious affiliation (see Table 4.1),
with non-affiliation rates of only 4.8% and 6.1%, respectively. 95% o f Poles are
Catholics; there are no Polish Protestants in this sample (ISSP 1991). In Hungary,
72.4% are Catholics, 21.4% are Protestants. Each of these countries has retained very
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Table 4.1 Church Affiliation Rates and Characteristics o f Church Members
(proportion o f church members in each category, by country)

Church Affiliates
Catholics
Protestants
Age Category
Under 25
65 and Older
Secondary Education Complet
Higher than Average Income
Right o f Center Self Placement
Married or Living as Married
Female
Community Size
<5000 people
>100,000 people
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
Source: ISSP 1991

W estern
Germ any
.89
.43
.45

E astern
G erm any
.35
.06
.29

H ungary
.93
.73
.21

Poland
.95
.95
.00

.13
.18
.26
.59
.52
.60
.53

.06
.25
.17
.69
.44
.63
.66

.08
.16
.32
.72
n/a
.72
.57

.16
.06
.36
.52
.58
.69
.53

.12
.63
.16
n/a
.33
.27
.01
.02
.50
.35
.08

.46
.20
.24
.01
.26
.25
.00
.06
.47
.47
.13

.31
.30
.40
.01
.27
.22
n/a
.01
.23
.34
.04

.43
.28
.18
n/a
.00
.04
.00
.09
.19
.34
.13
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high levels o f religious affiliation. In contrast, western Germany, which did not have a
policy o f official repression o f religion, reports a non-affiliation rate o f 10.7%. 42.6% of
the western German sample are Catholics, and 44.7% are Protestants. Eastern Germany
has the lowest rate o f affiliation; greater than 64% o f the sample claim no affiliation with
any organized religion. 29% o f the eastern German sample are Protestants; only 5.7%
are Catholics.
When Germany was divided into two countries after World War II, religious
affiliation was very similar between East and West. The main religious difference
between them was that East Germany was almost entirely Protestant while West
Germany was about evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics. To compare
overall affiliation rates, in 1950 the proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical
in eastern and western Germany, approximately 90% o f the population. But by 1989 the
proportion o f adherents in the East had dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of
the population (Lemke 1989).
The significant drop in religious affiliation in eastern Germany could be due to at
least two possible contributing factors. First, the drop could be due to a rapid
secularization o f East German society. Secularization theory proposes that as society
modernizes more material values tend to replace traditional values and the place of
religion in society is displaced by modem science and technology (see Greeley 1982;
Wilson 1982; Luckmann 1983). For many years East Germany was the model of
advanced Soviet society, exemplifying the very latest in Soviet technology and
development. Perhaps this modernizing pressure on East German society led to a more
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rapid secularization o f this society. If so, then younger East Germans should have
disaffiliated at a more rapid rate than their elders, as they have been more subjected to
these modernizing pressures through their education. If the secularization process is the
primary cause o f disaffiliation in eastern Germany then we would expect to see younger
eastern Germans disaffiliating in greater numbers than older eastern Germans.
However, another possible cause o f disaffiliation could be the severe repression of
the churches by the Soviet authorities. Repression o f religious expression, particularly
religious affiliation, may have been especially harsh in East Germany, the showcase of
Soviet society to the West. We know from historical accounts that religious clergy were
harshly sanctioned in East Germany. Accounts of the repression of citizens who
continued to express their religious faith have also been documented (see Chapter Two).
Repression, though, affects all age levels of society. As churches are closed and public
worship is negatively sanctioned, persons of all age groups are equally affected. If
repression were the primary cause of disaffiliation, then church membership rates should
be lower across all age groups in eastern Germany, especially when compared to
membership rates in western Germany. Figure 4.1 illustrates percentage o f church
members (of any denomination) for each age group, by country. One sees immediately
that church membership is dramatically lower for eastern Germans across all age
categories.
Sanctions against church membership were particularly detrimental for younger
people in East Germany; for example, young Christians faced severe discrimination in
educational and occupational opportunities (Childs 1983; Dennis 1988; Cordell 1990).
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But Figure 4.1 shows that disaffiliation was successfully promoted across all age groups.
This is the effect one would expect if repression of church membership is the primary
cause o f the decrease in church membership rates. No similar effect is seen in any o f the
other countries.
Since eastern Germany has a predominantly Protestant tradition (Lutheranism
originated in eastern Germany) and Catholics are associated with higher rates of
affiliation, I next restricted the sample to non-Catholics and again looked at percentage of
church members by age group. Again, church membership is much lower for eastern
Germans, across all age groups (Figure 4.2). The line for Polish non-Catholics is
misleading; there are so few Polish non-Catholics in the sample that they are not even
represented in all age categories. Therefore, that line was omitted from the figure.
The line representing Hungarian non-Catholics is interesting here, because it
shows more o f the effect expected from secularization theory. Younger Hungarian nonCatholics (those below age 45) are much less likely to be church members than are older
Hungarians, an effect associated with secularization. Note that for eastern Germans there
is a similar effect, though not as pronounced as for Hungarian Protestants. However,
when one takes into account the fact that church membership in East Germany was about
90% o f the population prior to World War II, the differences in membership rates for all
ages between Hungarian Protestants and eastern German Protestants suggest that the
decline in membership among eastern Germans is not attributable primarily to
secularization, but is more likely to have been caused by state repression o f the churches
there. In contrast, Hungarian non-Catholics show more of a secularization pattern in
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their church membership, since the older cohorts have not disaffiliated to any significant
degree. This is not to say that Hungarian society is secularized. Church membership
rates in Hungary overall are still nearly 95% o f the population, as reported above. This
membership pattern does allow for speculation, though, that membership rates in
Hungary's Protestant churches may continue to decline as younger, less affiliated cohorts
replace the older, more affiliated cohorts.
Characteristics of Church Members
Table 4.1 also presents some demographic characteristics of church members for
eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland. Again, figures for western Germany are included
as a benchmark reference point for comparison. Eastern German and Hungarian church
members are slightly more likely to be female than western German church members,
but Polish church members are equally likely to be female. The age distribution also
shows similarities between Poles and western Germans, and between eastern Germans
and Hungarians. The Polish sample was restricted to persons between the ages of 16 and
65, so the distribution of church members at the upper end of the age spectrum is
probably not representative for Poland.
In terms of education, just over one quarter of western German church members
have completed a secondary school education (secondary technical or trade school). In
contrast, more than a third o f Polish church members have completed secondary school
education. Hungarian church members are similar to Poles in education completed, and
eastern German church members have the lowest rates o f completed secondary education.
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Church members in all four places are most likely to be married or living with a
partner. Eastern German church members are the more likely to be widowed than
members in the other four countries, and church members in Poland and western
Germany are more likely to be single. Polish and eastern German church members are
more likely to live in a small community of less than 5,000 persons, while western
German church members are more likely to be urban dwellers. In Hungary, church
members are rather more equally distributed between rural and urban communities.
Political orientation of church members reflects a somewhat right o f center
ideology in all countries but eastern Germany. In that country only forty-four percent of
church members placed themselves to the right of the mean ideology score for their
country. Political ideology was not reported for Hungary. As for vote intention, church
members show little support for radical political parties on either end o f the ideological
spectrum. Between a quarter and a third of church members report they would vote for
either a center-left or a center-right party, in all countries except Poland. However, there
were so few Poles who were willing to identify with a political party in the survey
(somewhat under 15%) that meaningful comparisons here are not possible.
Finally, Hungarian church members are most likely to be members o f a union,
followed by eastern Germans, Poles and western Germans. Poland has the highest
percentage o f church members who are unemployed, but even there less than ten percent
of church members are unemployed.

Nearly half the church members in both parts of

Germany report white-collar employment; about one-fourth of Hungarian church
members and about one-fifth of Polish church members are white collar workers. About
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one-third o f church members in western Germany, Hungary and Poland are blue collar
workers; forty-seven percent o f eastern German church members are blue collar. And
although church members are unlikely to be self-employed, fully thirteen percent of
church members in both eastern Germany and Poland are self-employed.
Church Attendance
While church membership rates can tell us something about the extent o f Soviet
repression in Eastern Europe, church attendance is a better measure of religious
attachment. In other words, chinch membership rates are only a crude measure of
religious attachment; better measurement o f the extent of religious socialization is more
accurately captured by examining church attendance. For example, although about 89%
o f western Germans claim to be members o f a church, more than 21% admit they never
attend services. Mean rates of church attendance by age for each country are illustrated
by Figure 4.3. The figure shows similar country-specific patterns of church attendance
as was seen in Figure 4.1 for church membership. Poles show the highest rates of church
attendance, eastern Germans show the lowest rates o f church attendance, and church
attendance rates for Hungarians and western Germans are nearly identical.
American research on religious participation suggests that participation increases
with age (Hout and Greeley 1987). Since we already know that Catholic participation
rates are higher than Protestant rates, restricting the sample to Protestants only (Figure
4.4) shows more clearly the age effect on participation, particularly in Hungary. Note,
however, that the expected age effect does not hold for eastern Germany. Participation
rates for eastern Germany are at their lowest among 45- to 54-year-olds: the cohort
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which came o f age during the imposition of the communist regime in East Germany.
This group was most heavily influenced by the antireligious message of the Soviet
regime, but later cohorts do not appear to be as influenced; their participation rates are
similar to those o f older eastern Germans.
Religious Beliefs
Perhaps more illuminating to an understanding o f the persistence of religion in
post-transition societies than who continues to affiliate formally with a church is the
question of what religious beliefs have endured. The data here show some very
interesting comparisons. Respondents were asked to evaluate their level o f belief in six
different items o f religious faith: God, the devil, heaven, hell, an afterlife, and miracles.
Consistently, Poles show higher mean levels of belief across all age categories (with the
anomalous exception that younger western Germans report slightly higher levels of belief
in miracles). This finding reflects the strong position of the Polish Catholic church in
Polish society, even during the years of Soviet domination (see Chapter Two).
Another consistency is the finding that eastern Germans report lower mean levels
o f belief across all age categories (again, with the interesting exception that younger
Hungarians are less likely than eastern Germans of the same age to believe in miracles).
With church membership rates at only about 35% one would expect average levels of
belief to be low in eastern Germany. The mean levels of belief for Hungarians and
western Germans show the life cycle effect we would expect to find in a modem western
society (Hout and Greeley 1987). That is, levels of belief tend to decline among
individuals as they leave home to form their own families and establish careers. Mean
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levels o f belief reach their lowest levels with the 35-44 age group and then rise again in
the older age groups. This pattern suggests a curvilinear relationship between age and
belief, at least for Hungary and western Germany.
To explore a model that could explain religious belief for each country, I first
created an indicator of religious beliefs from a factor analysis of those six variables,
which taps an underlying dimension o f religious belief for each country. The dependent
variable o f religious beliefs is the factor score, comprised o f respondents' relative levels
o f belief in God, life after death, heaven, hell, the devil, and miracles. Each of these
variables loaded on a single dimension of religious belief in each country. Figure 4.5
illustrates the mean o f this factor score o f religious beliefs for each age category, within
each country. The curvilinear relationship between age and beliefs is seen most clearly in
the lines representing Hungary and eastern Germany.
There are a number of sociodemographic variables that are known in the literature
to affect religious belief. The literature suggests that church attendance is the most
important predictor o f religious beliefs, but other variables are also important in
predicting religious belief. Gender has been shown to be an important predictor of
religious beliefs (women express higher levels o f religious beliefs), as has age (older
persons express higher levels of religious beliefs), education (more educated persons tend
to express lower levels o f religious beliefs), marital status (married persons express
higher levels o f religious beliefs), and community size (rural residents express higher
levels o f religious belief). Conservative political attachments are also associated with
higher levels o f religious belief.
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To understand which characteristics best explain religious beliefs in each o f the
countries I next ran a set o f regressions of the religious beliefs factor score on these
sociodemographic characteristics, as well as church attendance, separately for each
country (see Table 4.2). I found, as expected, that church attendance was the most
important independent variable explaining religious beliefs for each o f the countries.
Several o f the other sociodemographic variables also predicted religious beliefs. Older
people in both East Germany and Hungary expressed higher levels of belief, but in West
Germany it was younger people who expressed higher levels o f belief. Those who place
themselves on the right politically expressed higher levels of belief, in all countries
except Hungary. This variable was not reported for Hungary, so had to be omitted from
that model. However, I expect that the same relationship would hold in the Hungarian
model, had that variable been available. Extremist vote intention predicted lower levels
o f belief in both regions o f Germany, as did white collar employment in eastern
Germany. Finally, unemployed persons in West Germany and Hungary expressed higher
levels o f belief. Altogether, the models fit the data well, with nearly a third o f the
variation in religious beliefs explained in western Germany and Poland, and nearly forty
percent o f the variation explained in eastern Germany and Hungary.
Besides religious beliefs, church attenders in these post-transition societies also
have definite attitudes about the distribution of moral values in society. Other questions
are available in the survey which allow me to compare church attenders with nonattenders on a variety o f attitudes about moral authority, family values, and the role of
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Table 4.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Religious Beliefs Factor
on Selected Independent Variables
W estern
Eastern
Germ any
Germany
H ungary
Poland
Age Category(Older)
-.06 *
.07 **
.10 **
-.03
Attend C hurch
.51 **
.56 **
.55 **
.50 **
-.04 +
Secondary Education Complet
.00
-.01
.04
Higher Income
.08 **
n/a
Left-Right Placement (Right)
.06 *
.07 *
Married or Living as Married
.06 *
.06 *
Female
.08 **
.02
Larger Community Size
Union Member
-.04 +
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.03
-.06 *
-.02
-.04
-.04
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
-.04 +
-.06 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.04
.00
.07 *
.07 *
Unemployed
.00
-.02
-.06 *
.00
-.03
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
“
Self Employed
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.29
.38
.37
.27
Adjusted R2
1458
1323
987
978
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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religion in politics. Using the same models which were employed above to predict
religious beliefs, I next tested these attitudes about the role of religion in public life.
Authority vs. Autonomy
Another set o f variables measures various aspects o f respondents' attitudes toward
authority, as well as the relative merit of autonomy versus obedience. A question was
asked o f Germans and Hungarians whether it is better to obey the law without question or
whether one should follow their conscience (Table 4.3). Western German church
attenders were more likely to favor obedience, but it was not one of the strongest
predictors in this model o f support for autonomy over obedience. Older persons, less
educated persons, lower income persons and those on the political right were associated
with obedience for western Germany. The same relationship holds in Hungary for older
persons and the less educated. In eastern Germany it is females and those on the political
right who advocate obedience. And in both parts of Germany persons who say they are
interested in politics are more likely to advocate following one's conscience, rather than
obedience. Church attendance does not affect opinion on this variable in either eastern
Germany or Hungary. Could this lack of association be due to a movement toward
individual autonomy among church members in these post-transition societies? Two
other variables are available which allow us to test this speculation.
The ISSP 1991 asks respondents in all four countries what should be the basis for
moral decision making. The questions ask whether right and wrong should be based on
God's law, or whether right and wrong should be a matter determined by society. These
questions provide further illumination to the autonomy/obedience question posed above.
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Table 4.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would
Follow Conscience Rather Than Obey on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Age Category(Older)
-.05
- .2 0 **
.06
Attend C hurch
-.04 +
Secondary Education Complete
.09 **
.0 1
Higher Income
.03
.05 *
-.07 +
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.08 **
Married or Living as Married
-.08 *
Female
-.0 1
Larger Community Size
n/a
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
.1 1 **
.1 0 **
Interest in Politics
.03
.1 0
Adjusted R 2
740
2060
N
**p<.01, * p<,05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Source: ISSP 1990

Hungary
-.23 **
.03
.16 **
.0 2

-.03
n/a
.05
.1 0

763
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In all four models it is very clear that church attenders firmly believe that right and wrong
are not matters to be left up to the individual conscience, but rather that moral decisions
should be based on God's law (Table 4.4). Again, older people, lower incomes, those on
the political right, and people from smaller communities are also associated with this
attitude in all four countries. Roughly a quarter to a third of the variation in attitude is
explained by these models. Thus, it does not appear that church members in post
transition societies question obedience to the law. Rather, it seems more likely that they
question the validity o f political authority. Perhaps, as they reflect on the arbitrary laws
and practices o f the previous regime, church members in post-transition societies are less
willing to blindly obey.
We see this questioning o f popular authority again in another question (Table
4.5). This one asks respondents whether right and wrong should be a matter that is
determined by society. Once again, church attenders in all four countries reject this
attitude. Women, too, disapprove o f socially relative morality. Although the model does
not explain as much of the variation here, nevertheless it helps illustrate the point that
church attenders are neither moral relativists nor blindly obedient.
Family Values
Further information about the distribution o f moral values in post-transition
societies can be found when we look at a set of questions about family values in society.
One indicator —a factor score composed of respondents' answers to four items about
working women and their families (see question texts in Chapter Three) - shows a strong
association between church attendance and preference for a traditional role for women for
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Table 4.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and
Wrong Should be Based on God's Law on Selected Independent Variables

-.06 *
- .0 2

-.03
-

Eastern
Germany
.16 **
.47 **
-.06 *
.08 **
-.08 **
-.05 *
-.06 *
.0 2

-

Hungary
.26 **
.40 **
-.08 **
n/a
-.05 +
-.05 +
- .0 2

.05 +
-

Poland
. 1 0 **
.40 **
-.05
-*■
00
o

*
oo
p

Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

Western
Germany
.17 **
.40 **
-.06 *

-.06 *
-.07 *
.06 +
-

.34
.2 2
.25
.37
Adjusted R2
1334
924
1150
954
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Table 4.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and
Wrong Should be Determined by Society on Selected Independent Variables
Eastern
W estern
Germ any
Germ any
Hungary
Poland
Age Category(Older)
.06 *
.06 *
.09 **
.04
Attend Church
-.10 * *
-.07 *
-.10 * *
-.08 *
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
n/a
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
-.07
-.11 **
Female
-.13 * *
-.11 * *
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
.00
.00
Center-Left Vote Intention
-.03
.05
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
.01
.02
.02
.03
Adjusted R2
987
1056
1339
1474
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as for western Germany (Table 4.6). In fact,
church attendance is one o f the strongest predictors in each model, along with age and
national pride. These models would indicate a clear preference for traditional family
values among church attenders in post-transition societies. But the evidence for this
relationship becomes less compelling when we look further. Two other questions are
available to us which also measure church attenders' attitudes toward traditional family
values.
The first question asks respondents to rank their agreement with the statem ent,
"A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the
family" (Table 4.7). Church attenders are more likely to agree with this statement in
eastern Germany and Poland, as they do in western Germany. But no such relationship
holds for Hungary. The strongest predictors in each model are older people, less
educated, lower incomes, and males. The model fits best in western Germany (R2 is .30),
but explains variation relatively well in the post-transition societies, too. Explained
variation is .19 for both eastern Germany and Hungary, and .11 for Poland.
A second question again asks respondents to rank their agreement with the
statement, "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job" (Table 4.8).
Once again, church attenders are more likely to agree with the statement in both parts of
Germany, but there is no relationship between church attendance and agreement with this
statement for either Hungary or Poland. Church attenders do not seem to be as
conservative on these family values in post-transition societies as they are in western
Germany. The strongest relationship in each model is age; older people tend to agree that
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Table 4.6 .Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Favor a Traditional Role for Women on Selected Independent Variables

Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
Interest in Politics

Western
Germany
.2 0 *
.1 2 *
-.08 *
-.06 *
.09 *
.0 1
- .1 0

.04
.07
.04
-.07
.15
-.08

*

+
*
+
*

*
*

Eastern
Germany
.13 *
.17 *
-.09 *
-.09 *
.06 +
.06 *
-.09 *
-.08 *
.04
.1 2 *
.0 2

-.04
.07 *
-.1 1 *

Hungary
.1 2 *
.15 **
-.09 *
-.05
.0 1

.06
-.06
-.03
.0 0

.03
-.0 1

-.08 *
.1 2 **
-.0 1

.2 2
Adjusted R 2
.11
.23
696
1216
N
1715
** p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS(1990)
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Table 4.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Husband's
Job is to Earn Money; Wife's Job is Home and Family on Selected Independent
Variables

Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

W estern
G erm any
.30 **
.13 **
_ 18 **
-.19 **
.1 0 **
.09 **
-.09 **
-.05 *
-.04

Eastern
Germany
.16 **
.08 **
- .1 2 **
- .1 2 **
.16 **
_

11

_

09

-

-

-

- .2 2
- .1 0

-.05 +
.08 *
-

**
**

n/a

Poland
.16 **
. 1 0 **
-.17 **
-.06 +
-.0 1

.0 1

+*

-

.03
.09 **

.04

- .0 1

-.06 *
-.07 *
-

-

Hungary
j g **

_

13

**

.

.06 +
1 4 **

-.07 *

-.03

- .0 2

- .0 1

.0 2

-

-

-

-

.01

-

-

-

-

.0 2

.0 2

-

-

.19
.19
.30
.1 1
Adjusted R2
954
924
1334
1150
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP(1991)
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Table 4.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That Family
Life Suffers if Women Work Outside the Home on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Eastern
Germany
Germany
Hungary
Poland
Age Category(Older)
.19 **
.16 **
.1 1 **
.2 1 **
Attend Church
.1 1 **
.13 **
.03
.05
Secondary Education Complet
-.16 **
-.04
-.09 *
-.06 +
-.17 **
-.03
-.07 +
Higher Income
-.06 +
1
j
**
I
]
**
Left-Right Placement (Right)
n/a
.0 2
.0 2
Married or Living as Married
.08 *
.0 2
.08 *
_
+*
-.04
.0 0
Female
Larger Community Size
-.05 +
.0 1
-.06 *
-.08 *
- .0 2
-.05 +
.05
Union Member
.04
- 1 1 **
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.08 **
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
.05
.05
Blue Collar Occupation
-.0 1
.04
Self Employed
.09
.07
.17
.1 0
Adjusted R2
1334
954
1150
924
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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family life suffers if women work outside the home. This relationship holds in each of
the four models.
Attitudes about Religion and Politics
A final set of variables allow us to examine church members' attitudes about the
proper relationship between religion and politics. These questions ask respondents about
how much influence the church should have in political life. They address the issue of
morality in public service, and they show that church attenders in post-transition societies
feel quite strongly about this issue, as do western German church attenders.
The first question (Table 4.9) asks respondents whether it is better if religious
believers hold public office. Church attendance is the strongest predictor o f assent on
this issue, in each country. Older people also agree with this statement, as do those on
the political right. The less educated tend to disagree (though the relationship is only
significant for eastern Germany and Poland), as do those who would vote for a radical
right party (but only in Germany). The model fits best for western Germany, with nearly
30% explained variation, but it fits reasonably well in the post-transition societies as well.
A similar question (Table 4.10) asks respondents whether those who do not
believe in God are unfit for public office. Again, church attendance is the strongest
predictor in the model in each country, though not completing secondary education is
equally strong in the Polish model. Older people agree with the statement, as do those
who have not completed secondary education, people with lower incomes (not in Poland),
those on the political right, and those from smaller communities.
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Table 4.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That It is Better
if Religious Believers Hold Public Office on Selected Independent Variables

Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

Western
Germany
.13 **
.45 **
- .0 2

09 **
-.04 +
.01

-

Eastern
Germany
.06 *
.36 **
-.06 *
] 1 **
-.05 +
-.05 *
-.04 +
-

Hungary
.1 2 **
.31 **
-.04
n/a
-.05
-

Poland
.06 +
.30 **
-.07 *
] i **

.0 0

.03
-

-

.0 1

.18
.14
.1 2
Adjusted R 2
.28
1323
1458
987
978
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Table 4.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Those
Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office on Selected Independent
Variables
W estern
Eastern
Germ any
G erm any
H ungary
Poland
14
**
Age Category(Older)
.1 1 **
.1 2 **
.09 *
A ttend Church
.32 **
.23 **
.25 **
.19 **
-.14 **
Secondary Education Complet
-.08 **
- .1 0 **
-.19 **
Higher Income
-.07 *
-.09
*
-.06 *
-.04
09 **
.07
*
n/a
Left-Right Placement (Right)
.16 **
Married or Living as Married
.06 *
.0 2
Female
-.0 1
.07 *
-.06 +
-.08 **
-.08 *
Larger Community Size
-.05 +
- .0 1
-.03
Union Member
-.03
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
-.04
.01
-.06 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
.04
- .0 2
- .0 2
Self Employed
.0 2
.19
.19
.13
.17
Adjusted R 2
1334
924
954
1150
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Two further questions ask about how much influence religious leaders should
have in political life. Church attenders are less consistent in their attitudes about the
proper role o f religious leaders in political life than they were about the proper role of
religious believers in political life in the two questions above. The models do not
predict these two questions nearly as well, for any of the countries. Church attendance is
still the strongest predictor of disagreement with the statement that religious leaders
should not influence the government (Table 4.11). Church attenders agree that there
should be a moral influence in political life, but they appear hesitant to turn over that
responsibility to religious leaders. Church attenders also tend to disagree with the
statement that religious leaders should not influence the vote (Table 4.12), though the
relationship is not significant in eastern Germany and the model is not significant for
Hungary.
Finally, when respondents were asked whether churches and religious
organizations have too much power (Table 4.13), church attenders voiced strong
disagreement with this statement, in all four countries. Church members agree that
religion has a role in political life. They agree that it is better when religious believers
hold public office. But they hesitate to endow religious leaders with the authority to
speak for all believers. Church attenders are less in agreement that religious leaders
should influence the government or the vote.
The results o f this preliminary look at religious values in the postcommunist
societies o f Eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland point to some interesting similarities
and differences. The figures on church membership by age category illustrate
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Table 4.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious
Leaders Should Not Influence the Government on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Eastern
Germany
Germany
Hungary
Poland
08
**
Age Category(Older)
.07 *
.11 *
-.03
Attend Church
-.23 **
-.09 **
-.12 **
-.12 **
09 **
Secondary Education Complet
.0 0
.0 2
.07 +
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

.0 2

-.06 *
.04
-.06 +
-.0 1

.05 +

-.06
-.03
.07
.08
-.03
.06
.0 2

n/a
*

.03
.08 *
-

.01
.01

*
**

+

.01

.0 0

.0 2

-

-

-

.0 0

.0 2

.04

-

- .1 0

- .0 1

**

.05

.0 2
.03
.06
Adjusted R2
.03
1339
1056
1474
984
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP(1991)
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Table 4.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious
Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote on Selected Independent Variables
W estern
Eastern
Germ any
Germ any
Hungary
Poland
Age Category(Older)
- .0 1
A ttend C hurch
-.18 **
-.06 +
-.09 *
.05 +
Secondary Education Complet
.03
-.03
.07 +
Higher Income
-.06 *
n/a
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.04
-.08 *
Married or Living as Married
-.05 +
.0 1
Female
- .0 2
.01
.05 +
Larger Community Size
- .0 1
- .0 2
.04
.08 **
.07 *
Union Member
-.04
.05 +
.01
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
.05
.0 1
White Collar Occupation
.0 2
.04
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
-

-

t

o
*

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

.0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.06
Adjusted R2
1458
987
978
1323
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Table 4.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That Churches
and Religious Organizations Have Too Much Power on Selected Independent
Variables

Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

W estern
Germany
-.28 **
.0 0

-.06 *
.1 0 **
-.05 +
.06 *
-

Eastern
Germ any
-.18 **
-.09 **
-.03
.0 0

-.03
.0 2

-

Hungary
-.15 **
n/a
-

Poland
-.36 **
- . 1 0 **
-

.01

.0 1

-

-

.0 1

- .0 2

-.06 +
-

-.06 *
-.04
-

.05
.03
.16
.11
Adjusted R2
987
1458
978
1323
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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dramatically the effect o f Soviet repression on church membership in Eastern Germany,
and show how minimal that effect was among Catholics in both Hungary and Poland.
When Catholics are removed from the sample the figure shows a moderate secularization
effect for Hungary and eastern Germany, with the age groups bom after the imposition of
communism most strongly affected by the pressure to disaffiliate.
Church attenders in all three post-transition societies express strong religious
beliefs, as do church attenders in western Germany. Fifty years of communism does not
appear to have had as much impact on religious beliefs as it has had on religious
behavior. Church attenders also have very different attitudes than non-attenders in their
opinions about where the authority for moral decision-making rests. Church attenders are
much more likely than non-attenders to declare that moral authority rests in God's laws,
and they are likewise less likely to agree that moral authority rightly resides within
society.
However, in attitude toward conventional family roles church members in these
post-transition societies do not appear to be as traditional as their western German
counterpart. Hungarian church attenders, in particular, are no more likely than nonattenders to support traditional family roles. This is further evidence, I would argue, of a
more secular character to Hungarian society. Churches in Hungarian society have made a
concerted effort to cooperate with the state and stay out o f the concerns of everyday
economic realities. Church members here are less likely to feel that the church takes a
stand, either one way or the other, on issues such as the role o f women in the home and in
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the workplace. Polish church attenders, likewise, feel no more strongly about women
working outside the home than to non-attenders. This is not an issue for the church there.
Church attenders in post-transition societies do feel strongly, though, that religion
does have a place in public life. They agree that it is better for society if religious
believers hold public office. They agree that non-believers should not hold public office.
They feel that it is right for religious leaders to have an influence in the government.
They disagree that religious organizations, such as churches, have too much power. But
they do not necessarily agree that religious leaders should influence the vote. They
appear to recognize the importance o f the sanctity o f the polling booth, and the necessity
o f a free and confidential ballot for the proper operation o f democratic process. In other
words, church attenders agree that religious believers have a moral obligation to be
politically engaged and to exert their moral influence in the public process of democracy.
But they resist the right o f anyone, even religious leaders, to interfere with democratic
process by influencing the vote.
These findings make it clear that religion is alive and well in these post-transition
societies. Although the effects of repression o f the churches will continue to be felt,
probably for several generations, there is a vitality to religious belief and moral values
that reflects well when compared to that o f religious believers in western Germany.
Similarly, it seems that democracy is also alive and well in these post-transition societies.
Apparently nurtured by the churches during the years o f totalitarianism, healthy attitudes
about the role o f religion in a democratic state have persisted in these societies. Further
research on the relationship between religious behavior and other democratic values in

the next chapter will help us to better understand just what role the churches have had
preserving democratic values in these societies.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL VALUES OF CHURCH ATTENDERS
In the previous chapter I examined patterns of church membership and church
attendance for the period immediately following the transition to democracy in each of
these postcommunist countries. I found that repression of the churches was most strongly
experienced in East Germany, where church attendance has been more than halved across
all age groups since World War II. While church repression was also experienced by
Poland and Hungary during that same time period (see Chapter Two) its effect on church
attendance has been very different in these two countries. Church membership in Poland
remains very high across all age groups, and repression appears to have had little effect
on church attendance in this country. In Hungary church membership also remains
relatively high, but when examined by age group we see that younger Hungarians report
lower levels o f church attendance than older Hungarians, a secularization (or life cycle)
effect seen also in western Germany.
As I discussed in Chapter One, I expect church attendance to have a differential
effect on political values depending on the political structure o f church/state organization
in the country prior to its democratic transition. I expect church attendance to have a
stronger effect on political values in countries where the church was heavily repressed by
the communist government -- Poland and East Germany - in countries where the church
was the only institution o f civil society allowed to exist alongside the government. I
expect church attendance to have less o f an effect on political values in Hungary, a
129

130
communist country that allowed for church participation in political life, where the
church was less severely repressed than in Poland and East Germany. Though I do not
empirically test this state/civil society contextual variable, I have provided details o f its
composition and effect in Chapter Two and have demonstrated evidence of its existence
in an analysis of church membership and church attendance in Chapter Four. Therefore, I
examine individual-level models separately for each country to control for this countryspecific effect.
In this chapter I examine a broad variety of political values to see what effect
church attendance has on political values in each o f these countries. I group the variables
into categories reflecting some aspect o f the political culture captured by those variables,
then describe how church attendance affects each o f those variables in each country.
Though I do not empirically verify the relationship between certain democratic values
and either the priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church, I have argued in Chapter
One for the face validity o f this conceptual scheme. There are certain democratic values
that reflect the priestly tradition o f the church. Democratic values such as confidence and
support in the regime reflect the priestly tradition’s insistence on the legitimacy o f earthly
authority.
Other democratic values are not consonant with the priestly tradition of the church
but they do reflect the prophetic tradition o f the church. Democratic values such as
interpersonal trust and political and personal efficacy are not highly valued in the priestly
tradition of the church, and church members are not ordinarily associated with these
particular democratic values. But in a repressive society, where the individual rights of
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church members have been oppressively compromised by the regime, the call for a return
to justice spoken by the prophetic tradition of the church resonates with individual church
members. The more the church was repressed by the regime, the stronger became the call
o f the prophetic tradition and the more it allied with these democratic values o f trust for
others and individual efficacy. Therefore, these democratic values are likely to be found
among church members in these post-transition societies, even though they are values not
usually associated with church membership.
Finally, there are democratic values which do not particularly reflect either the
priestly or the prophetic tradition o f the church. Such democratic ideals as political
tolerance, civil liberties, and attitudes toward conflict and protest are difficult to classify
into either tradition, as the church generally defines these values as outside o f the scope
o f religion. Similarly, questions that deal with preference for a particular economic form
have little to do with religious attitudes, although they do inform us about democratic
values. Religious belief does influence these values, but the effect of religion is
sometimes ambiguous. I have placed these relationships between the effects o f the
priestly and the prophetic traditions, because I believe that these values are influenced
sometimes by both traditions, and sometimes by neither. In this way I am able to
describe the "landscape" o f the political culture in each country and how it is
differentially affected by the church.
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Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition - Power from Above
Confidence and T ru st in the Institutions of Government
Confidence and trust are very important aspects o f the political culture, indicating
some measure o f legitimation o f the current regime by the populace. Legitimation is a
very complex concept, however, and confidence and trust reflect a somewhat superficial
level o f democratic support, related to government performance. People are likely to
indicate confidence and trust in the regime as long as civil order is maintained, the regime
is stable, and economic conditions are not fluctuating too severely. This is but one level
o f support for democratic values, however, and is not a particularly reliable indicator of
the true depth o f democratic legitimation (see Weil 1987, Weil 1989).
Confidence and trust in the regime by church attenders reflects the priestly
tradition o f obedience to authority. As I said before, obedience is a strong tenet o f faith
promoted by the priestly tradition of the church. The isolation of the past forty years of
these churches from their counterparts in the West has had the result of preserving
relatively pre-modem churches in the East. Because of this, church attenders in the East
are likely to be even more conservative than their counterparts in the West, especially
when it comes to attitudes o f obedience to authority, as I stated in hypothesis one.
Aspects o f this concept are captured by two separate variables -- a factor of
confidence in state institutions and a factor o f trust in government. Confidence in State
Institutions is a commonly asked question in surveys o f political attitudes. It is included
in all o f the surveys I analyzed here, and the factor includes the identical institutions
across all countries (see Chapter Three for variable construction details).

Table 5.1

Table 5.1 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Confidence in State Institutions Factor on
Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Hungary
Poland
1991
1991
1990
1991
1990
1991
1990
1990
.05
.01
Age Category(Older)
.05 +
.08 *
.02
.0 0
.13 * .05
.07 + .1 2 *
.1 0 *
.1 1 *
.04
.1 2 *
.11 **
.18 *
Attend Church
-.07 *
-.03
-.05
Secondary Education Complet
.02
.06 *
-.0 2
-.09 *
.02
Higher Income
.11 *
-.01
n/a
.11 *
-.07 * .1 0 *
.08 * .08 *
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
.09 * -.0 2
.04
-.08 *
.01
.04
-.01
.05
Female
.0 0
-.05 + -.05 +
-.08 * -.08 *
.00
n/a
-.08 *
Larger Community Size
.0
2
-.01
.06
*
-.04
Union Member
- ■
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.06 *
.01
.01
Center-Left Vote Intention
.07 *
.13 * .07 *
.08 * .1 0 * -.0 2
-.03
.1
2
*
.09
*
.05
.14
*
.1
0
*
.21
*
Center-Right Vote Intention
.06 + .05
Right Radical Vote Intention
.01
.06 *
-.04
Unemployed
n/a
.02
.02
-.08
*
White Collar Occupation
-.03
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
n/a
.16 *
.16 * n/a
.17 * n/a
.24 * n/a
National Pride
n/a
.16 * n/a
.15 *
.13 * n/a
n/a
Economically Satisfied
.06
n/a
.06 *
.1 2 *
.00
Interest in Politics
n/a
n/a
.09 * n/a
-

.07
.16
.11
Adjusted R2
1839
1150
1220
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any countiy
Sources: WVS (1990), ISSP (1991)

-

.10

1334

.07
706

.08
924

.14
653

.04
954
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presents standardized regression coefficients for models in all four countries for 1990 and
1991. The models are not identical, however, and care should be taken not to extend
inferences across models. The variables measuring pride, satisfaction with the economy,
and interest in politics were not asked on the 1991ISSP survey, but they were asked on
the 1990 World Values Survey, so the 1991 models do not include those variables.
Church attendance is one o f the most significant and consistent predictors of
confidence in state institutions within each model. With the exception o f East Germany
in 1990, church attenders express more confidence in state institutions in each o f the
countries. Those who indicate pride in their country are also more likely to indicate
confidence in its institutions, as are those who are satisfied with their economic situation
(but not in Poland), and those who are interested in politics (but not in Hungary). Older
people are also usually more likely to indicate confidence in state institutions, as are
people who express a preference for the political right or who would vote for a right o f
center party.
Table 5.2 models the same dependent variable, but focuses specifically on eastern
and western Germany in 1991 and 1992. Comparison o f Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows how
important questions measuring national pride and economic satisfaction are to properly
specifying this model. A look at the explained variance for the models for the two
Germanies on these tables illustrates the point. For western Germany adjusted R2 nearly
doubles in size when these two variables are included in the model, and model fit

Table 5.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Confidence in
State Institutions Factor on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1992
1991
1991
1992
Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
.16 **
.10 *
.1 1 *
.05 +
.04
Secondary Education Complete
.03
-.04
Higher Income
-.03
Left-Right Placement (Right)
.04
.07 +
.1 1 *
.1 0 **
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
-.0 1
-.06 * - .1 0 **
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
.08 *
.07 *
24
**
Center-Right Vote Intention
.13 *
.11 *
.16 **
1 1 **
Right Radical Vote Intention
- .1 2 *
- .1 1 **
- .1 0 *
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
.15 *
National Pride
.13 *
.03
.1 0 **
.17 *
.23 **
Economically Satisfied
.14 *
.26 **
Interest in Politics
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Adjusted R 2
.13
.24
.15
1039
1012
1039
N
** pc.Ol, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.18
1105

*
*

-

00

-

1

-

o

-
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increases substantially for eastern Germany, too .8 Once again, church attenders are more
likely to support state institutions, as are those who would vote for a center-right party,
those who express pride in their country, and those who indicate they are satisfied with
their economic situation. Those who would vote for a right-radical party (the
Republikaner) indicate less confidence in state institutions.
Trust in Government (Table 5.3) is another measure of support for the current
regime. Like confidence in institutions I expect church attenders to express trust in their
government. This variable is a factor score, comprised of three separate items asking
about trust in the government (see Chapter Three for question texts and variable
construction). Church attenders in both eastern and western Germany indicate trust in
their government, for both years. And these two years were particularly trying ones for
both parts o f the recently reunited Germany. Reunification extracted a heavy financial
toll on western Germans, which they experienced most strongly in 1991 and 1992, And
by 1991 and 1992 some of the transition euphoria had worn off in eastern Germany, and
the realities o f unemployment and a seriously inadequate infrastructure had become
apparent. But church attenders in both parts o f Germany reflect a basic trust in their
government, again indicative o f the priestly tradition o f acquiescence to authority. Those

8To test whether the addition o f these variables significantly improves the fit of
the model, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression test on each o f the models for this
variable in the WVS. F-test results indicate a significant improvement in each model
with the addition o f the variables o f national pride, economic satisfaction, and interest in
politics. For West Germany the value of F was -56.83, with d f for K2 12 and for
9; for
East Germany the value o f F was -15.62, (df for K2 12, for K, 9); for Hungary the value
o f F was -4.48, (df for K 2 12, for
9); and for Poland the value of F was -11.41 (df for
K2 10, for K, 7).

Table 5.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Trust in
Government on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1991
1992
1991
1992
Age Category(Older)
.07 *
A ttend C hurch
.1 1 **
.08 *
.09 **
Secondary Education Complete
-.03
.0 0
.0 2
-.05 +
.0
2
.01
Higher Income
-.0 1
-.05 +
Left-Right Placement (Right)
.13 *
.07 *
.2 0 *
.17 **
Married or Living as Married
Female
.08 *
.05
.03
-.0 1
Larger Community Size
-.05 +
-.05 +
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
.0 0
.07 *
-.07 *
.05
27 **
.29 **
Center-Right Vote Intention
.24 *
.31 *
- .0 2
- .1 1 **
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.08 * . 11 **
Unemployed
.0 2
- .0 2
White Collar Occupation
-.07 * -.06
Blue Collar Occupation
-.07 +
-.06
- '
Self Employed
.1 2 *
.08 *
National Pride
.1 0 *
.13 **
.24 **
.2 0 **
Economically Satisfied
.18 *
.25 *
-.06
*
-.0 1
Interest in Politics
-

-

-

-

-

.31
.25
.31
Adjusted R2
1039
1002
1039
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.33
1104
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who place themselves to the political right, those who would vote for the center-right
party, those who express national pride and those who indicate satisfaction with their
economic situation also indicate greater trust in government.
Support for Democracy as a Form of State
This item refers to democratic support on a somewhat deeper, more
philosophical level. Relative to the previous measures of democratic legitimation, this
concept gets at support for democracy in principle, irrespective of government
performance. While we would expect the church to express support for a democratic
form o f government from a purely utilitarian motive - democracy is at most agnostic,
while the Soviet regime was deliberately atheistic - - 1 argue that support for a democratic
form o f state among church members reflects a change in orientation among the churches
toward democracy. The church has learned, particularly as a result o f experiences since
World War II, that a democratic form of state is more closely aligned with religious
values. That is, a democratic state is preferred over an autocratic state because the good
of the community is preserved without sacrificing the good of the individual. Therefore,
as I stated in hypothesis two, I would expect church attenders to be more supportive o f a
democratic state than non-attenders. But surveys indicate that a reservoir o f democratic
legitimation tends to build up in a society, as people develop experience with a
successfully functioning democratic structure (see Weil 1989). Therefore, I would also
expect that church attenders in western Germany would indicate stronger levels of
support for a democratic form of state than their counterparts in eastern Germany, since
they have many years o f experience with a successful democratic state.
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Several questions were asked of respondents to find out their opinions on
democracy as a form o f state (see Chapter Three for question texts). The factor score of
these questions provides a measure o f the underlying dimension o f democratic support.
Table 5.4 describes the influence of church attendance on democratic support for eastern
and western Germany. Church attenders are more likely to indicate support for
democratic values in western Germany, both in 1991 and 1992. In eastern Germany
church attenders were also more likely to indicate support for democratic values in 1991,
but by 1992 church attenders were no more likely than non-attenders to express
democratic support. A further look at the model for 1992 in eastern Germany helps
explain why this relationship faded. Extremist vote intention, both on the right and on
the left, significantly reduced support for democratic values in eastern Germany as the
harsher realities o f reunification gradually replaced the initial optimism. Center-right
vote intention, satisfaction with the economic situation, and national pride (in eastern
Germany) also affect support for democratic values.
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition
Political Freedoms and Political Rights
A very important tenet of democracy is individual liberty and political tolerance.
In a democracy individual liberty is protected by law, as is the right of individuals to
pursue their own self interest. This particular set of democratic values is not so clearly
aligned with Christian values, however. The church does support and promote individual
human rights and in cases o f individual liberty versus state control does tend to stand on
the side o f the individual. However, the transcending value for the church is the

Table 5.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Support for a
Democratic Form of State on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1991
1991
1222
1992
Age Category(Older)
-.04
.07 *
1
2
**
Attend Church
.08 *
.09 *
.04
Secondary Education Complete
.07 *
-.03
Higher Income
.0 0
-.08 *
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.06 + -.03
.1 0 *
.07 *
- .0 1
Married or Living as Married
.05
-.0 1
Female
-.07 *
.07 *
Larger Community Size
-.08 *
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
.0 2
-.07 *
Center-Left Vote Intention
.16 **
.0 1
.1 1 **
.09 *
.13 **
Center-Right Vote Intention
.17 **
.16 *
.13 *
-.09 * - .0 2
.03
-.13 **
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.09 * -.04
.0 0
-.06 +
Unemployed
-.03
.05
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
.06 +
National Pride
-.08 * -.06
.06 +
.14 *
.14 **
.1 0 **
Economically Satisfied
.17 *
.08
*
.05
Interest in Politics
-

.1 1
.08
.1 0
Adjusted R 2
1039
1039
1012
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.14
1116
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promotion o f the community, not the individual. The common good is valued more
highly than individual liberty. Therefore, church support o f this democratic value tends
to be less strong. The rights o f individuals are valued only insofar as they promote the
common good. Individual rights which are divisive or extreme are not supported by the
church. As I stated in hypothesis three, I do not expect church attenders to be any
stronger than non-attenders in their support of individual freedoms and civil liberties.
Several questions from these data measure various aspects of individual freedoms
and allow us to examine this relationship in more detail. One question asks respondents
to decide which is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard o f living.
Table 5.5 displays multiple regression results for this variable.

Unambiguously, church

attenders prefer freedom and law over a higher standard of living, for each part of
Germany. However, notice how this question does not really address the idea of
individual liberty, but merely asks whether freedom and law is preferable to economic
security. One can answer in favor o f freedom and law here without stating a preference
for individual liberty over the common good. This answer is consistent with the priestly
tradition of the church, which values individual autonomy only insofar as it promotes the
common good. When individual liberties threaten the common good they are not
supported by the priestly tradition. That is why church members tend to be somewhat
less tolerant o f civil liberties and individual freedoms.
The next three tables show how church support diminishes when the issue of
political freedom involves choosing between individual liberty and the common good.
These questions probe the respondent's understanding of and support for the right o f free

Table 5.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Prefer Freedom and Law over Higher Living Standard on Selected
Independent Variables
W estern Germany
Eastern Germ any
1992
1991
1991
1992
Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
.1 2 *
.06 +
.07 *
.06 *
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
_ 1 1 **
-.09 *
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.0 1
.0 1
.04
Married or Living as Married
.03
.06 +
- .0 1
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
.09 *
.05
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.0 1
Unemployed
-.08 *
- .0 2
-.05
White Collar Occupation
-.04
-.03
Blue Collar Occupation
.0 2
Self Employed
.0 1
.07 *
National Pride
.07 *
.03
. 1 0 **
Economically Satisfied
.09 *
11 **
.0 2
.15 **
.1 2 *
Interest in Politics
-

-

-

-

-

1

o00
*

-

.0 0
.04
.06
Adjusted R2
1039
1076
1019
N
** pc.Ol, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.04
1116
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speech. Table 5.6 reports regressions o f a factor score o f respondents' tolerance for
extremist speech. Church attenders in western Germany are not tolerant o f extremist
speech. More educated persons are similarly intolerant, as are white collar workers.
Those who would vote for the right extremist party are more tolerant o f extremist speech,
but this effect is partly an artifact of variable construction. Since the variable measures
support for right radical or revolutionary speakers, right extremists are indicating support
for like-minded persons.
In eastern Germany there is no apparent relationship between church attendance
and tolerance for extremist speech. Older persons are less likely to endorse such speech,
as are those who are satisfied with the economic situation. And just as in the west, those
who would vote for a right radical party are more tolerant of extremists such as
themselves.
Table 5.7 asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel that individual citizens
have freedom o f speech in Germany. Western German church attenders do not differ
from non-attenders on this question, but eastern German church attenders in 1991
expressed strong agreement that individuals have free speech. Compared to their
situation in previous years, clearly they did gain the right to express their political
opinions freely. And since political opinions were being expressed from pulpits and
within religious gatherings under threat of political repression prior to the transition, the
freedom of speech that came about as a result o f the transition was felt particularly
strongly by church affiliates. However, by 1992 the political climate had changed in
eastern Germany and church attenders were less euphoric about their newly found

Table 5.6 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Tolerance of
the Right o f Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables
W estern Germ any
Eastern Germ any
1991
1991
1992
1992
A ge Category(Older)
-.05
-.03
-.11 *
-.10 *!
Attend Church
- .1 0 *
-.08 *
-.03
.0 0
Secondary Education Complete
.07 *
.08 *
.03
.01
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention

-

-

-

-

.00

-

-

.03

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-.01

-

White Collar Occupation

.1 1

Blue Collar Occupation
S elf Employed

.10 *

Interest in Politics

-

*

-

-.12 *
.01
-

-.04
.15 **
.09 **
.09 *
.07

-.01

.09 *'
.06 +
-.07

-.03

-.01

.10 *
-

-

-

-

-

.01

-

-.07 *
.02

-.06 *
-

.03
.07
.07
1076
1019
1039
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
Adjusted R2

-.07 *

-.05 +

-.10 *

.09 *

Economically Satisfied

.11 * !

-

Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed

National Pride

-

-.09 *
.05
.05
1116

Table 5.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Those Who
Believe Citizens Have Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1992
1991
1991
1992
Age Category(OIder)
Attend Church
- .0 2
- .0 1
.1 0 *
.03
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
- .0 2
-.09 **
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
.06 +
-.05 +
- .0 1
.0 2
-.08 * - .1 0 **
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
.08 *
.01
.2 0 **
Center-Right Vote Intention
.05
.17 *
.09 *
.0 2
.04
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.09 * - .1 0 **
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
.1 1 **
.1 1 *
.18 *
.1 2 **
Economically Satisfied
.
09 **
-.0 1
Interest in Politics
.07
.03
Adjusted R 2
.05
1076
1019
1055
N
**p<,01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.08
1106
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freedom o f speech. Males in eastern Germany are more likely to agree that political
opinions can freely be expressed, as are those who would vote for the prevailing centerright party and those who are satisfied with the economic situation.
Finally, Table 5.8 reflects opinions about the individuals’ right to freedom of
expression -- a more philosophical form of the question (see Chapter Three for question
wording). Church attenders in both parts of Germany in 1991 were less likely to agree
that people have the right to free expression . By 1992 this relationship no longer held,
for either part of Germany. Younger people are more likely to agree with the right to
freedom o f expression, as are those who would place themselves on the political left (at
least in 1991), those who would vote for a center-left party, and those who claim an
interest in politics.
These previous four tables illustrate the ambiguity o f support for certain
democratic values among church members. When individual rights do not conflict with
the common good, they are supported by the church. This again reflects the priestly
tradition o f respect for authority.

For example, the right to freedom o f speech was

supported by church members when it promoted the transition from totalitarianism, but
when free speech became divisive in 1992 (as a result of reunification pressures, the
skinhead movement, anti-foreigner activities, etc.) church attenders saw that democratic
value as conflicting with the common good and withdrew their support.
Protest Behaviors
Protest against the government is contrary to the priestly tradition of the church.
In general, church leadership is opposed to protest, as it disrupts order and threatens

b00
*

Table 5.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Right to Free
Expression on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1992
1991
1992
1991
_
0Q +>H
Age Category(Older)
- .1 2 *
-.03
-.06 +
-.11 * -.04
Attend Church
- .1 0 *
-.05
Secondary Education Complete
.09 *
.09 **
.0 2
.0 0
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
- .1 2 *
-.07 +
Married or Living as Married
.0 0
Female
Larger Community Size
.03
-.06 *
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
.06 +
.07 *
.07 * - .0 2
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
.0 0
White Collar Occupation
.06 +
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
-.04
-.06 + -.06 +
-.03
National Pride
.04
.09 *
Economically Satisfied
.15 **
.1 1 *
.05 +
.16 *
Interest in Politics
-

.05
.05
Adjusted R2
.15
964
1055
1013
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.01
1124
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authority. However, the prophetic tradition of the church, which calls upon individuals to
speak out and act against injustice, often endorses protest as a means of addressing
injustice. At several points in history church members have engaged in protest with
varying degrees o f institutional support. In East Germany, Poland and Hungary church
members engaged in protest against the government, sometimes with institutional support
and sometimes alone. However, the institution itself (both the Catholic Church and the
various Protestant Churches) when speaking as a public body, always spoke out in favor
of peace and against protest. Therefore, church members in these post-transition societies
received a mixed message from the church. While the official organization publicly
deplored protest activities, at the same time they witnessed the public protests of certain
brave individuals and occasionally even church leaders against an oppressive regime.
Consequently, church members in these post-transition societies are somewhat less
conservative when it comes to public protest than we would expect church members to
be. I stated in hypothesis four that I do not expect church attenders to support protest
more than non-attenders, but I expect that opposition to protest might be somewhat lower
for church attenders in these post-tradition societies than it is among western German
church attenders.
Table 5.9 shows respondents’ willingness to engage in political protest behaviors
(See Chapter Three). A Guttman scale is formed of respondents' answers to a list of
protest behaviors. Respondents are asked whether they have ever engaged in any of these
protest behaviors, or whether they might ever engage in any o f those behaviors.
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Table 5.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Support for
Protest Behaviors on Selected Independent Variables

.0 2
.1 2

*

- .2 0

*

- .0 2

.01

-.06 *
.0 0

.05 *
.1 1 *
.0 0

- .2 2

Eastern
Germany
-.39 *
.0 0

l
o
*

Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
Interest in Politics

Western
Germany
-.27 *

*

-.0 1

.26 *

-.15 *
.08 *
.0 2

-.05 +
-.15 *
-.03
.17 *

Hungary
-.24 **
-.04
.05
-.04
- .1 2 **
- .1 0 *
.09 *
.1 0 *
.1 0 *
-.04
-.09 *
.24 **

.24
Adjusted R2
.43
.31
1359
872
557
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS(1990)

150
Church attenders are no more or less willing to engage in protest than are nonattenders. Older persons are much less likely to indicate willingness to protest. Those
who say they are interested in politics are much more likely to be willing to engage in
protest. Males are more likely to protest, as are those from larger communities. Union
members in western Germany and in Hungary are more likely to support protest, and in
both parts o f Germany those who would place themselves on the political left and those
who say they are not proud to be German are more likely to support protest behaviors.
The next table (5.10) asks about respondents' tolerance for protest behavior.
Again, a Guttman scale is formed from respondents answers about whether the same list
o f protest behaviors as above should or should not be allowed. This variable, then,
addresses respondents' tolerance for protest, rather than their proclivity to engage in
protest. As expected, church members in western Germany are not tolerant o f protest
behavior. But there is no significant relationship between church attendance and
tolerance for protest in either eastern Germany or Hungary.
As I stated above, church attenders in these post-transition societies have been
receiving mixed messages about protest from their religious leaders, and tend therefore to
be somewhat less intolerant of protest than we would otherwise expect. This is a result
o f conflicting messages in these Eastern European churches coming from both the
priestly and prophetic traditions. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by the
church, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly tradition of
obedience to authority. However, public protest is an acceptable means to fight
oppression and injustice, well recognized from within the prophetic tradition of the
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Table 5.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would
Tolerate Protest Behavior on Selected Independent Variables
W estern Germany Eastern Germ any
Age Category(Older)
-.16 **
-.27 **
- .0 2
Attend C hurch
- .1 0 **
.08 +
Secondary Education Complete
.08 **
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
-.08 +
Female
-.04 *
Larger Community Size
.03
.05 *
Union Member
n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
-.13 **
Center-Right Vote Intention
-.08 **
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
.03
.05
- .0 2
Blue Collar Occupation
.03
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
14
+*
.14 **
Interest in Politics
.1 0
.19
Adjusted R2
574
2113
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, -t- p<.10, - not significant in any country
Source: ISSP 1990

H ungary
- .2 0 **
- .0 1

.16 **
_ 17 **
.1 2

**

n/a
.04
-.14 *
-.15 *
.15 **
.18
650
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church, and public protests were successfully used by several o f the churches to promote
the transition to democracy, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Therefore, church
members in these post-transition societies tend to look on protest somewhat differently
than their counterparts in western Germany, who still interpret protest as being dangerous
to the common good, reflecting the priestly tradition.
The rest o f the profile o f those who would support protest remains substantially as
it was in the previous table. Younger people are more tolerant o f protest, as are those
who say they are interested in politics, males, and those from larger communities (except
for eastern Germany). Union membership was not asked here for either eastern Germany
or Hungary, and neither political identification nor national pride were significant
predictors in any o f the countries.
The other side o f protest is attitude toward government repression of protestors.
Table 5.1 1 presents regression models of a factor score composed of attitudes about a
variety o f forms o f government repression of protest activity (see Chapter Three). In
general, as I said above, the priestly tradition of the church opposes protest and we would
expect church members to endorse the necessity o f government intervention to prevent
protest. Table 5.11 shows that church attenders in western Germany do support
government repression o f protest. But church attenders in eastern Germany are not likely
to either endorse or oppose government repression of protest. As before, church attenders
in post-transition eastern Germany are ambiguous about the place of public protest in
society. They are no more likely than non-attenders to favor government repression of
protest. Older people do support government repression, as do males, those who say they

I
o00
*

Table 5.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Oppose Government Repression of Citizens on Selected Independent
Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
1991
1221
-.16 **
-.19
Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
-.10 **
.04
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
-.19 **
Left-Right Placement (Right)
- .1 2
Married or Living as Married
Female
.07 *
.11
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
-.07
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
.0 2
White Collar Occupation
.13 *
.03
Blue Collar Occupation
.11 *
.0 0
Self Employed
.07 +
National Pride
-.23 **
-.14
.0 0
.0 2
Economically Satisfied
09
#*
.09
Interest in Politics
Adjusted R2
.26
.1 1
1059
1002
N
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p < 1 0 , - not significant in any country
Source: IfD 5055 (1991)
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are proud to be German, those who place themselves on the right politically, and those
who would vote for the prevailing center-right party. Females and those who express an
interest in politics tend to oppose government repression of protestors.
Economic Issues
In general, economic issues are separate from democratic values. There exists
within democratic governments a continuum o f economic organization ranging from
democratic capitalism on one end to democratic socialism on the other. Those who argue
that the responsibilities o f government should be limited fall toward the democratic
capitalism end o f the continuum. Democratic socialism, at the other end, favors more
government involvement in the economy. Democratic socialism argues that the
responsibilities of government include some level of involvement in the economy to
ensure the welfare o f all citizens. Therefore, questions about what should or should not
be included in the responsibilities o f government reflect particular economic orientations.
That is, those who favor a restricted role for government would tend to align more closely
with democratic capitalism than with democratic socialism. Neither orientation,
though, would be defined as undemocratic or antidemocratic.
The orientation of the church, with its emphasis on the welfare of the community
above the good o f the individual, tends to be in the direction of democratic socialism.
While the individual is highly valued and human rights are to be protected, the priestly
tradition teaches that the good of the community transcends individual rights. The
priestly tradition also admonishes that it is the responsibility o f the community to ensure
that the needs o f individuals are met. The purpose of government, according to this
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tradition, is to provide for the welfare of the community and ensure just treatment for all.
Therefore, the priestly tradition of the church will influence church members to support
the ideals o f democratic socialism. As I stated in hypothesis five, I expect that church
attenders will be no more likely than non-attenders in these post-transition societies to
support government intervention in the economy. A question which asks whether it
should be the responsibility of government to provide jobs for every person who wants to
work would be answered in the affirmative by those who support democratic socialism.
It would be answered in the negative by those who support democratic capitalism.
Similarly, a question which asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to
reduce income differences between the rich and the poor would be endorsed by those who
support democratic socialism and opposed by those who support democratic capitalism.
Table 5.12 shows regression results for the question of whether the government
should provide jobs. Models are provided here for all four countries, although the data
are available for Poland only in 1991. In each model, except for Poland, it is males, those
who place themselves on the political right and those who have completed secondary
education who are most likely to agree that it is not the responsibility of government to
provide jobs. For Poland it is males, those who are younger, those on the political right,
and those who do not attend church who agree that the government should not provide
jobs. For the 1990 models, those who have higher incomes agree that the government
should not provide jobs but this relationship does not repeat in the 1991 models, except in
eastern Germany. In general, church attenders do not have a clear opinion on this issue.
Eastern German church attenders in 1990 were more likely to agree that the government

T able 5.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Those W ho Say It Is N ot the Responsibility
o f G overnm ent to Provide Jobs on Selected Independent V ariables

Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991
1990
1990
1991
A ge C ategory(O lder)

.07 **

-.03

.03

-.05 +

Poland
1991

.01

.01

.00

.05

-.10 *

.09 *

.03

-.04

.00

-.08 *

Secondary Education Com plete

.09 **

.13 **

.13 **

.08 *

.12 *

.22 **

.05

H igher Incom e

.11 **

.05

.10 *

.08 *

.08 *

.03

.05

Left-R ight Placem ent (Right)

.06 *

.08 *

.07 +

.06 *

n/a

n/a

o
00
*

Attend Church

Hungary
1990
1991

M arried o r Living as M arried

-

-

-.06 +

-

.00

.02

-.10 *

-.06 *

Female

-.09 **
.05 *

.04

-.07 +

.02

n/a

-.03

-.19 ** -.11 **
.09 *

.02

n/a

.00
-.03

Left R adical V ote Intention

-

-

-

-.06 *

-

C enter-Left Vote Intention

-

-.07 *

-

1
b
*

.04

U nion M em ber

-.14 **
*
oo
o
r

Larger Com m unity Size

.00

-

C enter-Right Vote Intention

.04 +

-

R ight Radical V ote Intention

.04 +

-.01

-.05 *

.00
-

-.01
-

-

-.02

Unem ployed
W hite C ollar O ccupation
Blue C ollar Occupation

-.05 *

.02
.07 +

-

.09 *

-.12 **
.06 +
-.01
-.04

-.04

-

-

.05 +

-

-

.02

-.06 *

.02

-.02

-.04

-

-

-

-

-

-.02

-

-

S e lf Em ployed

-

.05

-

.00

-

.01

-.01

N ational Pride

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Econom ically Satisfied

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

n/a

-

n/a

-

n/a

n/a

.05

.06

.05

.03

.08

.07

.05

2060

1150

740

1334

763

924

954

Interest in Politics
A djusted R2
N

**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991
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should not provide jobs. Church attenders in western Germany and Poland in 1991
reflect more o f a democratic socialist attitude; that is, they are more likely to agree that it
is the responsibility of government to provide jobs.
This democratic socialist orientation o f church attenders in western Germany and
Poland is repeated in Table 5.13, which examines attitudes about government
responsibility to equalize incomes. Church attenders in both of these societies agree that
governments should work to reduce income differences between rich and poor. Eastern
German and Hungarian church attenders do not reflect this same attitude. In general, it is
better educated, higher income, political right oriented, males, and self-employed who
agree that it is not the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between
rich and poor.
Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition - Power from Below
Interpersonal T ru st
Just as trust in government is important for a successful democracy, so, too, is
interpersonal trust important to democracy. When people share decision making power
they must be willing to extend a certain level o f trust to their fellow citizens.
Democratic decision making relies upon cooperation among like-minded individuals who
have organized themselves to promote their cooperative interests. This activity cannot
take place without some level of interpersonal trust. And a notorious hallmark of
totalitarian government is a carefully cultivated level of interpersonal distrust, because
those who can trust one another are more likely to entrust one another with confidences
and organized activity. It is in the interest o f totalitarian government to keep levels of

Table 5.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Those W ho Say It Is N ot the Responsibility
o f G overnm ent to Equalize Incom es on Selected Independent Variables

A ge Category(O lder)

Attend Church
Secondary Education Complete
H igher Incom e
Left-Right Placem ent (Right)
M arried or Living as M arried
Female
Larger Com m unity Size
Union M em ber
Left Radical Vote Intention
C enter-Left Vote Intention
C enter-R ight V ote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
U nem ployed
W hite Collar Occupation
Blue C ollar Occupation

Western Germany Eastern Germany
1990
1991
1990
1991
.02
.00
-.05
-.08 **
-.05 + -.06 +
-.01
.03
.06 *

.05

** .09 *
.12 ** .15 **
-.02
.01
-.10 **
.08 *
.01
.06 *
.08 *
.08 *
-.04 +
-.02
-.07 *
.16

.19 **
.14

-.11 **
.04

-.06 +
.04

-

.08 +

.00
-.02
.10 **

N ational Pride

n/a

n/a

n/a

Econom ically Satisfied

n/a

n/a

-

n/a

**

-.06 *

-

.10 **

N

.09

-

.03

A djusted R 2

.04

n/a

S e lf Em ployed

Interest in Politics

**

.05

.13 **

.03

.00
.08 *

Hungary
1991
1990
-.07 +

.01
.12 ** .16 **
.09 *
.11 *
n/a
-.08 *
-.16 ** .03
.09 *
.02
n/a
.01
.01
.02
-.08 +
.02
.09 *
.01
-.01

1991
-.09 *

-.07 *
.05
.08 *
.11

*
.11 **
-.02
-

-.08

-.06
.07

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

-

n/a

-

n/a

n/a

n/a

**

-.03

n/a

n/a

.06

.07

.10

.05

.09

.04

.06

2060

1150

740

1334

763

924

954

**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991
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Poland
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interpersonal trust as low as possible, in order to reduce the likelihood that people will
organize themselves in opposition to the prevailing powers.
Trust in others is also a religious value, though it has little to do with the priestly
tradition. It reflects more the prophetic tradition of a call to believers to return to
community. The prophetic tradition is not as prevalent as the priestly tradition, and is
only sporadically experienced in the church. But the prophetic tradition is heard most
often during times o f crisis, such as immediately prior to and during the democratic
transition in Eastern Europe. I argue, therefore, that the influence of the prophetic
tradition will be reflected more strongly among church attenders in Eastern Europe, and
that this influence will be seen in their attitudes toward particular democratic values
which mirror the same values. As I stated in hypothesis six, I expect that church
attenders will express greater levels of interpersonal trust than do those who do not attend
church.
Table 5.14 examines relative levels of trust in family members. Only in western
Germany and Hungary are church attenders more likely to indicate they trust their family
members. In eastern Germany and Poland trust in family members is not related to
church attendance. Married people are more likely to trust their families, for each of the
countries, as are those who say they are financially satisfied.
Trust in family members is not crucial to democratic success, however. It may be
indicative o f some level o f interpersonal trust in society, but far more important to a
democratic transition is the broader perception that people in general can be trusted.
Table 5.15 examines this level of interpersonal trust. We can see from this table that
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Table 5.14 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Family
Members Can Be Trusted on Selected Independent Variables

Age Category(OIder)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
Interest in Politics

Western
Germany
-.09 *
.09 *
.03
.07 *
.19 *
-.04
.07 *
.07 *
.07 *
.1 2 *
-

Eastern
Germany
.04
.00
-

Hungary
-.0 1

.0 2
.0 0
.2 2

*

-.08 *
.01

-.03
.0 1

.07 *
-

.08
.13
-.07
.14
-.05
.05

+
**
+
**

.0 1

.09 *
.11 **
-

Poland
-.07 +
.04
.03
.03
.08 +
n/a
n/a
.03
-.04
n/a
.05
.05
-

.08
.0 1
.06
Adjusted R2
.1 0
1206
696
650
1715
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS(1990)

.03
1715

.04
1002

.09
1055

.05
1216

.04
1059

** p<,01, * p<.05, + P<-10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: WVS (1990), IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.04
1128

.04
696

*

I

Adjusted R2
N

©
'O

Table 5.15 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That People Can Be Trusted on Selected
Independent Variables
Western Germany
Eastern Germany
Hungary Poland
1992
1990
1991
1990
1991
1990
1522
im
-.05
-.05 +
.01
.06 +
.02
.08 +
Age Category(OIder)
.07
*
.06
.14
**
.03
.08
*
.05
.04
Attend Church
.08 +
.06 *
.02
.07 +
.11 **
Secondary Education Complete
.11 *
.09 +
.02
Higher Income
.01
.08 +
.00
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.06 +
.00
-.04
-.03
-.07 +
.0 0
.04
-.01
.05
-.08 *
-.03
-.0 2
Married or Living as Married
.01
-.05 + -.05 +
.01
-.01
Female
-.01
.02
-.08
*
Larger Community Size
n/a
Union Member
n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention
.06
+
-.04
.13
**
.07 *
Center-Left Vote Intention
.03
.07 *
.1 0 **
.03
Center-Right Vote Intention
-.01
-.0 2
-.05 +
-.05 + -.08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
n/a
-.06
-.01
White Collar Occupation
-.08 +
Blue Collar Occupation
-.09 *
Self Employed
-.06 *
National Pride
-.1 0 **
.03
.09 * *
.12 * *
.22 * *
.08 *
.07 *
Economically Satisfied
.1 1 * *
.07 +
.09 *
.06 *
.1 2 * *
.05
.05 +
.07 *
.02
Interest in Politics
.08 *
.02
.01

650
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church attendance is associated with greater levels of interpersonal trust, though the
relationship is not always significant in all o f the models. The most consistent predictor
o f interpersonal trust in all o f these models is economic satisfaction. Those who are
satisfied with their financial situation are more likely to agree that people can be trusted.
Similarly, those who say they are interested in politics are more likely to say that people
can be trusted. Those who have achieved at least a secondary education are also more
likely to agree that people can be trusted.
Optimism
Optimism is not necessarily a democratic value, but it certainly has a positive
effect on a democratic regime when citizens are optimistic about the course o f their lives.
This attitude again reflects the prophetic tradition, which exhorts people to take charge of
their lives, to get involved, to take responsibility for themselves and to act in a positive
manner. Hypothesis seven posits that church attenders in post-transition societies will be
more optimistic than those who do not attend church.
Church attenders in the new democracies of Eastern Europe are more likely to
describe their lives as happy (see Table 5.16). This relationship illustrates just how
powerful an experience this transition has been for church attenders in these countries.
There is no similar relationship between church attendance and happiness in western
Germany. Church attenders in Eastern Europe have reason to celebrate, as they are
finally out from under the shadow o f repression, and they reflect this in their reported
levels o f happiness. As expected, younger people, married people, and those with higher
incomes are also more likely to describe their lives as happy, in all four models.
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Table 5.16 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Describe
Their Life as Happy on Selected Independent Variables

Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

W estern
Germ any
-.08 *
.0 2

.03
14 **
.05
.24 **
.04
-

.0 1
.01
-

-.09 **
-.08 +
-.08
-

Eastern
Germ any
-.06 *
.1 0 **
-.03
.11 **
.03
.1 1 **
-.0 1

-

.06 +
.07 *
-.08 **
.01

.04
-

H ungary
-.17 **
.09 *
.06 +
.1 1 *
n/a
.24 **
-.04
-

-

Poland
-.18 **
.06 +
.07 *
.15 **
.1 1 **
17 **
-.08 *
-

.0 1

.0 0

.04
-

.06 +
-

j 2 **

.0 0

_

.0 1

-.05
-.09 *

-.09 +
-

-

.06
.1 1
.13
Adjusted R 2
.11
1334
924
954
1150
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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We can see this same relationship reflected in the next table (5.17). Here we look
at attitudes about reunification, for both parts of Germany. Church attenders in both
western and eastern Germany expressed joy about the reunification o f Germany in 1991.
This was a most significant event for church members in Germany, who could rejoice in
the reunification o f a church that had been artificially divided by the state in 1969. For
western Germany, economic satisfaction is the only variable in the model more strongly
related to joy about reunification. That is, those who were not financially disadvantaged
by reunification, as well as those who say they are interested in politics, city dwellers, and
males were more likely to express joy about reunification in western Germany. In eastern
Germany it was people who stood to gain the most from reunification who expressed joy,
as well as those who supported the prevailing political party. Younger people, church
attenders, those on the right politically, those who would vote for the center-right party
(the party in power in the West at the time of reunification) were more likely to express
joy about reunification in 1991. People who were proud to be German and those who had
jobs or were satisfied with their financial situation also expressed joy about reunification.
By the next year the relationship between reunification joy and church attendance
had moderated, for both parts of Germany, as the realities o f the financial burden of
reunification began to sink in. Those who were profiting from reunification -- who were
satisfied with their economic situation and proud to be German, as well as those who
supported the ruling center-right party -- were willing to express joy about reunification.
But the rest o f the population had more mixed feelings about reunification. In eastern
Germany, the model in 1992 explains reunification joy even more explicitly —more than

Table 5.17 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Reunification
Joy on Selected Independent Variables
W estern Germany
Eastern Germ any
1992
1991
1991
1992
Age Category(Older)
.06
.03
-.09 * - .1 0 **
Attend Church
.1 0 *
.04
.13 *
.04
Secondary Education Complete
.04
.01
Higher Income
.0 2
.2 1 *
Left-Right Placement (Right)
-.04
.13 **
-.06 +
.0 0
Married or Living as Married
-.04
Female
-.07 * -.05 +
-.06 *
.08 *
.0 2
Larger Community Size
Union Member
.0 0
-.15 **
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.07 *
- .0 2
Center-Left Vote Intention
.08 *
Center-Right Vote Intention
.06
.08 *
.08 *
.0 2
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.06 +
.
1
0
*
-.05
-.0 1
- .1 2 **
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
.05
.1 1 *
.1 0 **
.1 0 **
National Pride
.14 *
.19 *
.27 **
.23 **
Economically Satisfied
.0 0
.07 *
Interest in Politics
.2 1
.1 0
Adjusted R2
.07
1059
1002
1039
N
+* p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.26
1116
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a quarter o f the variation is explained by the model. The same variables as in 1991
explain reunification joy, with the exception of church attendance. That is, those who are
gaining from reunification are joyful. Extremists are not joyful, the unemployed are not
joyful. But young people, males, political rightists, economically satisfied, and those
who are proud to be German are more likely to express joy about reunification.
Church attenders in the post-transition societies also evaluate their current
situation and their future situation in more optimistic terms, relative to the past.

Table

5.18 describes attitudes comparing the present situation relative to the past, for both parts
of Germany in 1991 and 1992. At both times, church attenders in eastern Germany are
more likely to say the present is better than the past; there is no such relationship in
western Germany. Objectively, the situation now is much better than in the past for
church attenders in the East. They are finally free to gather and associate without fear of
repression by the authorities. As in the previous tables, those who are gaining by
reunification are more optimistic. For eastern Germany young people, those on the
political right, those who vote for the center-right, those who are proud to be German, and
those who are economically satisfied are more likely to give a positive evaluation o f the
present relative to the past. For western Germans, too, those who are least impacted by
reunification give a positive evaluation. Primarily, those who are economically satisfied
and those who are urban (in 1991) or not married (in 1992) say the situation now is better
than the past. Those who would vote for an extremist party are more likely to give a
negative evaluation.

Table 5.18 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Say the Situation Now is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent
Variables
W estern Germany
Eastern Germany
1992
1991
1992
1991
Age Category(Older)
-.03
-.0 1
-.07 * -.1 1 **
Attend C hurch
.03
-.04
.08 **
.1 1 *
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
-.03
Left-Right Placement (Right)
- .0 2
.25 *
.19 **
Married or Living as Married
- .1 0 **
.0 2
Female
Larger Community Size
.1 0 *
.1 1 *
Union Member
.0
2
-.14
**
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.0 1
Center-Left Vote Intention
-.07 *
.09 **
Center-Right Vote Intention
.03
.0 0
.1 0 *
.05 + -.06 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.07 * -.07 *
.04
-.09 **
Unemployed
.01
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
- .0 2
.13 *
.09 **
.03
National Pride
.32 **
.25 *
Economically Satisfied
.2 2 *
.26 **
Interest in Politics
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

♦
00
p
1*

-

.06
.30
.11
Adjusted R2
1039
1059
1002
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.29
1116
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When they predict into the future, too, church attenders are more optimistic than
non-attenders (Table 5.19). Even in western Germany, church attenders in 1991 were
more likely to predict an optimistic future relative to the past. As before, younger people
and the economically satisfied are more likely to be optimistic about the future. For
eastern Germany, church attenders in both 1991 and 1992 are optimistic about the future
relative to the past. Also young people, those on the political right, those who would vote
for the center-right party , and those who are proud to be German say the future will be
better than the past. A full thirty percent o f the variation in this attitude is captured by
this model for 1992 in eastern Germany, I expect that these models would behave
similarly for Hungary and Poland had the data been available.
Efficacy and A ttitude Tow ard Change
Political efficacy is the feeling that one has a say in the political process, that
each citizen is an actor who has a voice which can be used to effect change in a
democratic system. As I stated in hypothesis eight, church attendance is not usually
associated with political efficacy. I expect that church attenders in these post-transition
societies will be no more likely than non-attenders to express political efficacy.
A standard set o f questions from the University of Michigan National Election
Studies is commonly used to capture the concept o f political efficacy. A factor score
created from factor analysis o f four of these questions forms the dependent variable for
Table 5.20. We see in the table that church attenders are not particularly efficacious. In
fact, the only significant relationship is for church attenders in western Germany in 1991

Table 5.19 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Say the Future Situation is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent
Variables
W estern Germany
E astern Germ any
1991
1992
1991
1992
-.04
Age Category(OIder)
- .1 0 *
- .1 0 *
-.09 **
A ttend C hurch
.08 * -.03
.1 0 *
.06 *
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
- .0 2
.03
.2 2 **
.23 *
-.06 +
Married or Living as Married
.01
-.06 +
-.03
Female
.07 *
Larger Community Size
.13 *
Union Member
.0 2
Left Radical Vote Intention
-.14 * *
Center-Left Vote Intention
.05
Center-Right Vote Intention
.08 *
.1 1 *
.11 * *
-.06 + -.07 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
.0 2
-.06 *
.04
.04
-.04
Unemployed
-.06 *
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
.0 1
.13 *
.11 * *
National Pride
.06 +
.29 **
.2 2 *
.18 *
.25 **
Economically Satisfied
.08 *
Interest in Politics
.01
-

.26
.06
Adjusted R2
.11
1039
1002
1059
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

-

.30
1116

l
O
*

Table 5.20 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Political
Efficacy Factor on Selected Independent Variables
W estern Germ any
Eastern Germany
1992
1992
1991
1991
Age Category(Older)
-.09 * -.07 *
-.14 * -.15 **
Attend Church
-.07 *
.04
.04
.05
Secondary Education Complete
.1 1 *
.15 **
.09 * -.03
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
.0 2
-.09 **
.07 * - .0 2
Married or Living as Married
.01
.01
-.1 1 *
Female
-.04
-.06 +
Larger Community Size
Union Member
-.05 +
Left Radical Vote Intention
.0 1
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
.19 **
.1 0 *
.03
.08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention
-.06 +
-.05
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
- .0 2
-.13 **
Self Employed
-.04
.0 2
National Pride
-.09 * -.06 *
.18 *
.1 0 **
.16 **
Economically Satisfied
.15 *
.2 2 *
.18 *
.2 0 **
.27 *+
Interest in Politics
.2 0
.13
.16
Adjusted R 2
1039
1059
1002
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

.13
1116
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who are less likely to say they have political efficacy.

Younger people are more likely

to claim political efficacy, as are the politically interested and the economically satisfied.
Those who have completed secondary education are also more likely to claim political
efficacy, except in the eastern German model for 1992. Among eastern Germans, males
are also more likely to say they have political efficacy.
Personal efficacy, a similar concept, is the feeling that one has control over one's
life. This form of efficacy is also not a concept that is normally associated with church
attenders. In fact, the priestly tradition of the church teaches church members to be
obedient to those in authority and to defer personal will to the will of God. The prophetic
tradition, in contrast, calls church members to stand up and speak out against injustice. It
exhorts church members to action, to do something to change their lives, to attain
personal efficacy. But the priestly tradition if the church is the prevalent tradition.
Church members for the most part tend to be somewhat conservative. Church attenders
tend to be skeptical o f change and resistant to social change. The final two tables in this
analysis allow us to examine whether the prophetic call to social change was strong
enough in Eastern Europe to cause church attenders there to have a more efficacious
attitude toward social change.
In Table 5.21 the dependent variable is respondents' attitudes toward a statement
that people can do little to change their lives. Agreement with this statement equates
roughly to an admission of lack o f personal efficacy. As can be seen from the table,
church attenders in all four countries tend to agree that people can do little to change their
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Table 5.21 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That People
Can Do Little to Change Their Lives on Selected Independent Variables

Age Category(Older)
A ttend C hurch
Secondary Education Complet
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed

W estern
G erm any
.16 **
09 **

Eastern
Germany
.2 1 **

-.13 **
-.05 +

-.06 *
-.05
.08 **

.01

.08 *
.05
-

.11 **

- .0 2

08 **

Hungary
.04

.12 **
- .1 0
.0 0

n/a
-.03

-

-

-

-

-

-

.03

-.07 *

-

-.05 +
-.08 *
-

.0 2

-

-

-

-.13 **
-.15 **
- .1 0 **

-.09 *
-.06 +
-

-

.0 2

.13 **

-.03
-.06 +
.03
.09 *
-

.1 0

-

.05

*

Poland
.07 *

**

.07
.08
.1 0
.09
Adjusted R2
924
954
1334
1150
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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lives. From these models we would have to argue that the effect o f church activism in
the democratic transition has not been enough to cause church members in these post
transition societies to achieve personal efficacy. Older people are also less efficacious, as
are females (in eastern Germany and Hungary). Those who have completed secondary
education are more efficacious, as are white collar employees (except in Poland, where
white collar workers claim less efficacy).
Finally, one more variable addresses the concept of personal efficacy. This is a
factor score, created from factor analysis of three questions which ask people for their
outlook on life, each ranked on a ten-point scale(see Chapter Three). In general, higher
values indicate a more favorable attitude toward change in one's life. We see from Table
5.22 that western German church attenders have a more negative attitude toward change,
as we would expect from the priestly tradition. As stated above, church members tend to
be somewhat conservative and resistant to social change. The models show that older
persons and females are also resistant to change, as we would also expect. These two
groups are also typically seen as somewhat conservative and resistant to social change.
And those who say they are interested in politics, as well as the more educated and
economically satisfied (except in Hungary) exhibit a favorable attitude toward change,
also as expected. The politically engaged, the more educated and the financially stable
are all likely to have a more favorable attitude toward change in their lives.
What is unexpected in these models is the lack o f association between church
attendance and attitude toward change in the post-transition societies. We expect to see a
negative relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change, as described
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Table 5.22 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Favorable
Attitude Toward Change on Selected Independent Variables

1
o{Si
*

Age Category(Older)
Attend C hurch
Secondary Education Complete
Higher Income
Left-Right Placement (Right)
Married or Living as Married
Female
Larger Community Size
Union Member
Left Radical Vote Intention
Center-Left Vote Intention
Center-Right Vote Intention
Right Radical Vote Intention
Unemployed
White Collar Occupation
Blue Collar Occupation
Self Employed
National Pride
Economically Satisfied
Interest in Politics

W estern
Germany
-.27 *
-.09 *
.06 *
-.07 *
-.03
-

-.04
-.07 *
-.03
.05 *
-.06 *
.1 2 *
.1 2 *

Eastern
G erm any
-.16 *
-.04
.1 0 *
.03
-.05 +
.0 2

H ungary
-.17 *+
.00
.06
- .0 2

- .1 2

- .1 1

-

-

- .0 2

.1 0

.0 0

.0 1

.0 1

.08 *
.07 *
.15 *

**
**
*

.03
-.08 *
.03
- .0 2

.06
.07 +

.09
.11
Adjusted R2
.2 0
1
2
2
0
707
1839
N
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS(1990)

above and as noted in the case o f western German church attenders. But there is no
relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change for either o f the post
transition societies here. It is not possible to say that the influence o f the prophetic
tradition has caused attitudes o f personal efficacy to change among church members in
these societies. But the lack o f relationship provokes speculation that something different
has occurred in these two societies to dilute the expected negative relationship between
church attendance and attitude toward change.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION
Discussions o f political values often ignore the importance o f church affiliation in
explaining democratic attitudes. This research shows that there is an important
relationship between church attendance and democratic values, one which should not be
ignored or minimized. A close reading of the tables from the previous chapter provides
evidence that church attendance does affect democratic values, both in the established
democracy o f western Germany and in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. In the
first two chapters I explained why this relationship should exist. In brief, many o f the
values that churches teach and promote are also values that support and promote
democratic society, so it is to be expected that church attenders would support democratic
values. Such values resonate with the ideals that they hear from their religious leaders.
And democratic society is more favorable to the institution of the church. Democracy is
agnostic, but the Soviet regime was consciously atheistic. So the church gets a better deal
in a democracy. But there is more to church support of democratic values than
institutional self-interest and convenience.
As I discussed in Chapter One, the relationship is more complex than this. It is
true that many o f the values taught by the church are democratic values. This is one way
in which the church affects political culture. As an institution of civil society, the church
interacts with the state to affect the political culture. And I have shown in Chapter Two
that the church was virtually the only institution o f civil society allowed some measure of
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autonomous existence by the communist regimes in East Germany and Poland.
Therefore, the church contributed substantially to the democratic transitions in those two
countries.
But the situation in Hungary was somewhat different. In Hungary repression of
the churches was less severe, and the churches selected a different strategy in their
relationship to the state. From early on, the church in Hungary identified strongly with
the state and chose to work within the existing power structure rather than in opposition
to it. This course o f action, while it may have preserved more political latitude for the
church in Hungary, nevertheless necessarily stigmatized the church by its identification
with the regime. As Tocqueville said, “religion cannot share the material strength of the
rulers without being burdened with some of the animosity roused against them” (p. 297).
Because the church accommodated to communism, church members lost touch with the
Tocquevillian idea o f getting along with each other. Therefore, the church in Hungary
was less active in the democratic transition than it was in either Poland or East Germany
and consequently had less of an impact on the political values o f its church members. So
the relationship between the church and the state becomes an important contextual
variable which interacts with church support for democratic values on both the
institutional as well as the individual level.
I have demonstrated that the church does influence the political culture, and not
only as an institution but also through the actions o f individual church members. Chapter
Four looks at what remains o f the churches in these post-transition societies. By
examining patterns o f church membership and church attendance in these post-transition
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societies we begin to see how the state vs. civil society context affected individual church
members in each of these countries.
The effect o f official state repression is seen most strongly in East Germany,
where the churches have suffered dramatic losses in affiliates since the end o f World War
II. And examination o f church membership by age groups shows that these losses are
consistent across all age groups —it is not just the young who have left the church. State
repression had the weakest effect on the church in Poland, where Roman Catholicism is
deeply intertwined with Polish nationalism. To be identified as a practicing Catholic in
Poland meant simultaneously that one was a member o f the Polish nation and in
opposition to the foreign-imposed power o f the state. In Hungary, state repression had
practically no effect on the oldest two age groups —those who were already socialized
before the imposition o f communism. But in the younger age groups church membership
tapers off substantially, with younger groups reporting significantly lower levels of
membership, as they were increasingly assimilated into Soviet-controlled society.
This differential age effect on church membership makes sense in light of the
different configurations o f state vs. civil society in these three countries. In both East
Germany and Poland the church was severely repressed -- church leaders were killed or
threatened, most church-sponsored institutions were either transferred to state control or
forced to close. People in both countries felt intense pressure to reject their religious
faith. The people in East Germany tended to comply with the state and select the more
politically expedient path of disaffiliation. But the people of Poland for the most part
resisted this repression and continued to adhere to their religious faith, which was so
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strongly bound up with their sense of national identity. For Poles, to disaffiliate from
their religious faith meant to give up their Polish identity, and most Poles resisted this
pressure.
In Hungary we see a different configuration between church and state. Churches
were also repressed in Hungary; church leaders and church property there were also
sacrificed. But the church in Hungary had always been closely aligned with the state, and
church leaders quickly saw that they would have better prospects for survival if they
cooperated with the state and participated in the reorganization o f Hungarian society into
the socialist model. Therefore, the reorganization of the Hungarian state resulted in far
less disruption for Hungarian church members than it did for either Poles or East
Germans. Older Hungarians continued to practice their faith relatively unhindered, just
as they had before the time o f Soviet occupation. Younger Hungarians were increasingly
socialized into the model o f Soviet citizenry, which rejected religious faith and religious
instruction. Increasingly, younger people either disaffiliated from the religious faith of
their parents or chose not to affiliate at all. This explains why Hungarian church
membership remains high among the oldest age groups, then drops consistently by nearly
20

percentage points between each of the younger four age categories.
Church attendance patterns have similar characteristics as church membership

patterns. And regressions of church attendance on a variety o f religious beliefs and moral
issues show that church attenders in the East are substantially like their counterpart in
western Germany in their religious orientation toward these issues. Church attenders in
post-transition societies support the same moral values as western German church

attenders, with two telling exceptions. In Table 4.3, a question about whether it is better
to follow one's conscience or obey, western German church attenders are more likely to
agree that it is better to obey. But eastern German and Hungarian church attenders are no
more likely than non-attenders to hold this opinion. The priestly tradition of the church
strongly advocates obedience to authority, and this position is reflected in the attitude of
western German church attenders. The fact that it is not present in the post-transition
societies suggests a change in attitude from what we would expect for church attenders.
The other exception occurs in Tables 4.7-4.8, questions referring to traditional family
arrangements. Here we note that Hungarian church attenders are no more likely than
non-attenders to favor traditional family arrangements. Since family arrangements are
also related to economic conditions, this anomaly may be reflecting a different attitude
toward women in the work force in Hungary, rather than any particular change in moral
attitude by Hungarian church attenders.
Chapter Five, then, examines thoroughly how individual church attenders feel
about democratic values in these post-totalitarian societies. Here we can see more clearly
the subtle way that the priestly and the prophetic traditions within the church interact to
affect support for democracy. In the discussion from Chapter One we saw how these two
countervailing traditions have always existed within the church. The priestly tradition
tends to prevail at most times, advocating the need for obedience to authority in order to
ensure public order. As long as the earthly authority allows the church some latitude to
operate, the priestly tradition acknowledges and legitimates the power o f that earthly
authority. But the prophetic tradition can emerge as a voice from within the church
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during times o f stress and rapid change. The prophetic tradition advocates individual
opposition to oppression as a response to social injustice. Certain democratic values are
more expressive of the priestly tradition, others reflect the values o f the prophetic
tradition, and some democratic values are not advocated by either tradition. We see
evidence o f these two traditions by examining the tables in Chapter Five.
These tables are organized according to the democratic values which are shared
by each o f the traditions within the church. First, the democratic values which resonate
with the priestly tradition are discussed. Confidence in state institutions and trust in
government (Tables 5.1-5.3) are democratic values which are strongly supported by
church attenders in all o f the countries. These values reflect the priestly tradition's
admonition to obey and trust in the earthly authorities whose legitimate power derives
from God. In other words, authority exists on Earth because God knows we need it, as a
result o f our condition o f original sin.
Next, there are democratic values which do not reflect clearly either the priestly or
the prophetic tradition o f the church. These are either democratic values which address
the gray area between respect for individual rights and consideration o f the common
good, or else they are democratic values which have more to do with economics than with
politics. One aspect o f democratic values which falls into this "gray area" between
individual rights and the good o f the community is the whole concept o f political
freedoms and political rights. Tables 5.5-5.8 illustrate my point here. Depending on
question wording, church attenders try to balance the democratic value of individual
liberty (which can, under times of severe repression, be consistent with the prophetic
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tradition o f the church) with the priestly tradition's admonition to value order for the good
o f the community.
For example, Table 5.5 reflects strong church support for a preference for freedom
and law over a higher standard ofliving. But in this question no one is being asked to
favor the individual over the community. The next three tables (Tables 5.6-5.8 ), having
to do with the right to freedom o f speech, are either not supported by church attenders or
in several cases church attenders reject these democratic values. The right o f an
individual to the free expression o f his or her beliefs is interpreted generally as being
threatening to public order.
The tables addressing public protest (Tables 5.9-5.11) illustrate this same point
about individual rights vs. order, but they also more clearly point out the tension between
the priestly and the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies. Table 5.9 shows
that church attenders are no more likely to engage in public protest than non-attenders.
But Tables 5.10 and 5.11, where individuals are asked about their tolerance for protest
(and against government repression o f protest) show that church attenders in western
Germany, where there has been no severe government repression, strongly oppose public
protest and approve o f government repression o f protest. This is consistent with what one
would expect o f church members from the priestly tradition. But in the post-transition
societies o f eastern Germany and Hungary, where churches played a part in the
democratic transitions, one does not see this expected relationship. Church members in
those societies witnessed the effectiveness o f the prophetic tradition of the church when
church leaders and church members protested against unjust societies and successfully
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contributed to change in those societies. This has had a profound and visible (but
probably short-lived) effect on the strength o f the priestly tradition in their world view.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate the point that certain democratic values which have
to do primarily with economic issues are not interpreted by church attenders as having
anything much to do with their moral values. I expected that church attenders would tend
to uphold communitarian values and would therefore favor some government
redistribution o f wealth. There is some evidence of this hypothesized relationship for
western Germany and Poland in these tables, but the relationship is not strong. There is
no evidence o f such a relationship for either eastern Germany or Hungary. In fact,
eastern German church attenders immediately after the transition tended to agree that it is
not the responsibility of government to provide jobs. But there is no evidence o f this
relationship in the 1991 model. Church attenders in eastern Germany and Hungary
apparently interpret these questions only on the level o f economic interest, and do not see
a relationship between the responsibilities o f government and the moral values espoused
by the church.
Finally, the last nine tables (5.14-5.22) provide evidence of what I expect to be a
rather ephemeral effect of the prophetic tradition in post-transition Eastern Europe. These
tables have to do with democratic values which reflect the prophetic tradition. Such
democratic values as interpersonal trust, political efficacy, optimism, and openness to
change are values which echo the prophetic tradition, calling for individuals to stand up
and speak out to bring about change in an oppressive situation. As Brueggemann (1978,
p. 13) describes the prophetic voice: "The task o f prophetic ministry is to nurture,
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nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and
perception o f the dominant culture around us." These tables illustrate how church
members in these oppressed societies were influenced, at least for a brief time, by this
prophetic voice coming from their midst.
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 describe determinants of trust. Although the levels of
explained variance are not high, church attenders do tend to trust family members and
other people in general. Interpersonal trust was generally low in communist societies
because people were encouraged to report non-sympathizers to the authorities, but church
attenders show some evidence o f rejecting this aspect of the dominant culture and instead
declare their trust for family members and fellow citizens. These tables show evidence o f
the effect o f the prophetic tradition in these oppressed societies in changing the attitudes
o f church attenders away from the attitudes of the dominant culture.
Levels o f optimism in these post-transition societies are another sign o f the
prophetic tradition at work. Church attenders in eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland
are more likely than non-attenders to describe their life as happy (Table 5.16). This
relationship does not hold for western Germany; western German church attenders are no
more likely than non-attenders to describe their lives as happy. I argue that this is
because church attenders in these post-transition societies feel that they have something
to celebrate. Life is qualitatively better for them now that they have religious liberty and
freedom to associate with one another. However, this euphoric feeling is likely to fade
with time, as they become adjusted to the realities of their new way o f life.

185
Evidence that the effect o f the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies
is probably transitory can also be seen from the models in the next three tables (5.175.19). These tables show how this optimism among church attenders, while still strong in
1991, already shows signs o f decline by 1992. As the realities o f reunification sink in
among both eastern and western German church attenders their initial euphoria recedes.
In both tables asking for evaluation relative to the past (5.18 and 5.19) eastern German
church attenders are much more likely than non-attenders to express optimism; there is no
such relationship among western German church attenders. This is evidence of the effect
of the prophetic tradition on the optimistic attitude o f eastern German church attenders.
But already in the 1992 models this relationship shows signs of weakening, and I suspect
that it will, in time, disappear entirely as the priestly tradition once again establishes itself
in the attitudes o f eastern German church attenders and they become more like their
western counterparts.
Finally, the tables that explain efficacy and attitude toward change also show the
prophetic tradition at work. Table 5.20, a factor o f political efficacy, shows the expected
negative relationship between church attendance and political efficacy for western
Germany. But this relationship does not exist for eastern Germany. Church attendance in
eastern Germany is not related to political efficacy. Perhaps eastern German church
attenders feel a little more efficacious because they have recently witnessed the power of
political action to change the system. However, this attitude is likely to be short-lived.
Table 5.21 shows that post-transition church attenders have little sense of personal
efficacy. Like their western counterparts, church attenders in the post-transition societies
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o f Eastern Europe agree that people can do little to change their lives. But Table 5.22
shows that, for right now, eastern German and Hungarian church attenders do not have
the same negative attitude toward change as do western German church attenders. For
the period immediately after the transition there remains evidence of optimism and
efficacy, as church members identify with those who spoke up and brought about political
change in their country.
CONCLUSIONS
So what does this examination of the political and moral values of church
attenders in post-transition societies lead us to expect? This research shows that churches
and church members in the post-transition societies o f Eastern Europe are remarkably
similar to the West, despite half a century of repression and isolation. The resilience of
the institution in these societies is reflected in the similarity of attitude between East and
West.
Once again I return to the role of the church in civil society. As Tocqueville
pointed out so long ago in Democracy in America, there is a definite connection between
the moral values o f a society and its political practices. Democracy requires a
functioning civil society to provide a medium for the formation of democratic consensus.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a German Lutheran pastor, writing in 1940 about
experiences o f oppression during his recent past, explained how he saw the church
recovering democratic values out o f totalitarianism:
...everything connected with Christianity was severely repressed. Against
the worship o f irrationality, blood, and the bestial instinct in man, it was
necessary to counterpose reason, against arbitrary law -- the written law,
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against barbarism —culture and humanism, against coercion —freedom,
tolerance and the rights of man, against the politicization o f art and science
—the autonomy o f these different spheres of life. And so it happened that
among the defenders o f these maligned values as well as among
Christians, there grew a sense o f a certain kind of alliance. It turned out
that all o f these values —reason, scholarship, humanism, tolerance,
autonomy —which had until recently served as battle cries in the struggle
against Christianity and the Church, were in fact extremely close to the
Church. This was a time of the most unprecedented attacks on
Christianity, a time when its most fundamental truths were harshly
denounced in the most uncompromising manner, contrary to all norms of
reason, culture, humanism, and tolerance. And the more Christianity was
persecuted and oppressed, the stronger became its alliance with these
values, which unexpectedly widened Christianity’s horizons (as cited in
Michnik 1993, p. 122).
The churches in the totalitarian societies o f Central and Eastern Europe
experienced much the same sort o f conditions as Bonhoeffer describes. And out of these
experiences the churches, especially the churches of Poland and eastern Germany, have
made a heart-felt conversion to democracy. They have learned democracy, just as
Tocqueville reported o f the civil institutions of American democracy, through the process
o f recreating civil society in their societies. Through the actions of church members and
others committed to promoting a democratic transition who came together within the
protective spaces provided by the churches themselves, they began a process of
democratic discourse which led, inevitably, to democratic transitions.
Adam Michnik, the Polish leftist intellectual, recognized the importance o f civil
society to a democratic transformation. First, he said, transformation can only come
through reform from below —that is, through concerted action on the part o f individuals
without political power to associate and negotiate a democratic transformation. Second,
the only way those seeking such a transformation could succeed was to recognize the
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commonality o f their democratic commitments and use that as a bridge to overcome
political, cultural, and religious differences. Michnik (and Vaclav Havel, the Czech
intellectual, as well) argued that to achieve a democratic transformation of totalitarian
society one must create a civil society “as i f ’:
People should act as if they lived in a free society, and in the process they
would constitute moments and places for a free existence. They should
speak primarily to one another, not to their political overlords, expressing
their differences but with mutual respect. In this way, at least some
aspects of an independent social existence would be created (Goldfarb
1992, p. 15).
This experience of coming together, usually within the protective confines o f the church,
in order to recreate civil society caused church members to become the carriers of
democratic values within these societies. Out of this process of recreating civil society
church members in these post-totalitarian societies have learned how to be democratic
citizens.
And as Putnam (1993) suggests in his recent book, the shape of this civil society
is important to the success of a democratic outcome. Putnam argues that even within a
democratic society, when civil society is organized along a vertical dimension, when
patronage and favors determine allegiance, and interpersonal relationships are marked by
distrust, exploitation and powerlessness, democratic outcomes are less likely to occur.
But when civil society is organized along a horizontal dimension, with dense networks of
local associations and active engagement in community affairs marked by trust and
efficacy, democratic outcomes are more likely to occur.

I have shown in this research how civil society in these post-transition societies of
Eastern Europe has been shaped to some extent by the churches operating to preserve
and recreate civil society within these formerly totalitarian societies. I extend Putnam's
work on the importance o f the horizontal links o f civil society for democratic outcomes
by exploring how the churches contributed to support for democracy in these totalitarian
societies. I showed in Chapter Two how churches in the vertically organized, totalitarian
societies o f Eastern Europe preserved democratic values and promoted horizontal
linkages in society, especially in places such as Eastern Germany and Poland, where all
associations o f civil society were severely repressed. The discussion of church support
for democratic values in Chapter Five showed how church attenders continue to support
democratic values in these post-transition societies o f Eastern Europe. I expect that the
churches o f these post-transition societies will continue to work toward strengthening and
broadening the scope of civil society and contributing to the network of horizontal
linkages between people that are so important to the success of democracy. Evidence of
such activity is already being seen in Poland, where new democrats have strongly
opposed efforts by entrenched conservatives to reimpose measures such as a ban on
legalized abortion in the country. And in eastern Germany the churches are continuing to
work with environmental groups and others to improve the quality of life for eastern
German citizens. All o f these efforts will help to broaden and enrich the horizontal
linkages within civil society which were so carefully preserved by the churches during
the years o f totalitarianism.
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As the new democracies consolidate and routinize in eastern Europe, it will be
interesting to see how church/state relationships evolve. Further research should explore
what happens as the prophetic tradition recedes in influence and the priestly tradition
once again attains precedence in these churches. I expect that church attenders in these
post-transition societies will become increasingly like their democratic counterparts in
western Germany as time goes on. That is, I expect that church members will continue to
express strong support for democratic values, but primarily those democratic values
which reflect the priestly tradition. The church is once again in a favorable situation in
civil society within the newly emergent democracies. I expect that the expressions of
optimism, efficacy, and trust that I saw among church attenders in the data from 1991
will recede with time.
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